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# Governance of Local Development Projects in Bangladesh: A Study on Two Upazilas

Karim, Abdul

University of Rajshahi

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**Governance of Local Development Projects in Bangladesh:  
A Study on Two Upazilas**

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**February, 2016**

## **CERTIFICATE**

I have the pleasure to certify that the dissertation entitled **Governance of Local Development Projects in Bangladesh: A Study on Two Upazilas** is an original work of Abdul Karim. So far as I know, no other person was associated in any stage of completion of this dissertation.

I went through the draft and the final version of this dissertation very carefully and found it satisfactory for submission to the Institute of Bangladesh Studies (IBS), Rajshahi University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration.

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## **DECLARATION**

I do hereby declare that the dissertation entitled **Governance of Local Development Projects in Bangladesh: A Study on Two Upazilas**, submitted to the Institute of Bangladesh Studies (IBS), Rajshahi University, Bangladesh for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration, is completely a new and original research work of mine. No part of this thesis, in any form, has been submitted to any University or Institute for any Degree or Diploma.

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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

This study has been undertaken for partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. Degree in Public Administration. I am grateful to the Institute of Bangladesh Studies, Rajshahi University, Bangladesh for providing me opportunity to conduct the research. I acknowledge the kindness of Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD) and colleagues who provide support and encouragement in various ways, especially the Director General, BARD.

I express sincere gratitude to my respected supervisor, Dr. M. Zainul Abedin, Professor, Institute of Bangladesh Studies (IBS), University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh for his constant supervision and guidance for the completion of the dissertation. In spite of his busy schedule, he gave enough time to read the manuscript with patience. I must admit that without his active support and guidance, it would be quite difficult for me to bring it in this form.

I also express my sincere gratitude to Professor Dr. Swarochish Sarker, Director of Institute of Bangladesh Studies (IBS); Dr. Md. Mostafa Kamal, Associate Professor and Dr. Zakir Hossain, Professors, Dr. Md. Kamruzzaman, Associate Professor and Dr. Md. Najimul Hoque, Associate Professors of IBS for their scholarly comments and valuable suggestions they offered in different stages of this research work. In addition, I owe my sincere thanks to all the officers and staff of IBS, Rajshahi University and all respondents who provided information for completion of the study.

**Abdul Karim**

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## **List of Abbreviations and Local Terms**

ADP	:	Annual Development Programme
AUDP	:	Annual Upazila Development Programme
BARD	:	Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development
B.C.	:	Before Christ
BDO	:	Basic Democracies Order
CO	:	Circle Officer
CARR	:	Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform
DPHE	:	Department of Public Health Engineering
FGDs	:	Focus Group Discussions
GO	:	Government Organization
IRR	:	Internal Rate of Return
km	:	Kilometer
LGED	:	Local Government Engineering Department
LG	:	Local Government
LGRD	:	Local Government and Rural Development
MP	:	Member of Parliament
NGO	:	Non-Government Organization
PC	:	Project Committee
PIC	:	Project Implementation Committee
PIO	:	Project Implementation Officer
RWP	:	Rural Works Programme
SAE	:	Sub-Assistant Engineer
SDO	:	Sub-Division Officer
SSEP	:	Secondary Science Education Sector Project
Tk.	:	Taka
TDCC	:	Thana Development and Coordination Committee
UK	:	The United Kingdom

UAE	:	Upazila Assistant Engineer
UHFWO	:	Upazila Health and Family Welfare Officer
ULO	:	Upazila Livestock Officer
UNO	:	Upazila Nirbari Officer (Chief Executive of Upazila)
UPHO	:	Upazila Public Health Officer
UEO	:	Upazila Education Officer
UP	:	Union Parishad
UPC	:	Union Parishad Chairman
UZC	:	Upazila Parishad Chairman
UZP	:	Upazila Parishad
WM	:	Ward Member

### **Local Terms**

<i>Bazar</i>	:	Market
<i>Bari</i>	:	Locally know as a bunch of Households
<i>Ghatla</i>	:	Concrete stairs at bank of river
<i>Haat</i>	:	Village Periodic Market
<i>Jalmahals</i>	:	Water estate owned by government
<i>Parishad</i>	:	Council
<i>Paurashava</i>	:	Municipality
<i>Pucca</i>	:	Made of concrete
<i>Shava</i>	:	Meeting
<i>Thana</i>	:	Literally police station
<i>Union</i>	:	A rural area consisting of some villages
<i>Upazila</i>	:	Sub-district
<i>Zila</i>	:	District

## **ABSTRACT**

Good quality of governance in project management is one of the preconditions for proper utilization of project resources as well as for economic development of any country. In the context of Bangladesh, poor governance in every stages of project cycle results in poor project performance. In Bangladesh, available literatures indicate that very few researches have been made to study local development projects undertaken by the Upazila Parishads under the Annual Development Programme (ADP). Most of the previous studies focused on the role of the Upazila Parishads in the socio-economic-politico perspective. But governance perspectives especially in the management of local development projects have not been adequately studied at the Upazila level.

The main focus of this study is to understand existing governance in the development projects being implemented under the central government's grant by the Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh. Specific objectives of the study include reviewing existing legal and institutional framework of development projects, analyzing and assessing quality of governance of development projects taken by the Upazila Parishad. The research questions were: whether the existing legal institutional framework of development projects at the Upazila level was suitable for ensuring effective governance; whether the key stakeholders were effectively involved in the different stages of project cycle; whether the resources of the development project were utilized properly; whether the existing practices adopted in project management were suitable for ensuring quality of governance; how far intended benefits achieved by the projects; and to what extent governance issues, such as participation, accountability, transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency are ensured in the local development projects. Looking into these research questions the thesis argues that development projects of Upazila Parishads are suffering from poor quality of governance due to poor governance environment in different stages of project cycle. The study was conducted through adopting a qualitative method. Two Upazilas were selected purposively based on socio-economic conditions. A sample survey was conducted among the villagers of the two Upazilas. Key informants, focus

group discussions and researcher's observations were extensively used to collect information and the analysis of the study.

Governance is a multidimensional concept and a multi-disciplinary crosscutting issue which has been perceived in different ways by scholars, practitioners and international organizations. Considering complexity of context and circumstances, to have a widely accepted definition of governance is very difficult. Here governance is understood as a structure, a process, a mechanism and a strategy which could be either good or bad. Generally good governance is perceived as important factor for accelerated socio-economic development that depend on proper practices and adoption of some indicators or principles that are commonly understood as participation, transparency, accountability, free of corruption, efficiency and effectiveness. Moreover, these indicators are directly or indirectly inter-related and inter-dependent. Project's success or failure is associated with these indicators as found in the document survey. In this regard, for ensuring 'value for money' by the development project, every stage of project management needs to adopt some governance values, principles, methods and strategies.

Governance issues in the existing legal framework were examined highlighting constitutional provisions on local government as well as guidelines and directives of development project management with regard to ADP-projects of the Upazila Parishad. The study suggests that local government is responsible for preparation and implementation of plans for public services and economic development according to the Constitution of Bangladesh. The Act, rules and regulations that guide operation and management of development projects of the Upazila Parishad were analyzed to understand strengths and weaknesses in the governance perspective. Review of legal institutional framework shows that key governance issues such as active citizen's participation, transparency, people's centric accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in the project management were poorly reflected. A number of conditionalities imposed by the central government in selecting development projects likely limit autonomy of Upazila, scope of community participation as well as accountability to community, resulting in less inclusive public policy at the local level. Role of different institutions



such as standing committees, elected representative and bureaucrats were found less effective for ensuring quality of governance in project management due to many reasons such as personal or narrow interest of policy makers, poor supervision and monitoring, lack of clear guidelines of transparency, accountability and so on. As a result, desired results of government investment have become diluted and weaknesses and limitations in the existing legal-institutional framework may make counter-productive results.

Analysis on ADP-projects of the two studied Upazila Parishads show that Upazila Prishad in Bangladesh has implemented on an average 54 to 60 projects every year under their ADP-allocation which were predominantly small-sized. This trend has been prevailing for a long time. Findings of the study show that in the last five years the ADP-projects under the Adarsha Sadar were distributed among the unions unevenly while in Homna, projects were distributed almost equally. Local leaders, especially UP Chairman who are majority members in the Upazila Parishad prefers equal distribution of grants as a traditional practice and it has been accepted as strategy of avoiding of conflicts and confrontation. Most of allocation was invested in physical infrastructure development, especially in transport and communication sub-sector. Projects related to fisheries and livestock development, small and cottage industries, intensive crops programme, seed supply, social forestation, fruits and vegetable production, the health and social welfare sector were less preferred.

Based on empirical evidences, it was found that local ADP-projects of the studied Upazila Parishads suffered from low quality of governance in different stages of project-cycle due to poor reflection of community priorities, poor active community participation, limited access to project information, weaknesses of central government's directives, weak accountability, transparency, monitoring and supervision, high corruption, unfair political interference. As a result, performance and outputs of development projects as intended was less fulfilled.

At the macro level, Bangladesh has been facing a serious governance crisis in political, administrative and economic spheres. Nature of governance problems is

complex and multidimensional that varies sector to sector or institution to institutions or local to national level. Some common problems of governance of Bangladesh are corruption, politicization, weaknesses of bureaucracy, lack of accountability and transparency, poor people's participation, too much centralization etc. As a result, performance in the government sectors has not been encouraging as expected. Many studies and reform commission have detected causes and factors of poor governance of Bangladesh and provided a number of recommendations and suggestions to overcome those problems. But very few measures have been implemented properly.

The study provides some recommendations to improve project governance of Upazila Parishad.

- Conditionalities imposed in the existing legal framework of ADP projects of Upazila Parishads under central government's grants needs to be overhauled in order to make it more suitable for ensuring quality of governance.
- Criteria of allocation of grant could be balanced area development, level of poverty and other socio-economic situation prevailing among unions of the respective Upazila.
- Participatory practice as adopted in Local Governance Support Project for the Union Parishad could be included in ADP-project management of Upazila Parishad. Participatory project selection process could be done through project-planning workshop at the beginning of a financial year at the Upazila level.
- Before approval of projects, the mandatory condition of taking advice from the local MP was found problematic for proper project-management of Upazila Parishad. Government may repeal this. MP's role is more effective in project monitoring and evaluation as found in practice in Adarsha Sadar Upazila which could be institutionalized by making law.
- Display of signboard containing various information of project at the project-site, display of project list in notice boards at Upazila and Union level need to be properly enforced. Official website of Upazila can contain information on ADP-projects of Upazila.

- Before approval of project in the Upazila Parishad's meeting, standing committees of the Upazila Parishad could be involved to review the projects.
- Regular visits by higher authorities as well as local MP could be effective means of ensuring accountability in ADP-project implementation.

Development projects under public money need improved practices of governance in order to ensure 'value for money'. Success or failure of development projects is dependent on a wide number of factors which might be different in project to project. The study argues that better performance of projects is highly related to better governance environment and poor governance environment reduces quality of project governance. In this regard, findings of the study confirm that the existing governance environment in different stages of project cycle at the Upazila level in Bangladesh is less suitable for ensuring good quality of project governance. The study could be useful source for the government to take some policy measures in order to improve project governance at the local level.

# **Chapter 1: Introduction**

## **1.1 Prelude: Background of the Study**

In Bangladesh, after its independence in 1971, all the successive governments constantly strived to improve socio-economic conditions of the people of this country. It is also a constitutional responsibility of the government to provide basic services and make desired welfare of the nation. In this regard, government has been taking huge number of development programmes and projects in various sectors at both local and national level. At the local level, local government in one way or other has been involved in the development process from the beginning which was observed in the colonial regime also.

Successful implementation of programmes and projects contribute significantly in the process of national growth and development. For this, a conducive environment is very essential in this regard which is dependent on a number of factors. It requires an efficient management of developmental interventions, especially for effective implementation of development projects. Now-a-days academicians, development planner and policy makers put much emphasis on the issue of governance for better development management as well as economic growth as it seems that effective governance is considered as a key condition for improving the lives of the poor and reducing poverty. Poor governance directly or indirectly results in poor outcome of development efforts and low return of project's intervention as well as value for money is

not ensured. In this regard, to assess how far key governance ingredients or elements (participation, accountability, transparency) affect proper implementation of development projects is very significant in order to understand efficiency of development management at the local level, even essential at national level. On the other hand, in the context of Bangladesh, performance of projects in governance perspective has not been adequately studied so far. Under this background, the intended study might fill up this gap and could be helpful for policy planners to take necessary policy initiatives.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

### *1.2.1 A Short Theoretical Framework*

One of the main responsibilities for any country is to improve socio-economic conditions of the people which needs to undertake a wide range of development activities. The Constitution of Bangladesh as mentioned in the Article 15 states that fundamental responsibility of the state is to provide basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter, education, medical care in order to attain planned economic growth; a constant increase of productive forces; and a steady improvement in the material and cultural standard of living of the people. In this regard, government undertakes a variety of programmes and projects both at local and national level in order to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities as well as to provide a wide range of services to its citizens. In addition, projects as development interventions are usually taken to achieve economic growth, social and human development, poverty reduction and to remove backwardness in the society, though expected benefits of the projects might vary from project to project.

In Bangladesh, government generally spends huge amount of public resources through large number of development projects both at national and local level under development budget known as Annual Development Programme (ADP). But in many cases these fail to generate desired benefits as expected. Hence, poor performances of the development projects pose the question how far government resources or tax payers' money are effectively and efficiently utilized. As it is argued that poor economic performance and limited progress on poverty reduction in many Asian countries are caused by problems of governance issues.<sup>1</sup>

Demands for better governance voiced by citizens as well as civil society organizations and academicians are significantly being considered by the least developed countries to survive in the competitive global perspective. It is argued that poor governance significantly influences poor development performances.<sup>2</sup> Hence, efficient use of public resources as well as 'value for money' of public expenditure has been receiving a greater attention in a responsive governance system. In this regard, element of effective governance such as participation, accountability, transparency, equity, no corruption, efficiency and effectiveness affect significantly the quality of management of public resources that being flown through development projects.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, it is assumed that better governance in all stages of the project-cycle can produce effective results from the projects.

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<sup>1</sup> Hossain Zillur Rahman and Mark Robinson, *Governance and State Effectiveness in Asia*, Policy Paper (Dhaka: Power and Participation Research Centre, 2006), p.13.

<sup>2</sup> The World Bank, *Governance and Development* (Washington, DC: The world Bank, 1992), p.10.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12-45.

The Upazila Parishad (UZP), the middle tier of local government system in the rural areas of Bangladesh, was introduced in the 1980s as a focal point of all local development efforts. The new framework involved a multi-sectoral approach to local development in order to realize more need-based developments efforts, bottom-up development, more local resource utilization, participatory development and decentralized governance.<sup>4</sup> Although its continuation with democratic characters hampered in different regimes, a huge amount of public resources are still being channelled through this structure.

In this regard, findings of a study reveal that Upazila Parishads did not effectively contribute to local development through its development projects due to weak project formulation and weak inspection of the project site.<sup>5</sup> Shawkat Ali (1986)<sup>6</sup> found that abuse of authority by the Chairman of Upazila Parishad in the selection and approval process of projects resulted in misuse of development funds. Selection, approval and implementation of the project suffered from deviations between the legal provisions and the actual practices. The process of project management was less efficient as project-fund was distributed on the basis less efficient criteria. Malpractices in project implementation caused low quality of project output.<sup>7</sup> Another study found that alliances between the Upazila Parishad chairman and certain Union Parishad chairmen developed on the basis

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<sup>4</sup> N. Ahmed, "Government Politics and Village Reform in Bangladesh: a note on alternative approaches", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 1989, Vol.55, pp.4.

Yusuf Hyder, *Development The Upazila Way* (Dhaka: Dhaka Prokashan, 1986), pp. 43-57.

<sup>5</sup> Yusuf Hyder, *Development The Upazila Way* (Dhaka: Dhaka Prokashan, 1986).

<sup>6</sup> A M M Shawkat Ali, *Politics, Development and Upazila* (Dhaka: National of Local Government, 1986).

<sup>7</sup> Makhluqur Rahman, "People's Participation in Development Administration: An Study of Four Thanas in the District of Khulna and Jessore", Unpublished PhD Thesis (Rajshahi: IBS, 1995).

of political background and mutual support hampered efficient use of development fund by projects.<sup>8</sup>

Some studies argued that Upazila Parishad was used as instrument of transition from a military rule to a civilian rule and provided a strong power base for military regime.<sup>9</sup> Grant for development activities was extensively used in infrastructure related projects for partly political reasons as it assumes that constructions projects bear visible impacts for future political career or wining in the next election as perceived by local leaders.<sup>10</sup> One study explored participation issue in the decision-making process of project selection and implementation which reveals that rural people especially the poor were treated objects of decisions made by the elites and they did little access to articulate their views.<sup>11</sup> Another study expressed that some touts and intermediaries have enjoyed more access to projects and grasped befits of project while the participation of the poor or the marginalized section has not increased.<sup>12</sup> Nizam Ahmed (2009)<sup>13</sup> in this regard,

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<sup>8</sup> Muhammad Mustafa Alam, Ahmed Shafiqul Huque and Kirsten Westergaard, *Development through Decentralization in Bangladesh – Evidence and Perspective* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1994).

<sup>9</sup> A M M Shawkat Ali, *Politics, Development and Upazila* (Dhaka: National of Local Government, 1986); Tofail Ahemd, *Decentralization and The Local State- Political Economy of Local Government in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Agamee Prakashani, 2012).

<sup>10</sup> Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, “Local Resource Mobilization In Perspective: A Background Study”, Haahon Lein, “Infrastructural Development and Local Resource Mobilization in Faridpur”, in Harry W. Blair (ed.) *can rural development be financed from below* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1989); Abdul Hye Mondal and M. Asaduzzaman, *Maintenance of Rural Infrastructure at the Local Level: Experiences with the Defunct Upazila System in Bangladesh*, Research Report No. 194 (Dhaka: BIDS, 1993); M. Noore Alam Siddiquee, “Local Govenance and Agricultural Development in Bangladesh: The Experience of Upazila System”, *The Journal of Rural Development*, Vol. 23. No. 1. January 1993.

<sup>11</sup> Noore Alam Siddiquee, *Decentralisation and Development – Theory and Practice in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: The University of Dhaka, 1997)

<sup>12</sup> Z.A. Nazneen, “Popular Participation in Local Administration: A Case Study of Bangladesh”, (Dhaka: Gyan Bitarani, 2004) cited in Sheik Noor Mohammad, “People’s Participation in Development Projects at Grassroot level: A Case of Alampur and Jagannathpur Union Parishad”, Masters Thesis (Dhaka: North South University, 2010), p.5.

<sup>13</sup> Nizam Ahmed, *Bureaucracy and Local Politics in Bangladesh- A Study in Roles and Relationships* (Dhaka: A H Development Publishing House, 2009)



pointed out a ‘politico-bureaucrat relationships’ in the decision-making process aiming at serving mutual benefits and self-interest instead of greater interest of the community.<sup>14</sup> But the issue of governance in development management especially in project management at the local level in Bangladesh has not been adequately studied so far.

### *1.2.2 Emergence of Upazila and Its Necessity for Local Development*

Local government in Bangladesh has had a long historical legacy. During the ancient Bengal as part of ancient India, local government was the only formal authority where no central authority existed. From approximately 1200 B.C. the villages were governed by a village self-government as Sir Charles Metcalf called them ‘village republic’ which prevailed dynasty after dynasty.<sup>15</sup> The village self-government implemented public works and established different institutions from its own income as well as contributions of community compulsory labour. ‘A gracious community spirit’ was main feature of the ancient Bengal. Later on (approximately 600 B.C.), historian traced out Panchayet system (popularly known as Village Panchayets), acted as local authority which was controlled by local community leaders belonged to upper class of the society. Village Panchayets fulfilled community demands through digging wells, building roads, temples or irrigation systems and resolved local disputes.

During the Gupta rule (200 – 500 B.C), the ancient Bengal was divided into Bhukti, Vishay, Mandal, Beethi and Gram. The Bhuktis and Vishays which were similar

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<sup>14</sup> Nizam Ahmed, *Bureaucracy and Local Politics in Bangladesh- A Study in Roles and Relationships* (Dhaka: A H Development Publishing House, 2009).

<sup>15</sup> Kamal Siddiqui (ed.), *Local Government In Bangladesh – Revised Third Edition* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2005), p.29.

to the divisions and districts existing at now. At each level, there was an administrative council appointed by the king or his representatives. The functions of the local administrative councils were to collect revenue from land, to maintain law and order, to regulate trade and commerce. After the Gupta regime, the Palas ruled Bengal for nearly four centuries. They continued previous system without significant changes in the character of local administration. Historical facts show that there was local self-government system existing above the village level.<sup>16</sup>

In the Medieval Bengal, the Muslim rulers continued the Panchayet system which was mainly responsible for maintaining law and order and revenue collection, although it had some development roles, such as development of education, religious practices and moral education. During the medieval period, particularly under the Mughals, urban local government system was introduced. An office of Kotwal was posted as a part of Mughal municipal administration who was responsible to look after every sphere of city life. He was assisted by a Mir Mohalla who was responsible for many local affairs such as maintaining register for horses and roads, cemeteries, slaughterhouses, sweeper colonies, controlling of markets and supervising local prices.

After the fall of Mughal regime, the Bengal was ruled by the British regime for more nearly hundred years (1757 – 1947), but they did not adopt the indigenous system of local government. They introduced a new Zamindari system in 1793 which destroyed traditional local self-governing institutions of rural Bengal.<sup>17</sup> However, afterwards the

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p.35

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

British rulers revived the traditional Panchayet system and legally formalized it through passing a law, the Village Chaukhidari Act, 1870. A Panchayet consisting five-members appointed by the District Magistrate was mainly responsible for maintaining law and order.

In 1885, under the Bengal Local Self-Government Act, 1885 three local government units were introduced at three level of rural Bengla which were a District Board at district level, a Local Board at sub-district level and a Union Committee for a group of villages. The District Board was the focal point of local government structure which was responsible for looking after of various matters of public interest and utility, such as schools, roads and communication, vaccination, hospitals, famine relief, census, holding of fairs and exhibitions, construction and maintenance of railways, tramways and waterways, repair and construction of public buildings, etc. The Local Board acted as agent of the District Board which could exercise only those powers delegated to it by the District Board. It acted as a supervising body of Union Committee. It was not a truly local government system.

The District Board at the district level and the Union Board at the Union level continued till 1959 during the Pakistani regime (1947 – 1970). Later on, a four-tier representative local government system was introduced in 1959, which were named as Union Councils, Thana Councils, District Councils and Divisional Councils under the Basic Democracies Order (BDO), 1959. The Union Councils were constituted through directly elected members and the Chairman of the Union Council was indirectly elected by the members of the Council.

Thana Council, the second tier between the Union Council and District Council, was established at every thana,<sup>18</sup> popularly known as police station. It consisted of several Union Councils and it had both representative members and official members. The representative members include Chairmen of the Union Councils and Town Committees existed within the Thana area and official members were the concerned SDOs<sup>19</sup>, Circle Officers (Development) and other Thana level officers representing departments of Agriculture, Education, Health, Fisheries and Cooperative etc. The chief of Thana Council was a Chairman who was working as SDO on behalf of central government and Vice-Chairman was the Circle Officer<sup>20</sup> (Development) working under central government. The Thana Council conducted monthly meeting and was mainly responsible for maintaining coordination. As Kamal Siddique pointed out, “It [Thana Council] was basically an association of Union Councils without any revenue raising authority, rather than a local government in its own right, and therefore it was by itself of little benefit to the people”.<sup>21</sup>

The Thana Council system which was introduced during the Pakistani regime left some influence in shaping local government system at Thana level after independence of Bangladesh. After independence of Bangladesh, the four-tier local governments system

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<sup>18</sup> The Bengal Regulation, 1792 made a provision to divide each district into several police station known as Thana which was mainly responsible for two functions such as collection of revenue and maintaining law and order. The average area of the thana was 100-200 square miles. The officials of Thana include some constables; *havildar*, *subedar* and a sub-inspector.

<sup>19</sup> Sub-divisional Officer (SDO) was the chief executive at the sub-divisional level, a geographic area between thana and district.

<sup>20</sup> Circle was created in 1911 as an administrative unit below sub-division.

<sup>21</sup> Kamal Siddiqui (ed.) *Local Government In Bangladesh –Revised Third Edition* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2005), p. 38.

of Pakistan period was dissolved under the President's Order Number 7 of 1972. Thana Council replaced by Thana Development Committee headed by SDO who was the chief bureaucrat of Thana administration, and it was continued till 1973.

In 1976, a three tier-local government system was introduced for rural areas - Union Parishad at the Union level, the Thana Parishad at the Thana level and Zila Parishad at the District level. Thana Parishad consisted of elected and non-elected members. The elected members included Chairmen of Union Parishads,<sup>22</sup> and the non-elected members were government officials. The SDO acted as the Chairman as a chief of Thana Parishad, and the Vice-Chairman was CO (Development) who were non-elected bureaucrats at the Thana level. The primary responsibility of the Thana Parishad was to coordinate all development activities of Union Parishads within its jurisdiction. It prepared a Thana Development Plan based on Union plans and implemented development projects assigned by the central government. For development works it received government grants as development fund. It was also assigned functions related to family planning, development of environment.

#### *Introduction of Upazila System*

In 1982, military government came to power and established a Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR). The committee proposed to make the Thana as the focal point of administration and recommended to transfer all development activities to the Thana Parishad in order to ensure decentralized governance at the local

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<sup>22</sup> The lower tier of Thana Parishads,

level. Based on the committee's recommendations, the government promulgated the Local Government (Thana Parishad and Thana Administration Reorganization) Ordinance, 1982. Under this ordinance, existing Thanas were re-designated as Upgraded Thanas, later the Upgraded Thanas were renamed as Upazilas and an elected local government system namely Upazila Parishad (UZP) was introduced under the Local Government (Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganization- Second Amendment) Ordinance 1983.

The UZP was headed by a popularly elected chairman and composed of several categories of members: representative members, official members and women members. Under the new system, Upazila Parishad was entrusted with 'transferred subjects' mainly related development while regulatory responsibilities termed as 'retained subjects' were remained with central government. Before formation of elected Chairman, the UNO had to act as Chairman of the Upazila Parishad. Officers of all transferred subjects were placed under the Upazila Parishad who could participate in the Parishad's decision-making process, but were not entitled of voting rights. The UNO,<sup>23</sup> acted as Secretary of the Parishad and assisted the Chairman in executing programmes and policies of the government as well as of the Parishad. In 1985 first Upazila elections were held.

According to Ordinance, transferred subjects were formulation and implementation of development plans; promotion of health, family planning, family welfare, employment generation, cooperative movement, agricultural, educational,

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<sup>23</sup> Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) is an officer of BCS administration cadre with the rank of senior assistant secretary who acts as chief coordination officer of government departments at the thana level.

livestock, fisheries and forest development activities; planning and implementation of rural public works programme; promotion of socio-cultural activities. Before introduction of Upazila system, these functions were performed by the central government. Retained functions under the central government were maintenance of law and order; civil and criminal justice; administration and management of central revenues like income tax, custom and excise; large-scale industries, distribution of electricity power; education above primary level and so on.<sup>24</sup>

The UZP was, however, a short-lived experiment. From the very beginning of introduction of Upazila system, the major political parties protested for abolishing Upazila system, even they boycotted the first Upazila election. Upazila system was dissolved in 1991 mentioning some reasons, such as avoiding political conflict, satisfying demands of MPs, hostile attitude of bureaucracy towards Upazila system, conflicts between the generalists and the specialists and so on.<sup>25</sup> Arguments in favour of dissolving the Upazila system were failure of mobilization of local resources to achieve self-reliance and ensure people's participation in planning and implementation of development activities, increased dependency on national government grants, glaring deviation from laws, rules and guidelines and huge expenditure in the non-productive sector.<sup>26</sup>

In 1998, the Upazila system was revived through enacting a law, Upazila Parishad Act, 1998. The constitution of Bangladesh has mentioned that every administrative unit

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<sup>24</sup>For details, see Kamal Siddiqui (ed.), *Local Government in Bangladesh*, Revised Third Edition (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2008), pp. 75-79.

<sup>25</sup> For details, see Nizam Ahmed, *Bureaucracy and Local Politics in Bangladesh- A Study in Roles and Relationships* (Dhaka: A H Development Publishing House, 2009), pp. 163-169.

<sup>26</sup> Kamal Siddiqui (ed.), *Local Government in Bangladesh*, Revised Third Edition (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2008), p.79.

should have a local government unit. The enacted law has declared Upazila as one of the administrative units in Bangladesh that requires a local government system mandatory as a part of constitutional obligation. But nearly two decades passed, election was not held on due time.

Between 1991 (when the UZP was dissolved) and 2009 (when the UZP was revived), a system known as Thana Development and Coordination Committee (TDCC) at the Upazila level was established which was responsible for coordinating development activities. TDCC was composed of Union Parishad (UP) chairmen and officials of nation-building departments. The UP chairmen became chairman of the TDCC by rotation in alphabetical order. Local MP was involved as an adviser to the TDCC. The main functions of TDCC were to: assess the overall development needs of the *Thana*, resolve inter-union and inter-sector conflicts and problems, coordinate local and national plans and other responsibilities assigned by the central government.

In 2009, the government reactivated the Upazila Parishad Act, 1998 with some reorganization of composition of Upazila Parishad under the Upazila Parishad (Reintroduction, Repeal and Amendment) Act, 2009 which has provided legal power to local MP to act as adviser in the Upazila Parishad. According to the Act, Upazila Parishad will be formed by a Chairman, two-vice chairman (one will be women), all UP Chairmen under the Upazila, Mayor of Pourashava (municipality) existing in the Upazila and reserved women members.<sup>27</sup> Chairman and two-Vice-Chairmen will be elected by all


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<sup>27</sup> There are no fixed women members of Upazila Parishad, but the number will be determined based on number of Union Parishads and Pourashava existing under the Upazila. One-third women members will be elected from all women members of UP and Pourashava. During the study, it was found that women members were not elected.



voters of the whole Upazila. Tenure of an Upazila Parishad will be five years. Any member of the Upazila Parishad could be removed, if four-fifths members of Upazila Parishad bring 'no confidence' on the basis of some gross allegation and subsequently is approved by the central government after doing proper investigation (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Structure of Local Government in Bangladesh



***Necessity of Upazila Parishad***

Local government unit at the district and union level was established long before establishing of Upazila Parishad. During the British regime, local government at the district and union level was highly emphasized than other local government units. During the Pakistani regime (1948-71), Thana Council, local government unit at the *thana* (sub-district) level, was introduced which was continued till independence of Bangladesh. In

1976, Thana Parishad was again introduced at the Thana level. According to constitutional provision, at every administrative unit should have a local government unit. Hence, establishing Upazila Parishad at the Upazila level is a constitutional obligation for the government. In addition, Upazila Parishad has been perceived as a means of distribution of power from central to local, effective coordination of development activities at the local level, increased participation, responsiveness and local development through need-based development efforts and public service delivery as well as developed as system of decentralized governance. The rational, objectives and expected achievement for establishing the Upazila system as expressed by the Chairman of the Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR) were as follows:

- a) improvement of the socio-economic condition of the people;
- b) involvement of the people in the constructive decision making process;
- c) creation of opportunities for cooperation and coordination among the decision-makers, persons involved in implementation and local people with a view to ensure a dynamic development process;
- d) making government officials accountable to the people's representatives and distribution of administrative responsibilities among the local level authority;
- e) preparation and implementation of projects in accordance with the need of the local people;
- f) making the judicial process easy; and
- g) bridging the gap between the people and the administrators.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, "Local Resource Mobilization In Perspective: A Background Study", in Harry W. Blair (ed.) *can rural development be financed from below* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1989), p. 19

### *1.2.3 Budget Support for Upazila*

According to rules, every Upazila Parishad has to prepare an annual budget meaning an statement of income and expenditure and it has to be approved in the special meeting in the Upazila Parishad. The sources of income are mainly divided into two parts – revenue account and development account. As per Upazila Parishad Act, revenue account consists of, among others own revenue sources that specified by the central government (Table 1.1) and development account consists of mainly development grant provided by the central government. On the other hand, development account has two parts- revenue expenditure and development expenditure. Revenue expenditure includes mainly salaries, honorarium, entertainment, payment of taxes and utility charges. Development expenditure includes expenses on agriculture, irrigation, development of cottage industries, physical development and other sectors. The central government allocates annual development grant for the Upazilas based on size and population of the respective upazila in order to carry out its assigned development activities according to government instructions.

Table 1.1: Sources of Revenue of Upazila Parishad

1. Lease money from government specified *haat-bazar*, *jalmahals* and ferryghats situated within the upazila boundaries.
2. Tax on business institutions and industries situated with Thana headquarters.
3. (a) Tax on cinema situated in Thana headquarters of those upazilas where there is no paurashava.
4. Street lighting taxes.
5. Fees levied on fairs, exhibitions and entertainment show organized by non-government sector.
6. Fees for licenses and permits granted by the Parishad on profession, trade and callings.
7. Fees for services and facilities maintained by the Parishad.
8. 1% of registration fees imposed on land transfer and 2% of land development tax.
9. Tax, rate, toll, fees imposed on other source as directed by the government from time to time or income earned from other sources.

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Source: Upazila Parishad Act, 1998.

In financial year 2010-11, Upazila Parishads received Tk. 3500 million as development grants from the central government and Tk. 4000 million in 2011-12.<sup>29</sup> On an average, a UZP receives Tk. 7 to Tk. 8 million every year under the Upazila Annual Development Programme in order to implement local development activities. The amount of allocation in the Upazila development fund has been increased in the last few years (Table 1.2).

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<sup>29</sup> Government of Bangladesh, *Annual Development Programme 2011-12* (Dhaka: Planning Commission, 2011)

Table 1.2: Central Government Allocation under Annual Upazila Development Fund, 2007-08 to 2011-12

Financial Year	Amount of Allocation for Upazila Development Fund (Tk. in Millions)	Percentage of Total ADP
2011-12	4000	0.87
2010-11	3500	1.51
2009-10	3250	1.24
2008-09	1000	0.43
2007-08	1660	0.74

Source: Planning Commission, Government of Bangladesh, Annual Development Programme, 2011-12, 2010-11, 2009-10, 2008-09

### 1.2.5 Concept of Project Management and Governance

#### *Project Management*

Project is a planned endeavour to achieve specific objectives within a certain timeframe which create product or service or deliver a new, enhanced or modified service. Generally, in the private sector, projects are taken to make or increase profit, but in government sector, is not to make profit rather to deliver services to the community. Projects can be classified in numerous categories based on different criterion, such as social sector; professional; geographical segmentation (for example, national, provincial, area etc.); and phase (for example, new, rehabilitation, closure etc.). Based on geographical location, projects could be categorized as national level projects taken by central government to cover wide area, and local level projects which are taken by local government to cover small geographic area. Generally, projects undertaken by local


government are small-sized and intended to local development. This study focuses small projects taken by mid-level local government unit (*Upazila Parishad*) in rural areas of Bangladesh.

Every project management has a lifecycle from starting to end that follows a generic route map is called project cycle. The route involves a set of sequential activities which includes identification of project ideas, project appraisal, negotiation and approval, implementation, monitoring and control, evaluation and follow-up. These activities are broadly divided into three stages of project cycle, such as project selection, project implementation, and project monitoring and evaluation. Activities in project selection stage include identification or selection of project ideas, project analysis or appraisal, pre-feasibility study (whether project is technically, socially, economically and financially viable and sound) stakeholder analysis, project documentation, negotiation and approval etc. Activities in implementation stage involves mobilizing resources, engaging project management, defining roles and responsibilities of project organization, making contract, procuring inputs, and making outputs from the inputs according to goals and objectives of the project. Project monitoring and evaluation includes activities related to controlling of project performance according to its goals, objectives, targets through some project supervising authority and taking corrective actions based on feedback information, so that project goes in the right way to achieve desired results and outcomes.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> S. J. Anwar Zahid, *Rural Development Planning and Project Management in Bangladesh*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (Comilla: BARD, 2010), pp.22-25.

Figure 1.2: Project Cycle



*Governance issues*

As a growing concept governance covers a wide range of issues. Governance could be also understood from academic as well as donar’s perspective. Commonly governance is understood how the affairs of a state are administered and regulated. In this regard, governance in academic perspective focuses on exercise of power and authority in managing state affairs and governance in donor’s perspective focus on effective utilization of financial resources effectively (detail explanation given in chapter 3). Governance issue encompasses both structural aspects and process aspects. Structural aspects include laws, regulations while process includes interactions or relationships of actors of governance in the policy or decision-making process which could be either



participative or non-participative. Whether governance is good or bad could be understood through many principles or indicators which are commonly known as participation, accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. Quality of governance is more or less influenced by these principles as emphasized in both academic and donor perceived governance study.

Governance in project management implies adoption of governance values, principles and indicators in every stages of project cycle so that project resources can be utilized more properly and desired objectives of the project can be achieved. Every stage of project management needs to adopt some governance values and principles in order to ensure improved project management. Some governance values could be applicable to all stages of project management while some specific governance issues are more appropriate and suitable according to project's nature.

Governance issues in the project selection stage could be that project idea or proposal needs to be identified based on assessing priority of needs and demands of citizens or society. Conventional top-down approach for project identification method would be replaced by bottom-up participatory approach. Participatory tools and techniques, such as open community meeting, consultation need to be applied, so that voices and views of locality or beneficiaries are reflected in project selection or design.

Governance issues in project implementation stage focus mechanisms of accountability which will be citizen or beneficiaries oriented. Governance matters in project monitoring and evaluation aim at assessing whether the project is going on

according to objectives, compare status and performance with planned schedule and identification of risks to make project performance weak and take corrective measures accordingly in order to ensure quality project output.

#### *1.2.6 Why governance of Project Management Issue to be Studied –the Problem*

Whether the public resources at the Upazila level are being utilized properly is not adequately investigated so far in any study, especially in terms of governance perspective. Therefore, the main focus of the research is to assess level of prevailing governance in the project management that being implemented under ADP allocation given to the Upazila Parishad. The thesis argues that in Bangladesh local development projects under the ADP of Upazila Parishads suffered from poor quality of governance due to poor governance environment in different stages of project cycle.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The research has looked into following questions:

- whether the existing legal institutional framework of development projects at the Upazila level is suitable for ensuring effective governance;
- whether the key stakeholders are effectively involved in the different stages of project cycle;
- whether the resources of the development project under ADP allocation at the Upazila level are utilized properly;
- whether the existing practices adopted in project management at the local level are suitable for ensuring quality of governance;

- how far intended benefits achieved by the projects; and
- how far governance issues, such as participation, accountability, transparency, effectiveness, efficiency are ensured in the local development projects.

#### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

The main objective of this study is to examine governance issues in the local development projects at the Upazila level of Bangladesh. The specific objectives are:

- I. To develop a conceptual and theoretical framework to understand governance issues in the development projects;
- II. To review existing legal and institutional framework of processing and managing development projects of Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh;
- III. To analyze local development projects taken by the Upazila Parishad under Annual Development Fund;
- IV. To assess quality of governance in development projects taken by the Upazila Parishad; and
- V. To suggest future strategies for ensuring effective governance in development projects at the local level.

## **1.5 Rationale of the Study**

In Bangladesh, available literatures indicate that very few researches have been attempted to study local development projects undertaken by the Upazila Parishads under the Annual Development Fund (ADP). Most of the previous studies focused on assessing the role of the Upazila Parishads in different socio-economic-politico perspective. But governance perspectives especially in the management of local development projects have not been adequately studied at the Upazila level. Hence, the study has attempted to understand the local development process in the context of governance which may make up this knowledge gap and provide a better understanding of local development projects at the Upazila level. Knowledge acquired through the study might be useful for developing countries.

In Bangladesh, Upazila as a decentralized unit of local governance expected to be a vibrant tier of socio-economic development. A huge amount of public resources is being channelled through Upazila. In this regard, the findings of the study could be helpful for the development thinkers and policy planners to frame future policy issues with regard to effective project management and proper use of public resources at the Upazila level.

## **1.6 Scope of the Study**

The study has focused on development projects which were undertaken by the Upazila Parishads under the financial allocation of Annual Development Fund provided

to Upazila Parishad as grant by the central government. Issues covered in the study include:

- Existing legal and institutional framework that guiding the development projects of the Upazila Parishad and assessing its quality in the governance perspective;
- Nature of projects in terms of size, types, sectoral areas, geographical areas, characteristics of local development projects at the Upazila level etc.;
- Project planning, implementation, monitoring and review;
- Analysis of projects in terms of socio-economic benefits as well as governance perspective according to respondents' perceptions;
- Governance issues in the project preparation, such as time for project selection and approval, participation of intended beneficiaries, access to information, openness in the project selection, who participate in the project selection, how project priorities determined, political influences, community interest in the project identification, corruption in the project selection, deviation between legal issues and adopted practices in project identification and so on;
- Governance issues in project implementation such as period of project implementation, corruption in the implementation process (under payment of labourers, over costing etc.) quality of project team/committee, quality of procurement process or corrupting in procurement system, access to information and dissemination of information related to project, transparency in project decision making in different activities of project implementation, coordination in project implementation process, experiences of project committee and their

- orientation on project management, effective use of resources of the project, reporting of project implementation, accounting of the project and so on;
- Accountability in the project such as financial accountability, project accountability, legal accountability, performance accountability, beneficiaries accountability, internal and external accountability;
  - Project effectiveness in terms of achieving objectives, desired outcomes and benefits, level of performance;
  - Project efficiency in terms of project cost and benefits; and
  - Constraints hampering effective project preparation and implementation as well as ensuring governance issues in the project management.

### **1.7 Limitation of the Study**

Out of 487 Upazilas, the study was conducted in two Upazilas. In addition, the study location was in one district out of 64 districts. Due to time and resource constraints, it was difficult for the researcher to cover a representative sample of Upazilas of Bangladesh. As the study location is in two Upazilas, it might be difficult to make generalization based on the findings of two Upazilas, although composition, nature and working process are almost similar at every Upazila in Bangladesh. In addition, there were other local development projects at the Upazila level in which Upazila Parishad directly or indirectly could be involved, but the study attempted to study only development projects taken under ADP's grant allocation. Even in some cases Upazila Parishad might have some development projects from its own income which were not included in the study.

## **1.8 Methods of Study**

### *Nature of the Study*

This is an empirical, explanatory, analytical, descriptive and qualitative study. A combination of approaches has been adopted to collect qualitative and quantitative information. However, the nature of the study is mainly qualitative. To some extent, it is also an evaluative study as it has attempted to investigate effectiveness of development projects undertaken by the Upazila Parishads.

### *Data Collection Method*

It is now widely recognized that there is no ‘one best method’ of collecting data. A combination of methods was used to elicit information related to research objectives and questions. Several methods such as survey of documents, interview, focus group discussions (FGDs), case studies and observation were applied for the purpose. Data were collected from both primary and secondary sources.

Secondary data were collected from a variety of sources. Legal aspects of development project preparation and implementation both at local level were documented from the government documents, such as Acts, rules, regulation, guidelines and other formal documents. A thorough review of these documents was made to understand whether any gap existing between theory and practices regarding project management, especially at the Upazila level. In addition, books, research documents, articles, journals and other published or unpublished documents were reviewed for the study. Besides, internet was used to collect information regarding various issues of governance and

project management. Official documents such as proceedings of monthly meetings of the Upazila Parishad and other departments and committees were consulted for content analysis. Project documents of the concerned projects were reviewed. News items and articles published in the national and local daily newspaper related to governance and development projects were studied thoroughly. List of projects under the Upazila Annual Development Programme (UADP) for the last five financial years (2007-08 to 2011-12) were collected from the official documents of Upazilas.

Primary data were collected from different level of respondents through administrating different sets of semi-structured questionnaires and checklists. All questionnaires contain some common information regarding the background of the respondents, such as age, education, occupation, etc. were incorporated. Primary information regarding key governance issues and project management were collected through conducting interviews with different stakeholders, such as project beneficiaries, project implementation committees, government officials, public representatives, UNO, MP, members of civil society etc. In this regard, Likert scaling in the questionnaire were extensively used. Moreover, researcher himself conducted a number of formal and informal discussions with officials, journalists, members of local press club, members of other local forums through following a separate checklist. A variety of information was collected from some selected key informants, such as UNO, Upazila Chairman, UP Chairman and Upazila Engineer.

All the questionnaires were pre-tested before collection of data. The researcher himself was involved in the data collection. Four experienced investigators of the



research division of Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD) were engaged in data collection who were made well oriented about study and method of data collection. The researcher supervised and monitored them during data collection.

Some Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted to crosscheck and validate the data collected by questionnaire survey. In this regard, FGDs were conducted with different level of respondents, such as government officials, public representatives, civil society representatives. Issues in the FGDs included performance of the development projects, existing legal aspects, governance issues, success and failure of project and factors of improving project management and governance at the local level. Some FGDs were conducted with the some government departments, such as education, agriculture, livestock, LGED, health regarding project management. Researcher's own observations were extensively incorporated in the study.

#### *Selection of Study Areas*

At present, in Bangladesh, there are 487 Upazilas (sub-district) under 64 districts. These Upazilas are different in terms of their area, size of population, level of socio-economic development and location (rural, semi-urban and urban), though they are almost homogeneous in terms of structure, composition and working procedure. The numbers of Upazilas are varied from district to district. The district of Comilla, has been selected purposively for the study as it is one of the developed districts in terms of agriculture and rural development. It is about 100 km. away from capital city of Dhaka. Two Upazilas (Adarsha Sadar and Homna) of Comilla were selected purposively.

Adarsha Sadar was selected based on some criteria, such as more urbanized, close to district headquarters, more improved in some socio-economic indicators according to government information. Homna was selected on the basis of its remoteness from the district headquarters (60 km away from Comilla district headquarters) and it is predominantly rural and less developed compared to Adarsh Sadar with respect to some socio-economic indicators. General profile of Adarsha Sadar Upazila and Homna Upazila is shown in Table 1.3.

Table 1.3: Socio-economic Profile of Adarsha Sadar and Homna Upazila, Comilla

Profile	Adarsha Sadar	Homna
Area (Acres)	142 Sq. Km	142.79 Sq. Km
Households	26068	34101
Household size (Dwelling)	5.4	5.6
Population	229579	191449
Population Density (per sq. km.)	2181	1341
Literacy Rate (5 years and above)	56.74%	33.18%
Access to Sanitary Latrine	72.13%	40.30%
Sources of Drinking Water		
Tubewell	83.89%	91.45%
Main Sources of Income		
Agriculture	28.39%	46.91%
Business	20.97%	17.16%
Employment	18.21%	6.18%
Urbanization	58.65sq. km.	11.74 sq. km.
Number of Unions	6	9

Source: Office records of Upazila.

Fifty percent of the total Unions from each Upazila were selected randomly for conducting village-level survey. Adarsha Sadar Upazila consists of six Unions and Homna consists of nine Unions. Therefore, three Unions from Adarsha Sadar and five Unions from Homna Upazila were randomly selected. Then, three villages from three Union (each from one Union) under Adarsha Sadar and five villages from five Unions were randomly selected to collect information from the villagers through an interview schedule (Appendix 1.1).

Figure 1.3: Location of Study Area



### *Selection of Respondents*

Different categories of respondents were selected purposively to collect information on a wide range of issues. Respondents include government officials, elected representatives, civil society members, journalists, other local organisation's representatives, MP, project beneficiaries and local residents. UNO, Upazila Chairman and Vice-Chairman, Upazila Engineer, UP Chairman from both Upazilas were selected as key informants. In addition, 385 village level respondents (Table 1.4), based on sampling formula (Appendix 1.2) on known population were randomly selected to conduct a small survey.

Table 1.4: Sample Size of Villagers

Upazila	Union	Village	Total Number of Households	Sample Size n = 385
Adarsha	Kalirbazar	Jnagalia	133	74
Sadar	Amratholi	Palpar	117	64
	North Dorgapur	Kachiatoli	73	40
Homna	Vashania	NawaKandi	37	17
	Dulalpur	Chotokalamina	71	34
	Asadpur	Darikandi	112	52
	Garmora	Mirsikari	123	57
	Jaypur	Kondakarchar	102	47

## *Data Analysis*

The information of the study has been arranged in tables, graphs and charts. Simple statistical tools have been used to analyze the collected data. As the study's nature is qualitative, weighted average, percentage have been extensively used. Content analysis has been adopted as the method critically and objectively reviews the published or printed facts, figures, opinions, observations, generalizations in the light of its content values.<sup>31</sup> Thematic analysis and interpretive description are included in the analysis to share experience gathered through information. Data collected from the village level respondents were processed through SPSS software. Researcher's own observations were extensively used in analysing data. Views of respondents were analysed in a comparative perspective between two studied Upazilas.

### **1.9 Chapter Outline**

The thesis consists of eight chapters. The first chapter describes introduction of the study that contains background of the study, statement of the problem, research questions, objectives, rationale of the study, scope, study methods and limitation. Chapter two explores available literatures on governance issues of project management in context of Bangladesh to find out knowledge gap. Chapter three conducts a document survey on theoretical issues of governance, project governance and provides a conceptual framework to understand governance in project management. This chapter four reviews existing legal-institutional framework with regard to working system of the Upazila Parishad as well as project governance of ADP-projects of Upazila Parishad. This chapter

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<sup>31</sup> T.S Wilkison, and Bhandarkar P.L., *Methodology and Techniques of Research* (Bombay:Himalaya Publishing House, 1982).

five and six provides an analysis on utilization of ADP allocation, types and characteristics of ADP projects distribution of ADP allocation in different sectoral projects and some key governance issues in the management of local development projects in Bangladesh based on survey results. Chapter seven attempts to highlight some of the governance problems of Bangladesh and provides suggestions to overcome the problems. Finally, chapter eight presents summary of the chapter's findings, a comparative picture, recommendations and conclusion.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Review of Relevant Literature**

#### **2.1 Prelude**

This chapter attempts to explore available literatures to find out knowledge gap with regard to the governance issues of project management in Bangladesh. In this regard, an endeavour is taken to review contents of researches, articles and documents related to issues of development projects. As governance includes a wide range of issues, the review focuses some of the key issues of governance, such as participation, transparency and accountability. There are huge literatures on the field of governance. This chapter attempts to cover issues related to project planning and implementation as well as role of development actors especially rural local government units of Bangladesh, such as Upazila Parishad and Union Parishad.

#### **2.2 Review of Literatures**

Yusuf Hyder (1986) studied contribution of the Upazila Parishad as newly introduced decentralized administrative structure in the process of local economic development through examining its development efforts. He expressed,

Decentralised administration, in complete sense, is an economic programme, aiming at improving the quality of life of the rural people and giving them the strength of self-reliance. The aim of Upazila administration is, therefore, two fold. It is to ensure better administration as well as faster and more equitable economic growth for rural people ...

The Upazila administration works as a catalyst in the exercise of building up the rural economy.<sup>32</sup>

The study reveals that development fund of Upazila Parishad was distributed among the Union Parishads on the basis of equal shares instead of their actual needs. As he observed three years after introduction of Upazila system, he found that infrastructure sector was given more attention compared to other sectors of development. The study also mentioned that many projects taken by the Upazila Parishads failed to achieve desired results due to weak project formulation and weak inspection of the project site.<sup>33</sup>

Shawkat Ali (1986)<sup>34</sup> analysed the Upazila Parishad based on the theory of decentralization. The study found that Upazila Parishad as new local government system gained importance for its regulatory and development activities especially with regard to planning and implementation of local development projects, though Upazila Parishad was used as instrument of transition from a military rule to a civilian rule as well as provided a strong power base for military regime of General Ershad. The study identified abuse of authority by the Chairman of Upazila Parishad in selection and approval of projects, resulted in misuse of development funds. The study observed that an unholy alliance between public officials and elected representatives was prevailing. On the other hand, Upazila Parishad did not acquire adequate skill and technical experts for taking projects.; hence Upazila Parishad needed to follow government-provided guidelines and sectoral priority. As the study argued, quality of Upazila-administration substantially depended on both quality of the elected Chairman and willingness of central government's to provide

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<sup>32</sup> Yusuf Hyder, *Development The Upazila Way* (Dhaka: Dhaka Prokashan, 1986), p. 41-43.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 39-89.

<sup>34</sup> A M M Shawkat Ali, *Politics, Development and Upazila* (Dhaka: National of Local Government, 1986)



continuous support to make Upazila Parishad a truly decentralized form of local government.

Apart from, the study found that Upazila Parishad was not able to exert its role sufficiently in the process of project selection because most of the Chairmen of Union Parishads were more eager to receive project-fund on the basis of population of each Union Parishad. Upazila Chairman likely compromised with them in order to avoid a vote of no confidence. The study pointed out some malpractices in project implementation. For example, project's money was illegally misappropriated by producing fake vouchers by the project implementation committee. Selection, approval and implementation of the project suffered from deviations between the procedure prescribed by the government and the actual practices. The study recommended for improving monitoring and supervision mechanism in relation to utilization of ADP fund.

Skylark Chadha (1989) conducted some case studies on a number of projects of different central government departments, and pointed out a wide range of factors which affected proper implementation of projects in Bangladesh. Though nature of problems of project implementation was different from project to project, there were some common problems identified in the study, which were attributing to weak project performance and slow implementation of the projects. These were shortage of fund; inadequate original estimates; weakness in the design of the project; inexperience of project managers; weak supervision; inadequate estimate; weak accounting system; underpayment of labourers; low quality of work; misspent or misappropriation; lack of fulltime project director or lack of separate project implementation authority; lack of effective coordination among

different stakeholders; small project organization and its limited authority; lack of response of intended beneficiaries; inefficient use of available resources; low utilization of project aid; and lack of effective monitoring and evaluation.<sup>35</sup> He also mentioned that projects failed due to objectives of projects decided by the ‘top management’.<sup>36</sup>

As a result, projects suffered from costs overrun and time overrun. In this regard, the study cited some cases of projects, for example, the implementation period of Fisheries Development Project was originally from 1978 to June 1983, but the project needed June 1987 for completion, resulted in 80 percent time overrun. Citing another project, 250 Bed Hospital at Khulna, the study showed that estimated project cost increased by 264 percent while it was completed.<sup>37</sup>

Ahmed Shafiqul Huque (1989)<sup>38</sup> reviewed the Upazila system as a decentralized initiative with regard to local resource mobilization. Based on secondary information, he analyzed pattern of expenditure of Upazila Parishad. He expressed that fund provided by the central government was utilized mostly for the maintenance of local institutions. As a result, less allocation was available for the provisions of services to the localities as well as undertaking development activities. On the other hand, local institutions lacked ability to raise enough revenue from own sources to provide services that made all local government institutes including Upazila Parishads highly dependent on central

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<sup>35</sup> Skylark Chadha, *Managing Projects in Bangladesh: A Scenario Analysis of Institutional Environment for Development Projects*, Second edition (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1989), p.212.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., pp.212-229.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., pp.214-221.

<sup>38</sup> Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, “Local Resource Mobilization In Perspective: A Background Study”, in Harry W. Blair (ed.) *can rural development be financed from below* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1989).

government's grant. He pointed out that a significant portion of grant was directed to non-productive uses without more emphasis on increasing productivity, income generation activities of the rural poor and human resource development.<sup>39</sup> It was observed that central government's grant were being used in the 'pet projects' of local leaders due to weak monitoring as well as less involvement of local community. The study concluded that grants were not utilized properly due to ignorance, inefficiency or personal bias of local leaders. Findings of the study show that local resource mobilization by the Upazila Parishads was poor due to many factors, such as lack of initiative of both elected representatives and government officials to collect revenue properly from existing sources as well as to explore potential sources. As the study stated,

Administration of revenue in the UZ[Upazila] is affected by complicated directives, organizational inadequacy, and most important of all, neglect of the potential for increasing revenue from various suggested sources. The rules have neglected, perhaps deliberately [...] ... Elected leaders are not very concerned about local resource mobilization since the block grants provide them enough funds to undertake development works and operate the UZP. Officials suffer from a feeling of frustration as they are subordinated to the elected UZP Chairman. The loss of absolute control over UZP's since elected Chairman took over gave rise to resentment among officers, who do not consider it worthwhile to devote additional time and energy to the mobilization of local resources.<sup>40</sup>

Haakon Lein (1989)<sup>41</sup> studied two Upazilas of Faridpur focusing infrastructural projects in order to explore the relationship between infrastructure development and mobilization of monetary and non-monetary local resources. The study also examined utilization of funds received by the Upazilas under different development programmes

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp. 102-103.

<sup>41</sup> Haakon Lein, "Infrastructural Development and Local Resource Mobilization in Faridpur", in Harry W. Blair (ed.) *can rural development be financed from below* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1989), pp.146-186.

undertaken by the central government such as Annual Upazila Development Programmes (AUDP), Food for Work Programme, Special Food for Works Programme. The study revealed that in 1987-88 both Upazilas spent two-thirds of AUDP for construction of physical structures giving more priority on projects related to transport and communication such as roads and bridges. Preferring to physical infrastructure by the UZPs was explained. The study stated a number of explanations in this regard. First, scope of corruption or misappropriation was better in construction activities than in non-construction activities such as services. Second, physically visible outputs of projects served elected members for future political career. Third, local leaders were upholding traditional attitude towards physical infrastructure as they were experienced in planning and implementing such types of projects since a long time. Apart from that, the study mentioned that the Upazila Engineer played a key role in planning and selection of projects of Upazila Parishad. The study also pointed out some weaknesses of local level planning. For example, implementation of plans was highly uncertain due to lack of timely release of fund from central government.

A book edited by Kamal Siddiqui (1992) revealed that on an average an Upazila received Tk. 3.5 million as cash grant in 1986-87.<sup>42</sup> With regard to expenditure of grant by Upazila the book stated,

There is an undue emphasis on the building of physical infrastructure in the UZP development expenditure pattern. Even when the sector/sub-sector is agriculture or social welfare, the actual project tends to gravitate to the physical infrastructure. Thus, AUDP [Annual Upazila Development Programme] expenditure in agriculture (which include crop, fisheries, forestry and livestock) came down for 15.5% in 1982-83 to 7% in 1987-88. Felt need, visible demonstration effect, non-requirement of long-term planning and maintenance,

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<sup>42</sup> Kamal Siddiqui (ed) *Local Government in South Asia – A Comparative Study* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1992), p. 170.

and the relative ease of engaging in corrupt practices associated with such projects are possible explanations for this.<sup>43</sup>

Abdul Hye Mondal and M. Asaduzzaman (1993) pointed out in their study that politicians were found more interested in adding new infrastructural projects instead of maintaining existing ones. It helps to mobilize political support because infrastructural projects have visible effects. The study also reveals that poor quality of construction and reconstruction works of rural infrastructure was very widespread as contractors produced low quality works due to lack of project monitoring and control. The study suggested that if scope of active participation of the users in the maintenance of projects would have ensured, it could contribute to sustainable use of infrastructure and cost saving.<sup>44</sup>

Noore Alam Siddiquee (1993) observed that the Upazila Parishad is highly dependent on central government's fund for its development activities. He also observed that Upazila Parishad put much emphasis on undertaking infrastructure development projects ignoring maximum limits of allocating resources according to the rules that provided by the central government. The reason for preferring more on construction projects was to attain political interest by the local leaders (Chairman of Upazila and Union Parishad) who thought by dint of these visible works they would be re-elected in future elections. He also pointed out that equity in sharing benefits of projects did not

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<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p.171.

<sup>44</sup> Abdul Hye Mondal and M. Asaduzzaman, *Maintenance of Rural Infrastructure at the Local Level: Experiences with the Defunct Upazila System in Bangladesh*, Research Report No. 194 (Dhaka: BIDS, 1993), pp. 27- 88.

ensure because Upazila Chairman and other local influentials accrued maximum benefits and used project inputs as ‘personal property’.<sup>45</sup>

Muhammad Mustafa Alam, Ahmed Shafiqul Huque and Kirsten Westergaard (1994) conducted a study on four Upazilas to examine the capacities and constraints of local government regarding the planning and implementation of development activities. The study reveals that annual development plans of Upazila Parishad gave less focus on development projects related to ‘software oriented sectors’ such as education, health. Upazila Parishads were found more interested on projects related to civil works concentrating on the construction of infrastructure or other ‘hardware projects’. It was found in the study that uncertainty of funds and deviations from government guidelines made development projects of the Upazila Parishad difficult to implement properly. The study also observed that projects were not taken on the basis of policy and priority as mentioned in the guidelines or community demands. As the study stated, “the decisions reflected outcomes of uneven competitions among members of upazila parishads to obtain projects for specific areas. This competition was often compounded by alliances between the upazila parishad chairman and certain union parishad chairmen.”<sup>46</sup>

The study found that decision-making process of project-approval was influenced by some factors such as nature of relationship between the Upazila Parishad Chairman and UP Chairman and their alliances, informal links and personalities. A particular Union

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<sup>45</sup> M. Noore Alam Siddiquee, “Local Governance and Agricultural Development in Bangladesh: The Experience of Upazila System”, *The Journal of Rural Development*, Vol. 23. No. 1. January 1993. pp. 1-26.

<sup>46</sup> Muhammad Mustafa Alam, Ahmed Shafiqul Huque and Kirsten Westergaard, *Development through Decentralization in Bangladesh – Evidence and Perspective* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1994), p.46.

Parishad received more projects than other Unions due to a strong relationship between the Upazila Chairman and of that particular UP Chairman. The study pointed out, “Because of alliances struck between the upazila parishad chairman and certain union parishad chairmen, a disproportionately large number of projects tended to be allocated to particular unions.”<sup>47</sup> Mutual beneficial alliances were developed through same political background and mutual support during election. It creates opportunity of getting contracts to implement projects though it has negative impact on quality of work as project fund was poorly utilized. In addition, the study observed, “... the officers in charge of social welfare, agriculture and fisheries had difficulties in getting their projects included in the annual development plans. In contrast, the UNO and the Upazila Engineer in most cases had more influence, and often managed to push through projects of their preference even if there was some opposition from the elected members.”<sup>48</sup>

Makhluqur Rahman (1995) in his PhD thesis explored issues on people’s participation in the Upazila Parishad. He has pointed out that after the creation of Upazila system, the scope of popular participation in administration by the local influentials has increased, but the landless and the extreme poor were yet out of the reach of the system. On the other hand, the planning system of the Upazila is severely regulated from the top. Field level functionaries follow traditional method of preparing schemes without any meaningful examination of its viability, needs and priority. People are not informed before approval of the projects by the Upazila Parishad and they normally come to know during implementation. Union Parishad members often put forward the projects to the

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p.37.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p.37.

Upazila Parishad without much consultation even with the members of the Union Parishad. Instead of local needs, personal profit and partisan consideration are reflected in the selection processes of projects. Mostly government officials are involved in project monitoring and supervision.<sup>49</sup>

Syed Margub Murshed *et al.* (1996) have conducted case studies on two Upazilas with a view to assessing impact of decentralized administration in Bangladesh on the rural people. It was observed that the trend and priority of spending of the Upazila development fund was highly concentrated in development of physical infrastructure and communication. The study reveals that as a result of Upazila system, development process took new changes in terms of widening scope of development as well as project planning and implementation mechanisms. Findings of the study show that most of the respondents expressed their opinion regarding necessity of the Upazila Parishad for accelerating local development. The study mentioned that less efficient decision making and implementation process regarding project planning and implementation was due to parochial attitude of both elected representatives and government officials, political pressure, rigidities of government instructions, administrative complexities (for example, delay of fund release, weak accounts keeping, weak coordination), inadequate opportunities to participate in the planning process.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Makhluqur Rahman, "People's Participation in Development Administration: An Study of Four Thanas in the District of Khulna and Jessore", Unpublished PhD Thesis (Rajshahi: IBS, 1995), pp.184-294.

<sup>50</sup> Syed Margub Murshed *et al.*, *Decentralization of Administration in Bangladesh – with Cases of Two Upazilas and Some Perspective Issues* (Comilla: BARD, 1996).



UNDP (1996)<sup>51</sup> conducted a study on local government in Bangladesh to examine some governance issues with regard to functioning of the Union Parishads and Pourashavas. Data of the study were mainly collected through case studies and focus group discussions. The study commented,

If local government is to take on an effective and permanent role in Bangladesh society, then it must function in support of programmes and activities taking place in society. More importantly, it must draw its resources from individuals and groups in society and be built around groups and organizations which are involved in managing their affairs... [I]n Bangladesh, local government has been used for many purposes and primarily to lead people rather than to aggregate public opinion in order to guide public officials. Rather than primarily function as a unit for centralized planned development projects and programmes, a viable local government needs to provide a supportive climate for all types of initiatives by all types of community members, in order to promote sustainable growth and development... With regard to resources and capacities, local government units must have adequate financial and personnel resources at their disposal to carry out their mandated functions and role [...]<sup>52</sup>

The study observed that overall environment of working process of local system in Bangladesh was not conducive to the development of a ‘responsive, accountable and transparent’ local government system due to central and bureaucratic control, unequal power distribution between central and local government as well as between the Chairman and other members inside local government unit and highly centralized power structure.<sup>53</sup> Reviewing legal framework of the Union Parishad and Pourashava the study stated, “Laws, rules and regulations under which the local government system operate are often not clear or precise... many contradictory... Some rules enhance autonomy, independence, participation and responsive. Other rules effectively expunge and

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<sup>51</sup> UNDP, *Local Government In Bangladesh: An Agenda For Governance* (New York: UNDP, 1996).

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., pp.4-5.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p.6.

obliterate these provisions. In the process, the laws, rules and regulations make the local government system weaker and more dependent”.<sup>54</sup> Regarding peoples’ participation in local government the study found that participation at the local level was an electoral instead of continuous interactive process between the local government and citizenry, and citizen’s voice particularly from the poor was not heard in the deliberations of the local government system. The study identified three limiting factors in the way of development of sound, effective and autonomous local government in Bangladesh which includes: (a) weakness in democratic institution building, (b) weakness of legal framework to enhance effective constant interaction among stakeholders of local government and (c) lack of proper decentralization policies focusing distribution of functions based on capacities and resources.

Noore Alam Siddiquee (1997) conducted a study on two Upazila Parishads to examine the role of the Upazila decentralization programme in accelerating rural development and widening people’s participation in government administration and developmental activities. The author argued,

The upazila decentralization programme has largely failed to achieve the objectives it claimed to pursue. The decentralization programme that promised to promote grass-roots participation, did not enable the vast majority of the rural population to involve themselves in the local development process and thereby to improve their living conditions. It did not improve the delivery of local services nor did it make local administration more responsive and accountable to the local populace. Its promise of improved access remained unfulfilled for the bulk of the rural population, who are required to manage access to public services through patrons, touts and brokers and financial transactions. Although this

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p.8.

[upazila system] benefited some people, especially rural elites, the upazila produced few benefits for the majority of the people.<sup>55</sup>

The study reveals that introduction of Upazila system has created a major shift regarding project management at the Upazila Parishad. Upazila Parishad as a self-dependent local government authority is provided with power without seeking approval of higher authority to plan, allocate resources and implement development projects of local importance. As the author states,

This represented a major shift from the past tradition whereby the local government acted merely as the implementing agency of the centrally planned and financed projects. Under the new arrangement ... the UZP was made the final approving authority for all projects to be implemented. Thus for the first time in Bangladesh, the rules of the game were reversed by handling over the control of local development funds to locally elected councils with staff deputed to them for the implementation of the schemes which they select.<sup>56</sup>

Regarding negative aspects of Upazila system, the research expressed that Upazila system helped to extend corruption and create scope of different forms of patronage-networks (based on kinship and/or political allies and/or preferential treatment by UZC and system of rewarding supporters and sympathizers and to serve parochial group interests. On the other hand, rural people especially the poor have become objects of decisions made by the elites as the Upazila system did not provide any mechanisms to articulate their views in the Upazila meetings. Referring decision-making related to project planning and implementation, the author stated that

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<sup>55</sup> Noore Alam Siddiquee, *Decentralization and Development – Theory and Practice in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: The University of Dhaka, 1997), pp. 266-267.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

[T]he upazila system has no major impact on increasing the participation of the common people in the development planning process.... development projects are still planned and decided in the old fashion, whereby UPCs and WMs decide themselves without any consultation with their constituents.... [I]n few cases, UPCs and WMs consulted with local elites with whom they have some socio-political attachments. As a result, only small minority of villagers ... had some prior knowledge of the development projects to be undertaken locally. The vast majority of the rural population came to know about these schemes at a much latter stage, usually at the time of their implementation. [As a result] ... such projects hardly reflect the needs and aspirations of the mass of the population.... often lack public support, and at times their implementation is met with public resentment and criticisms.<sup>57</sup>

The author observed that local elite-dominated project committees (PC) worked as ‘mechanisms of patronage distribution’ which was formed from same clan, faction or socio-economic interests. In addition, the study mentioned that tender process was the most frequently used instrument for corruption and patronage distribution because tender system creates opportunities for local representatives and officials to favour selected candidates and thus enhanced personal economic position.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, it was observed that local representatives tend to consider project as an opportunity to build a future for themselves and for their cronies, they rarely prefer to include persons in PCs who are veteran opposition figure.<sup>59</sup> It was observed that an alliance developed and maintained between project implementation committees, local representative members, contractors and key government officials in order to share undue benefits from the projects through misappropriation of resources. In this regard, the author remarked that “[s]uch an alliance puts a big question mark on the very philosophy of local level planning and management of development programmes. Because in such situation the objectives of the schemes are

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<sup>57</sup> Noore Alam Siddiquee, *Decentralization and Development – Theory and Practice in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: The University of Dhaka, 1997), p. 220-221.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 204.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p.226.

over run by the personal objectives of those involved in the planning and implementation processes.”<sup>60</sup> In such situations public complains largely become unheeded for obvious reasons.<sup>61</sup>

The study observed that local elected representatives were more intended to take ‘lumpy projects’ related to construction activities and reluctant to ‘soft projects’ such as demonstration farms for popularizing new crop varieties and/or modern methods of cultivation. Regarding quality of local projects taken under Rural Works Programme (RWP) the author cited that loss of project resources through corruption was from 40 to 72 percent.<sup>62</sup> The study also observed that project implementation through tender system is not efficient. Instead of competitiveness, tenders were allocated on the basis of personal relationships, political allegiances and amount of bribes a contractor is willing to offer, not on the basis of price or quality. As a result, project resources were not used efficiently and quality of works become poor.<sup>63</sup> As the author stated, “[p]ublic criticisms and grievances against ... corrupt practices matter little to these actors [government officials]. Ordinary villagers ... reported that the upazila administration did not respond to complaints about the quality of work, or the low quality of materials used by contractors on local projects. Since contractors are closely linked with local elites and the officials are already paid-off, such inaction on their part is nothing unusual.”<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 197.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 175.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 211.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 210

In addition, the study explored social dynamics affecting Upazila system. Findings of the study indicate that the newly elected chief executive, Upazila Chairman, intended to develop an interest group based on nepotism and patronage networks. Growing power and prestige of Upazila Chairman became a conflicting source for different political rivalries including local MP which contributed development of factional politics.

Rita Afsar (1999) has conducted an evaluation on a government-led rural water supply programme under the Directorate of Public Health Engineering which highlights some problems of project implementation.<sup>65</sup> In many cases, appropriate site selection for installation of tubewells were not done due to political interference, weak investigation, low participation of whole community in the decision making, corruption and misuse. She also expressed that majority of the direct project beneficiaries were large farmers instead of the poor landless, although priority of the programme was the poorer section of the community because the poor could not able to afford sharing of the certain cost of project inputs. In addition, the study revealed some other problems. Beneficiaries had to pay additional cost to get project benefits. Refundable money was forfeited by the officials; and one deep tubewell was not found in field where it was installed.<sup>66</sup>

Regarding political interference the study observes,

Special allocation by political sources often leads to breach of site selection criteria. Ministers/MPs generally indicate site or their options for TW [Tubewell] installation .... which does not necessarily follow DPHE's long established site selection criteria. In-depth interviews with SAEs [Sub-Assistant Engineers] revealed that in eleven out of thirteen

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<sup>65</sup> Rita Afsar, *Public Water Supply in Rural Areas: An Evaluation of DPHE's Performance in Installation of GOB Funded Tubewells*, Research Report 165 (Dhaka: BIDS, 1999).

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

thanas, political interventions either by ministers, MPs or Chairmen Union Parishad or Army/BDR creates one of the major obstacles in maintaining site selection criteria ... Influence of UP Chairmen in the distribution system is even more pervasive.<sup>67</sup>

Mahmudul Alam (2000) conducted an evaluation study on a project namely Secondary Science Education Sector Project (SSEP), aimed at improving the quality of secondary science education at the secondary level as well as enhancing the access to secondary science education, which was implemented by the Ministry of Education during 1984 to 1991. Findings of the study show that intended results of the project could not effectively reach to the disadvantaged students of rural non-state schools who were the main target group of project beneficiaries. The study pointed out that the supply driven project interventions (such as increasing facilities) as generally adopted by policy-makers in an underdeveloped country were found more appropriate for improvement in a particular sector or to solve a problem, but in many cases, the project-generated services and goods remained unutilized/underutilized or of low quality due to neglect of proper attention to the views of demand-sides. The study expressed,

Like most of the supply-side approach-based development projects SSEP has been a product of planning-implementation by technocrats and bureaucrats (both national and/or expatriates), identified as the state centered actors. Alongside, this top-down state-mechanism of the project implementation, a network of clientele (or facility-user) groups should be organized. These social groups (e. g. composed of parents of secondary school students in the project areas) of SSEP, at the grass-root level, can be organized to receive proper knowledge on science and secondary education, articulate their demand for relevant education and make the education-related bureaucracy/administrators accountable and efficient. For any demand-side financing of the secondary science education in a developing society such social groups become essential. It should be noted that Bangladesh has

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

successfully implemented a similar approach to organize user-groups in the case of rural electrification.<sup>68</sup>

Anisur Rahman and others conducted a study (2000)<sup>69</sup> on participation of mass people, particularly disadvantage section of the community in the development process as well as for societal changes. The study investigated people's capability in the process of decision-making process aimed at development process and changing their present conditions. Examining some cases, the study states,

In large parts of the Third world, the lack of participation by the rural poor in development reflects the domination of rural society and its development effort by certain privileged social groups or classes on whom the rural poor are critically dependent for their material subsistence. This material dependence inhibits them taking independent initiatives of their own to improve their lives and status in the society, produces in them an attitude of mental dependence on the dominant social groups. The latter are thereby able to appropriate the reflective functions in development as well as much of the benefits of development. Together, such material and mental dependence enables the dominance/dependence relation to perpetuate.<sup>70</sup>

Apart from, bureaucracy and traditional power structure likely reduce participation of the poor and they generate an 'anti-participatory macro-social structure' which limit the development of local participatory process or spoils people's creative energy. Participatory process could be evolved through spontaneous or guided initiatives. The study shows that spontaneous process was accelerated when participants gained some material benefits through participation. Moreover, role of 'activists' (external actors) was found critically important to generate and to enrich participatory process. The

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<sup>68</sup> Mahmudul Alam, *State-Intervention In The Secondary Education Sub-Sector Of A Developing Country: Impact Of Secondary Science Education Sector Project (SSEP) of Bangladesh, 1985-1991*, Research Report 166 (Dhaka: BIDS, 2000), p.31.

<sup>69</sup> Md. Anisur Rahman (ed.) *Participation of the Rural Poor in Development* (Dhaka: Pathak Shamabesh, 2000).

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. p.20.



study concluded, ‘the domination of the masses by elites’ could not be ended until the masses own not only the means of production but means of thinking [meaning mass consciousness].’<sup>71</sup>

Referring successful implementation of Barendra project, Katsuhiko Yamashita (2003) mentioned some contributing factors of successful project implementation in Bangladesh that were: hard work of the project staffs beyond office time, high level motivation of all staffs, strict control of bureaucracy and corruption, seriousness of project director, transparency of works, well informed staffs about the whole project and informal (not rigid) relationship between project staff and beneficiaries. He expressed that positive results of a project may come when beneficiaries are selected non-biasly and free of interference of political touts.<sup>72</sup> Nazmeen (2004) expresses that some touts and intermediaries have enjoyed more access to projects and grasped their fruits while the participation of the poor and the marginalized section has not increased.<sup>73</sup>

Nazrul Anwar (2009) has examined different aspects of projects taken by the central government of Bangladesh under the ADP (Annual Development Programme). He has pointed out that list of projects in the ADP is very long and project are mostly under-financed. Rate of project completion is low. On an average, 11 to 12 percent of the total listed projects are completed. A project required nearly 5 to 6 years more additional

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p.124.

<sup>72</sup> Katsuhiko Yamashita, “Changing Pattern of Socioeconomic Development Programs in Bangladesh: A Study on Tanore Upazila in Rajshahi District”, Unpublished Thesis (Rajshahi: IBS, 2003), p.138-139.

<sup>73</sup> Z.A. Nazmeen, “Popular Participation in Local Administration: A Case Study of Bangladesh”, (Dhaka: Gyan Bitarani, 2004) cited in Sheik Noor Mohammad, “People’s Participation in Development Projects at Grassroot level: A Case of Alampur and Jagannathpur Union Parishad”, Masters Thesis (Dhaka: North South University, 2010), p.5.

time which was planned to complete within 3 years. About 36 percent of the projects have incurred cost over-runs to the extent of 80 percent of the initially estimated cost. The study shows that a large number of projects included in the ADP are likely low priority in terms of public investment, viability and equity. Some weaknesses relating to project management include insufficient scrutiny of projects, weak capacity in project selection, design and implementation. Moreover, list of project becomes too large due to satisfying political demands.<sup>74</sup>

This situation is still prevailing in the recent years. A report shows that on an average, a project included in the financial year 2010-11 has increased its schedule by 83 percent.<sup>75</sup> Another recent survey shows that average of implementation period of projects included in ADP of 2010-11 was 3.52 years, but real time of implementation increased to 6.44 years.<sup>76</sup> In some cases, it was observed that projects declared closed without completing all the project activities as planned in the approved project document, though duration of project completion has been repeatedly increased. As a result, project fails to achieve its goals and objectives fully.<sup>77</sup> A review of ADP-projects in 2010-11 also shows that average real cost of every project has increased to 32 percent amounting Tk. 1659 million against the estimated cost of Tk. 1252.7 million and every projects incurred additional cost of Tk. 640 million.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Nazrul Anwar, "Government Budgeting in Bangladesh: The Changes and Challenges", unpublished PhD Thesis, (Rajshahi: IBS, 2009), pp.123-125.

<sup>75</sup> The Daily Janakantha, 23/1/212, p.18.

<sup>76</sup> The Daily Janakantha, 23/1/212, p.18.

<sup>77</sup> The Daily Janakantha, 23/1/212, p.18.

<sup>78</sup> The Daily Janakantha, 23/1/212, p.18.

Sharif N. As-Saben and Md Fazle Rabbi (2009)<sup>79</sup> explored how far the democratically elected Upazila Parishad was able to be responsive and accountable to people in the existing legal and administrative context. The study argued that the Upazila Parishads in Bangladesh with democratically elected representatives have somewhat failed to enhance their responsiveness and accountability to the people. A number of factors as identified in the study include ‘the presence of a large number of rules and regulations imposed by the central government, inadequate local resources available to the Parishad, loyalty of the civil servants to the central authority rather than to the elected Parishad, hidden agenda of the government to consolidate regime, lack of skills and knowledge of elected representatives, corruption, domination of local elites in decision making process, and provision of ex-officio membership of the Union Parishad Chairmen’. The study also pointed out some factors of ineffective accountability in the Upazila Parishad which include partisan interests/political influence, election irregularities, weak national democratic environment. In addition, control of Ministry of central government as well as MP over the Upazila Parishads make accountability process weak.

Nizam Ahmed (2009)<sup>80</sup> explored to understand role of politician and bureaucrat in policy-making process in three Upazila Parishads using an explanatory framework which is based on the honeycomb model meaning a collective decision-making process in which each player negotiates mutually to achieve his/her objectives of individual and/or

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<sup>79</sup> Sharif N. As-Saber and Md Fazle Rabbi, “Democratisation of the Upazila Parishad and Its Impact on Responsiveness and Accountability: Myths versus Realities”, JOAAG, Vol.4. No. 2. 2009

<sup>80</sup> Nizam Ahmed, *Bureaucracy and Local Politics in Bangladesh- A Study in Roles and Relationships* (Dhaka: A H Development Publishing House, 2009).

organizational. Ahmed attempted to understand ‘politico-bureaucrat relationships’ in the decision-making process and observed some characteristics which influenced in the process of upazila governance. The study reveals that politics-bureaucracy at the Upazila level works in by adopting a less conflicting strategy for some reasons such as realizing mutual benefits, self-interest, stability ground, although dominant role of bureaucracy in local government cannot be overlooked.

Ahmed explored role perceptions of local bureaucrats and politicians as well as their prevailing attitude to each other in order to assess direct or indirect influence of politics and bureaucracy in the local governance. The study observed that role perceptions differed in accordance with socio-economic status of both local representatives and bureaucrats which mismatched with common people of Bangladesh. In addition, actual performance and normative expectations in the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats differed case by case according to nature of politicians and bureaucrats. The study explained role and attitudes in terms of three types of elected politicians and two types of bureaucrats. The politicians are ‘delegate’ (performing not freely but bounded by any kind of mandate); ‘trustee’ (free to decide based on own best judgment and conscience in order to serve common good, a rational man); and ‘politico’ (more sensitive to conflicting alternatives and more flexible, less dogmatic). Classical bureaucrats are more rule-bound and less sensitive to political influence compared to political bureaucrats. As the author states, “The classical bureaucrats preferred to

maintain less contact with politicians, were more critical of them and sought to remain independent of the influence of other bureaucracy.”<sup>81</sup>

The study provides a detailed account on perceptions, behaviour, attitude of politicians and bureaucrats at the Upazila level, which helps to understand governance process to some extent. It partially explained some of the structural issues of development projects and its rationality in terms of behaviour of Upazila Parishad. Regarding project selection the politicians tend to engage in some sort of bargaining and negotiation to serve their interests as much as possible. As the author states, “negotiation and compromise provided the dominant method of policymaking and coordination. The inclination of the role actors to avoid conflict made this task relatively easier. Whatever policy thus emerged in the end was likely to be less than optimal. Most decisions failed to satisfy any rational criterion/standard.”<sup>82</sup> As a result, ‘rationality was sacrificed to personal gains and profits’<sup>83</sup> as well as resulting in poor decision as ‘corruption in upazila government was prevalent.’<sup>84</sup>

S.J. Anwar Zahid (2010) mentioned that planning and implementation of rural development projects were not based on local problems/needs of local community. Bureaucrats, professional planners and politicians played key roles in formulating development plans and projects, where the participation of people was negligible. The beneficiaries’ participation was comparatively higher in implementation of project compared to identification of local needs/problems and evaluation of project. Reasons

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., p.148

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p.127.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 133.

behind poor participation of beneficiaries were lack of training and low level of knowledge to articulate their views and less scope of participation. Design and selection of development projects were done through traditional methods as rate of return, net present value, IRR and sensitivity analysis were rarely applied by the Planning Commission, administrative Ministry and executing agency involved in development projects. In addition, he highlighted some other weaknesses in project planning and implementation, such as inter-ministerial/departmental weak coordination and conflicts; delay in project appraisal and approval; delay in fund release; influence of politicians and policy planners of ruling party in selecting sites of the project and recruitment of project personnel; and irregular review meetings and inadequate monitoring.<sup>85</sup> He pointed out that major problems in the effective implementation of the projects at the macro and micro level of Bangladesh include change in project priority with the changes of government and its philosophy, financial stringency, corruption, interference of the political leaders, low level of education of the beneficiaries.<sup>86</sup>

In addition, a research conducted by Saleh Ahmed (2010) reveals that projects of central government included in the ADP suffer from some governance issues such as lack of expertise of project managers to run project, delay in recruitment of project personnel, lack of knowledge of project managers on procurement rules and procedures, frequent transfer of project directors, reluctance of central authority to delegate power to project implementation authority; and weak monitoring of respective ministry.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> S.J. Anwar Zahid, *Rural Development Planning and Project Management in Bangladesh*, Second Edition (Comilla: BARD, 2010), pp. 161-170.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231.

<sup>87</sup> Saleh Ahmed, "Problems of ADP Implementation in Bangladesh: An Analytical Review", Unpublished Masters Thesis, (Dhaka: Institute of Governance Studies, BRAC University, 2010), pp. 24-29.

Sheik Noor Mohammad (2010) has examined participation issue in the projects undertaken by the two Union Parishads, the grassroots level local government system in the rural areas of Bangladesh. The study reveals that participation of community people in project planning is very low (7 percent) while it rises to 24 percent during implementation stage. Institutional and regulatory framework, economic, social, political and cultural factors are not suitable for ensuring effective participation of indented beneficiaries of the projects. It was found in the study that PICs (Project Implementation Committees) were highly dominated by socially, economically and politically well off people and they are highly politically linked to same ruling political party. Selections of projects or decisions regarding activities of the project (for example, site selection, beneficiaries selection, nomination of members in PICs) are highly influenced by local Member of Parliament (MP), political leaders at Upazila level and local political persons nominated by local MP. As a result, local development projects in many cases were found less need-based or not fulfilling local demands of the majority community people. Moreover, the local influentials often control the project benefits to their own group interest and become united to share mutual benefits. Regarding the nature of the projects taken the two Union Parishads the study reveals that most of the projects (87 percent) are related to three categories, such as infrastructure, transport and communication, public health and sanitation. Project priorities are rarely openly identified and the project

management authority is highly reluctant to disclose project related information to the community people.<sup>88</sup>

Pranab Kumar Pandey and Mohammed Asaduzzaman (2011)<sup>89</sup> conducted a study to examine problems with regard to implement decentralization policy in Bangladesh. Based on views of Upazila officials, local political leaders and Union Parishad members, the study suggested that confrontational and unforgiving nature of political culture and attitude became hindrances in implementing and practicing decentralization policy in Bangladesh. The study also found that the law makers were reluctant to lose their control over local government institutions. Findings of the study revealed that prevailing colonial bureaucratic attitude in the bureaucracy acted as obstacle to transfer power to the local elected bodies, resulted in independent and powerful local governance obstructed.<sup>90</sup> The study also mentioned that poor people did not have easy access to services provided by local government institutions. Instead of making decentralized local governance system, ruling political party and the bureaucracy exploited local government system for exercising power as the study observed. Political problems, such as confrontational politics, hegemony of political party at the local level impeded sustainable development and people's participation at the local level. According to comments of the study, MP's involvement in functioning of the Upazila Parishad is "a clear violation of democratic

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<sup>88</sup> Sheik Noor Mohammad, "People's Participation in Development Projects at Grassroot level: A Case of Alampur and Jagannathpur Union Parishad", Masters Thesis (Dhaka: North South University, 2010), pp.37-74

<sup>89</sup> Pranab Kumar Pandey and Mohammed Asaduzzaman (2011), "Politics, Problems and Trends of Decentralized Local Governance in Bangladesh" in Ishtiaq Jamil et al. (ed.) *Understanding Governance and Public Policy in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Bengal Com-Print, 2011).

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. p.162.



values and inconsistent with the spirit of the Bangladeshi constitution”.<sup>91</sup> Regarding bureaucracy the study observed that it worked as ‘invisible actor’ behind the political forces and it maintained an ‘informal patron-client networks’ with political forces to serve vested interests.

On the other hand, the study highlighted some positive aspects of the Union Parishad Act of 2009 which might have impact for improving governance at the local level. As the study stated,

In order to ensure people’s participation in the process of LG decision making and ensure accountability and transparency of their activities, the present government enacted” the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009”. It is no denying the fact that the government was mostly motivated by some donor driven local government best practices including Sirajganj Local Governance Development Fund Project (SLGDP). The Act of 2009 can be considered as well thought out act since several important provisions has been incorporated in the new act that can help the establishment of a successful local government body. Special features of the Act of 2009 include the provision of introduction of ward shavas (ward meetings), holding meeting for a open budget, declaration of citizen charter, and provision of the right to information. All these are made for involving people in the decision making process and ensuring accountability and transparency of the total process ... Proper implementation of these provisions would certainly open up new avenue for the ordinary people to take part in the activities of the UP on the one hand , and on the other hand it would ensure accountability and transparency of the activities of the UPs.<sup>92</sup>

The study observed four issues. First, an appropriate balance between centralization and decentralization is essential for the effective and efficient functioning of the government. Second, instead of becoming ‘self-governing’ local government units, they had been established as an extension of the central government which

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p.162.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p.166-167.

provided limited scope of people's participation. Third, local government units suffered from institutional, financial weaknesses as well as social and political credibility. Four, local government in Bangladesh were established based on principles of deconcentration and delegation, not on devolution, resulted in centrally controlled local activities of local government.

Salahuddin M. Aminuzzaman (2011)<sup>93</sup> reviewed a local development project related to improving local governance of Union Parishad. The study highlighted that the existing government policy such as the National Rural Development Policy, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) underlines the significance of accountable and responsive local government institutions in order to deliver public services as well as socio-economic development at the local level. As the study stated, "It therefore appears that, in addition to the strong Constitutional commitment, Bangladesh has a number of supplementary policy pronouncements and regulatory framework to establish an effective local governance system. These policies have further widened the scope, role and function of the local government system of Bangladesh to address the developmental challenges of the country".<sup>94</sup>

The study pointed out some features of local governance scenario of Bangladesh in the political-bureaucratic perspective. First, government policy focusing local government has been changed with the change of government that directed to creating loyalty as well as serving legitimacy and creating power-base of the ruling government.

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<sup>93</sup> Salahuddin M. Aminuzzaman, "Local Governance Innovations: An Assessment of the Challenges for Mainstreaming Local Governance Support Program", in Ishtiaq Jamil et al. (ed.) *Understanding Governance and Public Policy in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Bengal Com-Print, 2011).

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p.198.

Second, local government institutions had been facing problems of bureaucratic control and resource crisis along with invisible role of other political actors (for example, MP) resulting in weak decentralized governance. Third, local governance at UP level suffered from a number of challenges, such as poor consultation with community people, poor understanding of both elected local government functionaries about their prescribed roles and responsibilities, too much power given to the chairperson of local government institute, lack of accountability of government officials, centralized project design, weak relationships and coordination between administration and elected representatives and so on. Fourth, some cultural issues prevailing in the rural Bangladesh are not conducive for better local governance which are characterized as culture of non-participation of community in formal community activities, existence of patron-client relationship in the rural society, confrontation and violence in political leadership.

The study analyzed a local governance improvement project, LGSP-LIC (Local Governance Support Program- Learning and Innovation Component) program which aimed at fostering good governance through ‘enhanced fiscal decentralization as well as strengthening the capacity of UPs to deliver improved basic services to the community’.<sup>95</sup> Though a participative planning and implementation system was introduced in overall management of the project, but success and sustainably might be constrained by a number of governance challenges and political constraints, such as dominance of patronage politics, absence of political and bureaucratic ownership, mutual mistrusts

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 203.

between local bureaucracy and local elected leadership, lack of integrity, initiatives, commitment, vision of local leaders and so on.<sup>96</sup> The study concluded,

Pilot experiences in Bangladesh as well as regional /international experiences reveal that rural local government could utilize the resourcefulness of the rural poor and create the conditions for them to improve upon their conditions through an enabling environment. However it is also true that without a real devolution of authority, local government will find it hard to be effective in addressing the developmental needs, poverty and the cry for good governance at the grass roots. In fact, countries that have developed efficient local government systems have had to take hard policy decisions, which in most cases, were not politically popular. What is therefore needed is a strong political will to install an effective and truly decentralized local government system.<sup>97</sup>

Tofail Ahmed (2012)<sup>98</sup> argued that decentralization policy introduced in 1982 by the military regime was rather used as an instrument for ‘capitalist accumulation, class domination, legitimisation and crisis management’ of the military regime instead of achieving the real objectives of decentralization such as ‘debureaucratisation, democratisation, destatisation’. In this regard, he explored causes of the inherent weakness of local government system through reviewing decentralization policy from both theoretical and practical perspective. He also reviewed measures of local government reforms in Bangladesh from a historical perspective to understand class coalition among the dominant elites in the society in order to legitimate bourgeois class under military dominance as well as local government institution acted in the process of civilization and legitimation of military rule. In reality, as he argued, the legal framework of decentralization policy for introducing local government system at the Upazila level became a centrally regulated institution instead of decentralized organization. In this

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid., pp. 204-5.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., pp.211-2.

<sup>98</sup> Tofail Ahemd, *Decentralization and The Local State- Political Economy of Local Government in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Agamee Prakashani, 2012)

regard, the study critically reviewed the legal framework of the Upazila Parishad which argued that the central government possesses ample discretionary power and authority to intervene in the operation of Upazila Parishad.

As a result, it was difficult for the Upazila Parishad to take development projects according to local demands. As he stated, “The effect of central control was to limit the growth and development of decentralised planning by means of centrally determined sectoral priorities with a minimum and maximum limit of resources that could be allocated to each sector”.<sup>99</sup> The author further commented, “If the UZPs were to have full authority and control to determine their own sectoral priority and budgetary allocations according to their locally felt needs, the UZP plan could contribute something even within a context of severe financial crisis. Development needs and problems vary from upazila to upazila, but the central regulatory controls on plan framework were the same for all UZPs. Results of an opinion survey show that UZP projects widely contradicted with the official government framework imposed through the planning commission in relation to priority given by UZP chairmen”.<sup>100</sup> In this regard, the study revealed that one hundred and forty five UZP chairmen listed eleven sectors and the top four sectors were education, agriculture, physical infrastructure and health, population control and family planning.

The study found that dominant class and their local allies captured most of the benefits provided through Upazila Parishad because the poor and unorganized mass of

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid. p.172.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. p.173.

rural community were denied to access to public services as much as possible. The research argued that a relationship between the local dominant class and the state was developed in order to fulfill their mutual benefits. The relationship was further consolidated within and beyond the Upazila Parishad by means of the appropriation of public resources for private gains. The study stated, “Within a decade of the evolution of the Upazila system, a new type of dominant classes had emerged at the UPZ level, absolutely dependent on the local state for their progress in economic and class terms and flexing their political muscles by riding the horses of the local state”.<sup>101</sup>

Highlighting development activities of Upazila Parishad the study revealed that development projects of Upazila Parishads were highly concentrated on small rural development infrastructures such as roads, bridges, culverts, markets, small scale irrigation schemes. The study mentioned that 94 percent of resources of development budget of Upazila Parishads were spent in infrastructural programmes. The study identified some governance issues in implementation of development schemes. Referring two schemes, implementation of projects which was assigned to a project committee was implemented in reality by two of UP members who acted as contractors. Local participation through recruiting local labourers in the implementation of schemes was minimal and in some cases not available. The study commented,

The Participation of the project committee was nominal; most of the works were commissioned either by the UZP contractor or by the UP members of the respective project area. The assessment of the social and economic impact of these infrastructural projects on the quality of life on the people is a different issue altogether. But if the direct benefit of these programmes are assessed on face value, it is surely the contractors, officials concerned and the representative members of the UZP who

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid. p.256.

benefited directly by earning profit, bribes, commissions and/or salaries either as contractors or as decision makers. The benefits accruing to the labourers and to the general public were marginal in comparison.<sup>102</sup>

On the other hand, nearly 7 percent of project-money siphoned off by the contractors, suppliers and other agents and intermediaries in the process of project implementation. The study found that after all these legal, extralegal and illegal appropriations, only 25 percent of the budgetary resources of project cost went to ground because corruptions took away a huge amount of project resources. One mechanism of doing corruption in project implementation was underpayment of wages of labourers as pointed out in the study.

Abdul Karim and S. M. Humayun Kabir (2012)<sup>103</sup> explored issues related to the legal framework with regard to role and responsibility of actors and institutions in the process of governance of the Upazila Parishad of Bangladesh. The study covered a wide range of issues, such as development activities and operational aspects of MDGs at the Upazila level, relationship among different actors of local governance and so on. According to study, Upazila Parishad was being hindered by the central bureaucracy and sometimes by the MPs. The study reveals that a number of problems which making the Upazila Parishad less effective to perform its development activities. They are, among others, conflicting relationships between Upazila Chairman and UNO, influence of local MP in selecting projects of Upazila, unplanned development projects due to lack of five year plan, lack of role of Vice-chairmen.

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid. p.232.

<sup>103</sup> Abdul Karim and S. M. Humayun Kabir, *Working of Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh: A Study of Dumki Upazila* (Comilla: BARD, 2012).

The study suggests that huge number of departmental committees which were mostly headed by UNO performed important role in the decision making process. on the other hand, standing committees of the Upazila Parishad were found less active. In most cases, these departmental committees did not work transparently. The study revealed that notice of the meeting was not served to the members of the committee before organizing meeting, even in some cases, resolution of the meeting was written earlier.<sup>104</sup> The study suggests that projects under ADP allocation were taken on unplannedly and hastily as the Upazila Parishad decided projects when installments received. Upazila Parishad just approved the projects to spend government allocation.

Daniela Christina Buchmann (2013)<sup>105</sup> studied issues related to participation, transparency and accountability from socio-political perspective in the working of Union Parishad in Bangladesh. The study argued that social and political factors may enable or prevent ensuring public accountability and participation in the decision-making process in fragile governance like Bangladesh. The study examined the legal framework of the Local Government Act (Union Parishad) 2009 with regard to scope or ‘spaces’ for ensuring participation and accountability. The study revealed that social hierarchies based on gender, education, family and wealth as well as political alliances in the context of rural Bangladesh made the less participation of poor. On other hand, local government functionaries, both elected and non-elected, were less accountability to common people. According to study, the existing legal framework provides some institutional mechanisms

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p.28.

<sup>105</sup> Daniela Christina Buchmann, *Accountability at the Local Level in Fragile Contexts: Bangladesh Case Study*, IDS Working Paper 419, (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2013)



such as ‘*ward shava*’ (community meeting at the ward level), standing committees for ensuring people’s participation in the decision-making process. But the legal structure possesses some inherent constraints, such as bureaucratic control, vagueness of creating spaces with regard to participation, accountability and transparency. As a result, hidden power becomes able to capture decisions.

A number of recent reports and articles published in the daily news papers pointed out some issues related to problems of project management both at local and national level. A report indicated that implementation of project’s activities at the national level delayed to due to long delay in appointing adviser as mentioned in the project document.<sup>106</sup> In some cases, local level projects undertaken by the Union Parishads under the national-government funded project (for example, Local Governance Support Project) suffered from corruptions, such as underutilization of project’s resources, even forfeited project allocation without implementation of project activities.<sup>107</sup> Some common problems of national development projects were highlighted in another report which include high number of projects in ADP, approval of project without feasibility study, political considerations in project approval instead of assessing viability in terms of socio-economic analysis, delay in fund release, weak monitoring by concerned authority, poor skill and experience of project director as well as transfer of project director during project implementation.<sup>108</sup> Low quality of project implementation was caused by lack of strong monitoring, delay of fund release and unskilled project personnel. It was reported that 40 percent of development expenditure was misused or lost in corruption due to lack

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<sup>106</sup> The Daily Janakantho, dated December 25, 2013, p. 18.

<sup>107</sup> The Daily Naya Diganth, dated 3/10/13, p.11.

<sup>108</sup> The Daily Sangbad, dated 29/09/13, p.6

of transparent procurement, and most of the corruptions were happened in projects funded by local fund.<sup>109</sup> Sometimes conflicting relationship among the elected representatives of different tiers hampered proper project implementation.<sup>110</sup>

### **2.3 Conclusion**

In sum, these studies reveal a wide range of issues related to project performance in Bangladesh. Some studies focussed on issues related to weaknesses of project formulation from financial and economic perspective. Some studies highlighted institutional aspects related to project managements such as monitoring and supervision, nature and behaviour of project implementation authority/committee. Some studies explained attitude of local government functionaries with regard to project selection and implementation. Some studies identified factors contributing poor results such as cost over-run and time over-run as well as failure of project targets. However, findings of these studies give some insight to understand factors of success or failure of development project. These may help understand some partial issues of governance as well. But, for better understanding of governance issues in different stages of project cycle were not explored based on empirical evidences. This study has attempted to fill up these gaps.

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<sup>109</sup> The Samakal, dated 4/9/13, p. 10.

<sup>110</sup> The Daily Prothom Alo, dated 16/7/12, p.3

## Chapter 3

### Governance in Project: Conceptual Issues and Theoretical Framework

#### 3.1 Prelude

Governance as a multidimensional concept has become a much-talked issue in the development discourse for the last few decades. Development thinkers and practitioners lay emphasis on improved governance as one of the prerequisites for effective and efficient management of resources. In this regard, projects which are one of the means of spending scarce financial resources both in private and government sectors have become a great concern or object of governance. Governance as broad issue is defined and discussed by scholars, practitioners and development organization according to context and circumstances. Considering complexity of making a widely accepted definition of governance, this chapter attempts to survey theoretical issues of governance in the perspectives of project governance and to develop a conceptual framework which could be helpful to understand governance issues in project management.

#### 3.2 Wide Meaning of Governance

David Levi-Faur has expressed that “Governance is said to be many things, including a buzzword, a fad, a framing device, a concept, an umbrella concept, a descriptive concept, a slippery concept, an empty signifier, a weasel word, a fetish, a fief, an approach, a theory and a perspective.”<sup>111</sup> As a growing concept, governance

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<sup>111</sup> David Levi-Faur, “From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”?” in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.3.

covers multi-disciplinary crosscutting issue that “units scholars across the social sciences, many of whom recognize the growing gaps between the formal constitutional order and the way order is produced and reproduced in every life.”<sup>112</sup> Therefore, governance encompasses wider spectrum of issues, and mostly is explained from different perspectives. Perception of governance could be also understood from academic perspective as well as some international organization’s concepts.

Literally governance denotes steering or directing. The Oxford English Dictionary provides three key meanings of governance that include: (i) the state of being governed: good order; (ii) the office, functions or power of governing: authority or power to govern; and (iii) the manner in which something is governed or regulated; method of management, system of regulations. As a notion of steering or directing or management system, governance has been prevailing from the start of human civilization. However, issue of governance has been evolved as an influential phenomenon in the recent development literature through a number of writings of some scholars, such as Oliver Williamson, Rod Rhodes.<sup>113</sup>

Many authors define governance in different perspectives. Hye described ‘governance’ as the undertaking of activities, management of resources, organization of men and women by groups of people, communities, local government bodies, business organizations and branches of the state (Legislature, Judiciary and Government) through social, political, administrative and economic arrangements that meet the daily needs of people and ensure sustainable development including how the affairs of a state are

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid., p.4.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., pp.5-6.

administered and regulated – either good or bad as expressed in normative way, which is associated with ‘correctness and efficiency’.<sup>114</sup> Mills and Serageldin describe governance as ‘how people are ruled, how the affairs of the state are administered and regulated’.<sup>115</sup> Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido Lobaton pointed out three dimensions of governance – (a) the process, by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and formulate, implement and enforce sound policies and regulations; and (c) the extent of participation of the citizens in the affairs of the state.<sup>116</sup>

According to G. Stoker (1998 quoted in Khan, 2007: 321) draws five propositions to comprehend the concept of governance that include: (i) Governance refers to institutions and actors from within and beyond government; (ii) Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues; (iii) Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective actions; iv) Governance is about autonomous self-governing network of actors; and v) Governance recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority.

Governance is also understood as a structure, a process, a mechanism and a strategy. As David Levi-Faur stated,

As a structure, governance signifies the architecture of formal and informal institutions; as a process it signifies the dynamics and steering

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<sup>114</sup> Hasnat Abdul Hye, (ed.) *Governance South Asian Perspective* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2000), p.2.

<sup>115</sup> Cited in Muhammad Mahmudur Rahman, “Good Governance in Bangladesh: A Theoretical Discourse”, *South Asian Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, July 2005, p. 52.

<sup>116</sup> Cited in Muhammad Mahmudur Rahman, “Good Governance in Bangladesh: A Theoretical Discourse”, *South Asian Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, July 2005, p. 53.

functions involved never-ending processes of policy making; as a mechanism it signifies institutional procedures of decision-making, of compliance and of control (or instruments); finally as a strategy it signifies the actors' efforts to govern and manipulate the design of institutions and mechanisms in order to shape choice and preferences.<sup>117</sup>

Structure of governance is a 'hard-wire' part of governance process that provides basic foundation in the decision-making process. In this regard, structure includes laws rules and regulatory institutions. The process of decision-making is a 'soft-wire' part of governance based on application of laws, rules and institutional mechanisms. Governance involves both 'hard-wire' and 'soft-wire'. Soft-wire is somewhat related to art of governance which could be hierarchical or top-down based governance, or it could be collaborative, participatory and interactive.

Governance theory focuses on how the affairs of an organization are administered, managed and regulated- either good or bad. This is a normative way of explaining governance issues. As B. Guy Peters expressed, "[t]he normative element of governance becomes most apparent when the term "good governance" is used, as it is increasingly in both academic and practitioner discourse. Perhaps most notably the world Bank has placed a great deal of emphasis on "good governance" as part of its program for development in its donee countries."<sup>118</sup> In fact, how to ensure good governance has become a prime concern in the governance literature as well as development thinkers. Governance literatures suggest a wide range of indicators for assessing good or bad

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<sup>117</sup> David Levi-Faur, "From "Big Government" to "Big Governance"?" in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) p. 8.

<sup>118</sup> B. Guy Peters, "Governance As Political Theory,' in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.26.

governance. In this regard, some donor or international organization provide concepts on governance (Box 1)

Box 1: Governance as perceived by Development Partners

**“The World Bank:** The World Bank defines governance as the manner in which power is exercised in management of countries economic and social resources for development. Accordingly, the term governance includes public sector management, accountability, the legal framework, transparency and information. The World Bank’s views Good governance as epitomized by predictable, open and transparent policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law.

**Asian Development Bank (ADB):** Asian Development Bank defines the ‘four pillars of governance’ as follows: Accountability is the capacity to call officials to account for their actions. Effective accountability has two components: answerability and consequences, answerability is the requirement to respond periodically to questions concerning one’s official actions Transparency entails low cost access to relevant information. Reliable and timely economic and financial information is a must for the public (normally through the filter of responsible media). Predictability results primarily from laws and regulations that are clear, known in advance and uniformly from laws and regulations that are clear, known in advance and uniformly and effectively enforced. Lack of predictability makes it difficult for public officials to plan for the provision of services. Participation is needed to obtain reliable information and to serve as a reality check and watchdog for government action.

**The Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP):** provides another conceptualization of governance. It states that, ‘governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not

implemented).’ It explains that governance can be applied to different contexts- corporate governance, international governance, national governance and local governance.

**European Union:** In the context of a political and institutional environment that upholds human right, democratic principles, and the rule of law, good governance is the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in managing and distributing resources, and capacity building for elaborating and implementing measures that aim to prevent and combat corruption.

**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP):** Governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes, and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their legal obligations, and mediate their differences.

**Commission on Global Governance:** Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal instructions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.

**Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR):** Governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realization of human rights. Good governance accomplishes this in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with



due regard for the rule of law... Governance therefore calls for enhancing the scope for the common people to influence law, and promoting their rights and privileges. In the broader mosaic, generic features of governance include:

- a) promotion of democracy and open pluralistic societies with free and fair electoral process,
- b) strengthening of transparent, accountable, efficient and effective national and local government,
- c) promotion of respect for human rights.,
- d) reinforcement of rule of law, including fair and accessible legal and judicial system.
- e) promotion of independent media and the dissemination of information, and
- f) anti-corruption initiatives and efforts to reduce excessive non-developmental expenditure.”<sup>119</sup>

To the World Bank, good governance is conceptualized as a process of ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in the management of public affairs and public resources through accountable, transparent and participatory process.<sup>120</sup> This line of thinking indicates that governance is related to development administration and regeneration of economy with a vision to ensure a sound development management. Good governance could act as one of facilitating factors for achieving desired outcomes and it has some sort of causal relations with acceptable level of performance. Because good governance structure, process, mechanism and strategies can create an enabling environment that maximizes the opportunities of growth and efficient uses of resources for development.

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<sup>119</sup>Salahuddin M. Aminuzzaman (ed.), *Governance and Development – Bangladesh and Regional Experiences* (Dhaka: Shrabon Prakashani, 2006), pp. 14-16.

<sup>120</sup>Hossain Zillur Rahman and Mark Robinson, *Governance and State Effectiveness in Asia*, Policy Paper (Dhaka: Power and Participation Research Centre, 2006), p.7.

On the other hand, poor governance or bad governance or ineffective governance creates opportunities of misuse or waste of scarce resources. Poor governance can be reflected through many symptoms. According to The World Bank, bad symptoms of governance are:

- Failure to make a clear separation between what is public and what is private, hence, a tendency to divert public resources for private gain;
- Failure to establish a predictable framework of law and government behaviour conducive to development, or arbitration in the application of rules and laws;
- Excessive rules, regulations, licensing requirements, and so forth, which impede the functioning of markets and encourage rent-seeking;
- Priorities inconsistent with development, resulting in a misallocation of resources; and
- Excessively narrowly based or nontransparent decision making.<sup>121</sup>

Apart from these, corruption as an indicator of poor governance has become prime governance issue in the public affairs in both developing and developed societies. Because corruption diverts scarce public resources to private gains and acts as a ‘disincentive to investment’ as well as brings burden on poor consumers of public services.<sup>122</sup> Besides, corruption retards growth and accelerate poverty. It also impedes desired results and outcomes of a planned activity.

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<sup>121</sup> The World Bank, *Governance and Development* (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1992), p.9.

<sup>122</sup> Hossain Zillur Rahman and Mark Robinson, *Governance and State Effectiveness in Asia* p.8.

### Box 2: Governance as Sector Specific Issue

Concept of governance is considered in sector-specific terms as the UNDP (1997) presented five variations. First, economic governance involves processes of decision-making that influence economic activities in a country and have strong impacts on societal issues such as equity, fight against poverty and quality of life. Secondly, political governance refers to the legitimacy and authority of decision-making and policy implementation that allows citizens to freely elect their representatives to oversee the legislative, executive and judicial organs of government, thus representing the interests of a pluralist unit. Thirdly, administrative governance is related to the systems of policy implementation carried out through an efficient, independent and accountable element in the public sector. Fourthly, systematic governance includes the structures and processes that guide political, social and economic relationships, protect cultural and religious beliefs and values, create and maintain an environment of health, freedom and security, and provide opportunities to exercise personal capabilities leading to a better life for the citizens. Finally, international governance addresses the pattern in which the community of nations across the world manages its affairs.

Source: Juha Vartola, Ismo Lumijarvi and Mohammed Asaduzzaman (ed.) *Towards Good Governance in South-Asia* (Dhaka: Osder Publications, 2013), p.41.

From the above definitions, it reveals that governance has two main components, (a) actors of governance and (b) the manner or process through which the actors interact to manage activities effectively. Actors include both individuals and institutions having different roles depending on circumstances as well as their capacity. As a working definition, governance applied in this study refers to efficient and effective decision making for managing development affairs and proper utilization of public resources in the development projects through effective involving of relevant actors.

### 3.3 Issues of Effective Governance

Effectiveness of governance is associated with a wide range of issues. It is not only a matter of structural issue, but also is related to values, process and outcomes.<sup>123</sup> Governance structure, process, mechanisms and strategies are critical factors for promoting effective governance. Weaknesses of any factors can make other factors weak due to a mutual dependency. For example, weak governance structure attributes to weak governance process. Therefore, effective governance includes effectiveness in structure, process, mechanisms and strategies of governance in order to accrue better results or desired outcomes.

Effective governance also depends on efficient roles of actors engaged in the process of governance to deliver goods or services or to solve a common problem. In fact, all actors have some roles based on their capacities, resources and jurisdictional authorities. State, local government, political parties, private organizations including citizens have multiple roles. For example, citizens have three roles which include as governors (owner-authorities, voters, taxpayers, community members); activist-producers (providers of services, co-producers, self-helpers obliging others to act); and consumers (clients and beneficiaries).<sup>124</sup> Like this, state, local government and other organizations have multiple roles. Governance as a concept of changing boundaries between public, private and voluntary actors suggests that engagement of all stakeholders through

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<sup>123</sup> Hossain Zillur Rahman and Mark Robinson, *Governance and State Effectiveness in Asia* p.8

<sup>124</sup> Mark Moore, *Creating Public Value* (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1996) in Anwar Shah (ed.), *Local Governance in Developing Countries* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2006), p.16.

cooperation, collaboration, and networks is essentially important for making governance more effective.<sup>125</sup> This sort of thinking indicates that governance shifts from a hierarchic or bureaucratic approach to interactive and deliberative approach that demands involvement and engagement of potential stakeholders to solve the common problems of the society.

Direct and indirect roles of formal institutions as well as the roles of informal norms, networks, community organizations and neighborhood associations are essentially important to accelerate collective actions.<sup>126</sup> It is assumed that the more relationship exists among the actors, the more efficient and effective governance is ensured. It is also essential for making governance successful to contain a clear understating of goals or destination that to be achieved by all actors.<sup>127</sup>

Institutional capacity also contributes in making effective governance. Hossain Zillur Rahman and Mark Robinson have identified some institutional aspects that contributed the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED)<sup>128</sup> for increasing its institutional capacity. These are: (i) organizational decentralization, (ii) professional work culture and recognition of outstanding achievement, (iii) strong monitoring system, (iv) informal decision making: de-emphasizing of bureaucratic file movement in favour of use of information technology, (v) leadership, (vi) team work, (vii) sense of mission,

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<sup>125</sup> For details on network governance, see R. A.W. Rhodes, “Waves of Governance” in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.33-44.

<sup>126</sup> Anwar Shah (ed.) *Local Governance in Developing Countries* (Washington: The World Bank, 2006), p. 1-2.

<sup>127</sup> B. Guy Peters, “Governance As Political theory,” in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.22.

<sup>128</sup> LGED is a central government department responsible for infrastructure development allover Bangladesh, especially rural areas.

(viii) attitude and (ix) pragmatic attitude to accommodating political and financial pressures without compromising work quality.<sup>129</sup>

Institutional capacities of governance actors may be constrained by many factors. In respect of local government institutes in Bangladesh institutional constraints include lack of proper understanding of the operational procedures of local government by the elected members; unawareness regarding rules, regulation and guidelines of budgeting, planning and resource management by the local government functionaries; limited number of staffs and low level of their knowledge and skills, weak authority compared to field administration units; improper record keeping, resource constraints, inadequate logistic support, centralization of executive powers and decision-making and so on.<sup>130</sup>

### **3.4 Indicators of Governance**

Existing literatures suggest a wide range of indicators of governance. A research report published by the World Bank has grouped governance indicators into six categories from more than two hundred indicators which were adopted by different national and international development or research institutes to assess a variety of governance issues. These are voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of

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<sup>129</sup> Hossain Zillur Rahman and Mark Robinson, *Governance and State Effectiveness in Asia*, pp.25-26.

<sup>130</sup> see Abdul Karim and Md. Mizanur Rahman, *Governance in Union Parishad of Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects* (Comilla: BARD, 2008), pp. 9-17; UNDP, *Local Government In Bangladesh: An Agenda for Governance* (New York: UNDP, 1996), pp. 41-46.

corruption.<sup>131</sup> Based on these six indicators, a study was conducted to understand level of governance in different dimensions across the world.

The study provides meaning of these indicators. Voice and accountability means ability of citizens to participate in selecting their government, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Political stability and absence of violence means government will not be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. Government effectiveness means quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Regularity quality means ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Rule of law means the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Control of corruption means the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.<sup>132</sup>

However, governance indicators are commonly understood as participation, transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, although these are also

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<sup>131</sup> Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, "Governance Matters VI- Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2006" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280. (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 2007).

<sup>132</sup> Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, "Governance Matters VI- Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2006" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280. (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 2007), pp.3-4.

explained as principles or values in the governance perspectives. Governance indicators are directly or indirectly inter-related and influence each other to make desired results and outcomes especially efficient and effective decision-making. Following sections attempt to discuss elaborately each of indicators.

### *Participation*

Participation means engagement or involvement of stakeholders or citizens' voice through direct or legitimate intermediate institutions in the decision making process. The literature on participation stresses that "involvement of stakeholders enhances the support for policy proposals, because more information becomes available. Stakeholders get a better picture of the arguments used in order to arrive at a certain assessment and decisions. When actors are involved earlier and more intensely in the governance process, it is expected that they will be more willing to accept both the process and the decision reached."<sup>133</sup> In addition, M. E. Warren argues, "decisions resulting from deliberation are likely to be more legitimate, more reasonable, more informed, more effective and more politically viable."<sup>134</sup>

Meeting, consultation, dialogue, public hearing are commonly used as means and tools to promote participative process of decision-making. In addition, some innovative practices are observed in Europe for direct engagement of citizens in the decision-making process, such as citizens' juries, deliberative forums, multisectoral partnerships and

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<sup>133</sup> Erik Hans Klijn, Arwin Van Buuren, & Jurian Edelenbos, "The Impact of Governance: A Normative and Empirical Discussion," in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.304.

<sup>134</sup> cited in Frank Fischer, "Participatory Governance: From Theory To Practice," in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.462.



coproduction where citizens being involved as principal actors in relationship to political decision makers and public bureaucracies, thereby citizens become part of government.<sup>135</sup>

Based on concept of participation, a mode of governance style (widely used as participatory governance) has been evolved as an effective mechanism of managing state affairs in different levels. It is argued that it has influential role in increasing “efficiency of programs (in terms of uses of resources) and effective projects (that achieve their intended outcomes) in the provision and delivery of services, in both developed and developing worlds.”<sup>136</sup> The World Bank’s experience also suggests that citizen’s participation increases successes of projects in a variety of sectors (notably, irrigation, forestry, livestock and agricultural credit, urban development and rural water supply, health and nutrition, the environment, and social investment funds).<sup>137</sup> It is also argued that participatory governance contributes to the “development of communicative skills, citizen empowerment, and community capacity-building”.<sup>138</sup>

Moreover, in the context of project management, participation ensures efficient allocation of public resources and makes projects suitable to public needs and priorities<sup>139</sup> as it was observed that projects conceived and implemented by outside organizations had

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<sup>135</sup> Laurence E. Lynn, JR, “The Many Faces of Governance: Adaptation? Transformation? Both? Neither?” in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.51.

<sup>136</sup> Frank Fischer, “Participatory Governance: From Theory To Practice,” in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.460.

<sup>137</sup> The World Bank, *Governance and Development* (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1992), p.26.

<sup>138</sup> Frank Fischer, “Participatory Governance: From Theory To Practice,” p. 459.

<sup>139</sup> Sheik Noor Mohammad, “People’s Participation in Development Projects at Grassroot level: A Case of Alampur and Jagannathpur Union Parishad”, Masters Thesis (Dhaka: North South University, 2010), p. 23.

failed to produce desired outcomes.<sup>140</sup> Perceived knowledge of all stakeholders through participations in developmental decision making is very important for efficient use of resource as well as allocative efficiency.

At local level, scope of community participation is very essential because it is assumed that community people possess a better understanding of their local conditions and can provide a better feedback in decision making process related to local affairs, even take responsibilities to implement decisions effectively. Srilanka experience shows that people's participation in project implementation reduces estimated costs as the Gramodaya Mandalayas (GMs) [a local government unit] completed a number of projects by spending one-fifth of the estimated cost as local community contributed land, labour and donation to bear local costs of project.<sup>141</sup> In Bhutan, introduction of a vulnerable labour components in project implementation has not only reduced costs of projects, but making more funds available to accomplish more projects and accelerating the pace of local development. In addition, it helped villagers to be aware of how the government can or cannot assist them and consequently they have become more moderate and discriminating in their demands.<sup>142</sup>

In many developing countries, participation of disadvantage section (for example, women, poor community, tribes) in decision-making process at the community level is a crucial challenge in governance discourse because local elite domination in the

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<sup>140</sup> I. Jazairy, *Assessing Participatory Development: Rhetoric versus Reality*, (Rome: Westview Press, 1989) cited in Sheik Noor Mohammad, "People's Participation in Development Projects at Grassroot level: A Case of Alampur and Jagannathpur Union Parishad", Masters Thesis (Dhaka: North South University, 2010), p. 74.

<sup>141</sup> Kamal Siddiqui (ed) *Local Government in South Asia – A Comparative Study* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1992), p. 206.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p.285.

deliberative process acts as deterrent in effective engagement of citizens. Apart from that, ‘power gap’ between rich and poor created from resource inequalities tends to act as a barrier to meaningful participation.<sup>143</sup> To make effective participation, it is essential to a rough equality among the participants which can make an enabling condition for participatory decision making. Conceptually it is argued that powerful patriarchies are more prone to capture development benefits either by themselves, or by their patronage networks. Studying Bangladesh context, Noore Alam Siddiquee stated,

Experience shows that unless the poor are effectively involved in the development process, resources and benefits are often monopolized by the powerful few... Participation develops confidence and competence among the poor to pull down benefits from locally managed development projects which would otherwise be siphoned off by local elites... who are often unsympathetic to national policies and insensitive to the needs of local residents, especially the poorest groups in rural areas<sup>144</sup>

In addition, it is assumed that weak capabilities of ordinary citizens or the lowest strata of society are regarded as an important obstacle in the process of participation. But lessons from experimental projects related to local development efforts based on participatory approach put a serious challenge to this assumption. The participatory projects in Porto Alegre (in Brazil) and Kerala (in India) show that “citizens with less formal education can ... participate with surprisingly high levels of competence. In the case of Kerala, most of the members of local deliberative councils ... described as simple farmers. Nonetheless, they participated impressively in planning projects, the likes of which one very seldom finds in the advanced industrial world.”<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> Frank Fischer, “Participatory Governance: From Theory To Practice,” p. 462..

<sup>144</sup> Noore Alam Siddiquee, *Decentralisation and Development – Theory and Practice in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: The University of Dhaka, 1997), p.52.

<sup>145</sup> Frank Fischer, “Participatory Governance: From Theory To Practice,” p. 459.

## *Transparency*

Transparency as an indicator of governance means availability of information to those who will be affected by particular decision or policy for them. Decisions made in secret might create confusion, distrust and negative reactions among relevant stakeholders. Sometimes policy makers do not want to disclose information to the concerned stakeholders or those affected by the policy in order to realize personal or vested interests. Therefore, to make information available to citizens many countries including developing countries (for example, India, Bangladesh) have enacted law to ensure citizen's rights to access to information regarding public matters. It removes not only confusion, but also provision of accurate and useful information increases capacity of citizens or the concerned stakeholders to hold accountable of the decision-makers

Transparency is essentially important element for institutional accountability. Transparency in government decision-making and public policy implementation reduces uncertainty and makes a check in doing corruption particularly in spending public money. It plays an important role in promoting efficiency in financial markets as well as other sectors of economy. It is observed that transparent procurement procedure is essentially important for effective use of public resources.<sup>146</sup> In addition, transparency helps “improving quality of administration and correct reporting, people's participation and awareness, accountability, ensures fair play and controls corruption.”<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> The World Bank, *Governance and Development* (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1992), p.44.

<sup>147</sup> Centre for World solidarity, *Panchayati Raj and Good Governance* (Tarnaka: Centre for world Solidarity, 2008), p. 22.

## *Accountability*

Governance and accountability are closely related. B.Guy Peters states that “Governance implies also some conception of accountability, so that actors involved in setting goals and then in attempting to reach them, whether through public or private action, must be accountable for their actions to society.”<sup>148</sup> Generally accountability means ensuring responsiveness and answerability of actors of governance (policy makers, institutions involved in the process of decision-making and implementation) to the public or to stakeholders or those who will be affected by decisions taken for them. Responsiveness means doing the right thing—making decisions that are consistent with citizens’ preferences or are citizen focused. Answerability means making response with regard to failure of doing right thing.

However, ensuring accountability is not easy task especially where decision-making and implementation process involves a variety of actors who are mutually dependent and work through a complex chain of interactions or collaborative networks.<sup>149</sup> Because ‘external public’ become unable to distinguish whom among the network members to praise or blame for their performance as well as evade accountability by shifting to their partners the blame for failure or misdeeds.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> B. Guy Peters, “Governance As Political Theory,” in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.20.

<sup>149</sup> Erik Hans Klijn, Arwin Van Buuren, & Jurian Edelenbos, “The Impact of Governance: A Normative and Empirical Discussion,” in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.303.

<sup>150</sup> Yannis Papadopoulos, “The Democratic Quality of Collaborative Governance,” in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 516-517.

In a democratic society, conventionally policy makers (namely elected representatives) at national and local levels are bound to become accountable to citizens. Traditionally citizens exercise their power by casting their votes after a specific period. But how citizens could be able to exert constant pressure on policy makers in the process of policy-making and implementation at a regular basis has been a growing concern of governance theory. One author suggests that “decision-makers provide *ex post* reasons to justify their decisions, that such reasons be subject to public debate, and that decision-makers be sectioned if they fail to convince their audiences.”<sup>151</sup> In addition, at the local level, it is widely argued that opportunities for more direct participation of citizen in decision-making process and flow of information creates a demand for accountability among the participants.<sup>152</sup> The Swiss constitution has provided some direct democratic provisions to make citizens powerful such as people’s initiatives (people’s proposal to be accepted if certain number of voters give signatures in favour of it); referendum (entitlement of people to pronounce their judgments—either accepting or rejecting government decision); and petitions (all eligible voters can submit a petition to the government and are entitled to receive a reply).<sup>153</sup>

There are many types of accountability. For example, political accountability addresses the acceptability of political system by the people or other political systems, such as elections, parliament, and committees of parliament. Bureaucratic accountability

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<sup>151</sup> Yannis Papadopoulos, “The Democratic Quality of Collaborative Governance,” in David Levi-Faur (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.514.

<sup>152</sup> Nick Devas, “The Challenges of Democratic Decentralisation,” in Munawwar Alam and Andrew Nickson (ed.) *Managing Change in Local Governance* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006), p. 39.

<sup>153</sup> Anwar Shah and Sana Shah, “The New Vision of Local Governance and the Evolving Roles of Local Governments,” in Anwar Shah (ed.) *Local Governance in Developing Countries* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2006), p.28.

ensures a system to monitor the performance of government offices and officials with regard to quality of service, efficiency and abuse of discretionary power. Financial accountability concerns with efficiency in investment and in the production and delivery of goods and services. Public accountability holds government agencies accountable to citizens by social audit.<sup>154</sup> Though all accountability mechanisms are essentially important to make an effective accountable system in government-led actions, here a citizen-centric accountability approach is emphasized to understand accountability process of government-funded projects.

### *Absence of Corruption*

Absence of corruption is one of the desired goals of effective governance at any level as well as considered as important indicator of assessing level of governance. Corruption is generally conceptualized as “the abuse of public power for private gain.” But this definition carries limited notion. Corruption is not only occurred through abuse of power, but there are other practices that are almost close to corruption such as nepotism, cronyism, patronage, systemic discrimination which directly or indirectly act as agents of corruption. Corruption carries a wide range of negative consequences affecting development efforts through making wastage and leakages of resources. It is observed that in Bangladesh, development projects face serious problems of corruption through leakage of resources.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Social audit is a public scrutiny through engagement of citizens to assess progress of intended activities in a participatory way.

<sup>155</sup> Mohinder S. Mudaha and Raisuddin Ahmed, *Government and Rural Transformation – Role of Public Spending and Policies in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: The University Press, 2010), pp.197-198.

### *Effectiveness and efficiency*

Effectiveness and efficiency are considered as ends and means in the process of ensuring effective governance. Depending context and perspectives meaning of effectiveness and efficiency vary. Economists tend to discuss issues of effectiveness in terms of Pareto optimality, namely a situation in which no individual can be made better off without making another individual worse off. Currently in economic terms, effectiveness is conceptualized as ‘value for money.’ In the context of public spending, value for money implies desired outcome through ensuring optimal benefits to community. On the other hand, efficiency in public spending means how far benefits generated to community from incurred cost, though profit is one of the major indicators of efficiency in the private investment which is not prime concern for government investment.

In addition, concept of effectiveness and efficiency defines as processes of governance and institutions that produce results which meet the needs and demands of the community through proper utilization of all sorts of resources, both financial and non-financial. A number of analytical tools are applied to measure efficiency, such as cost-benefit analysis, input and output analysis, efforts and results analysis, expenditure and income relationship etc.

In this study, key governance issues, such as participation, accountability, transparency, effectiveness, efficiency and absence of corruption have been adopted to



study the sound management of development projects as well as proper use of public resources at the local level.

### **3.5 Theoretical Dimensions of Project**

#### *Project as a Development Effort*

Literally, ‘project’ is a planned endeavour to achieve or accomplish specific objectives within a certain timeframe. The Project Management Institute (2004) has defined project as a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product or service.<sup>156</sup> According to Ross Garland, “[a] project is an undertaking of fixed duration to deliver a new, enhanced or modified service for the organization.”<sup>157</sup> Ral Muller expressed, “Projects are created to accomplish an organization’s strategy... The heart of each project is a task (or endeavour) to create an outcome... A project is a temporary organization due to its planned start and end date”.<sup>158</sup>

These definitions reveal that the main purpose of a project is to generate services or goods or improving existing goods and services or changing current situation. Generally, in the private sector’s organizations, projects are taken to make or increase profit, but government’s priority is not to make profit rather to deliver a wide range of services to the community. In this regard, Skylark Chadha stated projects as ‘the kingpins of development planning,’ ‘excellent organized efforts’, ‘basic blocks of

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<sup>156</sup> Project Management Institute, *A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge*, 3rd Edition (Newtown Square: Project Management Institute, 2004) in Sheik Noor Mohammad, “People’s Participation in Development Projects at Grassroot level: A Case of Alampur and Jagannathpur Union Parishad”, Masters Thesis (Dhaka: North South University, 2010), p. 18.

<sup>157</sup> Ross Garland, *Project Governance: A practical guide to effective project decision making*, (London: Kogan Page, 2009), p. 175.

<sup>158</sup> Ralf Muller, *Project Governance* (England: Gower Publishing Limited, 2009), pp. 15-16.

development’, ‘cutting edge of development’, and ‘privileged particles of the development process’.<sup>159</sup> He also mentioned that a project starts with the identification of a “challenging” problem or an opportunity and the decision to do something about it. In this study, project refers to a collective endeavor undertaken by government and local government organizations to achieve some sort of developmental goals through generating community goods and services or providing common good.

### *Types of Projects*

Projects can be classified in numerous categories based on different criterion, such as social sector (for example, health, rural development, energy etc.); professional division (for example, research and development, marketing etc.); ambit of involvement (for example, process know-how, design and construction etc.); geographical segmentation (for example, national, provincial, area etc.); and phage (for example, new, rehabilitation, closure etc.). Projects can be classified according to the financing source, according to degree of importance, according to the financial source, according to financial involvement in the project, according to social sectors, according to the managing authority and according to the ownership structure i.e. private/public sector.<sup>160</sup> Based on geographical location, projects could be categorized as national level projects taken by central government to cover wide area, and local level projects which are taken by local government to cover small geographic area. Generally, projects undertaken by local government are small-sized. This study focuses small projects taken by mid-level local government unit (*Upazila Parishad*) in rural areas of Bangladesh.

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<sup>159</sup> Skylark Chadha, *Managing Projects in Bangladesh: A Scenario Analysis of Institutional Environment for Development Projects*, Second Edition (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1989), p7.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

### *Project Cycle and its Different stages*

Every project has a lifecycle from starting to end that follows a generic route map is called project cycle. The route involves a set of sequential activities which includes identification of project ideas, project appraisal, negotiation and approval, implementation, monitoring and control, evaluation and follow-up. These activities are broadly divided into three stages of project cycle, such as project selection, project implementation, and project monitoring and evaluation.

Activities in project selection stage include identification or selection of project ideas, project analysis or appraisal, pre-feasibility study (whether project is technically, socially, economically and financially viable and sound) stakeholder analysis, project documentation, negotiation and approval etc. Activities in implementation stage involves mobilizing resources, engaging project management, defining roles and responsibilities of project organization, making contract, procuring inputs, and making outputs from the inputs according to goals and objectives of the project. Project monitoring and evaluation includes activities related to controlling of project performance according to its goals, objectives, targets through some project supervising authority and taking corrective actions based on feedback information, so that project goes in the right way to achieve desired results and outcomes.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> S. J. Anwar Zahid, *Rural Development Planning and Project Management in Bangladesh*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (Comilla: BARD, 2010), pp.22-25.

### 3.6 Contributing Factors for Project Success or Failure

Project's success or failure is associated with a wide range of issues, such as effective project management, sound organizational policy, and effective governance of project and so on. The function of project management includes defining the requirement of work, establishing the extent of work, allocating the resources required, planning the execution of the work, monitoring the progress of the work and adjusting deviation from the plan.<sup>162</sup> Successful project management requires appropriate planning with firm commitment to complete the project; appointment of a skilled experienced project manager or team; proper planning of activities; ensuring correct and adequate information flows; changing activities to accommodate frequent changes on dynamic; and accommodating employees' goals with performance and rewards.<sup>163</sup> Effective project management is also highly related to efficient decision making at every activities of project and project team needs to be accountable for the use of resources and should put emphasis on ensuring satisfaction of project users. In addition, effective management of project needs suitable approaches and strategies at the same time.

Success of project is also related to other factors, such as sound organizational policy, capacity, coordination, supervision, adequate timely finance and integrity of procedures in the organizations and efficient performance of the project personnel.<sup>164</sup> In addition, other governance factors have significant impact on effective project

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<sup>162</sup> A K Munns and B F Bjeirmi, "The role of project management in achieving project success", pp.81-82.

<sup>163</sup> A K Munns and B F Bjeirmi, "The role of project management in achieving project success", p. 82

<sup>164</sup> S.J. Anwar Zahid, *Rural Development Planning and Project Management in Bangladesh*, Second Edition (Comilla: BARD, 2010), pp. 153.

governance that include: dedicated, skilled, capable and experience project manager; effective review in project selection; appropriate methods of project management; organization's internal capabilities; effective control mechanism, sufficient freedom and authority to solve day-to-day issues and so on.<sup>165</sup>

On the other hand, a number of reasons or factor may contribute to project failure. Project failure means that when the project could not make success in terms of inadequate achievement of its desired outcome and/or attained or maintained inadequate quality and/or not completion within planed period and so on. A review on a number of the World Bank funded projects implemented in different countries has mentioned some reasons which are related to poor governance that include pervasive corruption, effective accountability system, lack of citizens' demand for good governance, weak monitoring of projects under public expenditure, poor access to and use of information, weak auditing and accounting system, lack of proper decentralization, less popular participation in the design and implementation of projects.<sup>166</sup> Reasons of project failure might vary from project to project depending their types and nature.

A K Munns and B F Bjeirmi pointed out some reasons of project failure, such as inadequate basis for project; appointed wrong person as project manager; unsupportive top management; tasks inadequately defined; lack of proper project management technique; lack of commitment to project; under-costing, overspending, lack of careful attention of the project management; insufficient site information and unaware of project constraints; lack of well-defined strategies, weak personal, technical and organizational

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<sup>165</sup> Ralf Muller, *Project Governance* (England: Gower Publishing Limited, 2009).

<sup>166</sup> The World Bank, *Governance and Development* (Washington, D. C. : The World Bank, 1992), pp.10-47.

skills of project management team; flawed from the start of the project; weak linkage between the project team, poor decision making; weak involvement of project clientele in the project planning and implementation; and ineffective evaluation process in the whole project from conception to close down.<sup>167</sup>

Standing Group and Office of Government Commerce in the UK identify some causes for project failure, which are:

- “The link between project and organizational objectives is unclear, or becomes broken as circumstances change.
- Success criteria, scope and requirements are unclear or unrealistic.
- Senior manager fail to take ownership of the project, or to provide clear leadership and direction.
- The project team fails to engage effectively with users and other external stakeholders (or vice versa).
- There is a lack of key skills or resources.
- Schedules and plans are unrealistic.
- The project team fails to operate as a cohesive unit, with clear allocation of rules and responsibilities.
- The capabilities of suppliers, technologies and tools are misestimated, especially in the face of a rapidly changing circumstance.
- There is a failure to perform key processes, such as communications, risk management, quality management, change management and benefit realization, effectively.

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<sup>167</sup> A K Munns and B F Bjeirmi, “The role of project management in achieving project success”, *International Journal of Project Management*, Vol. 14. No. 2, 1996, pp.82-86.

- There is a failure to break the project down into manageable steps.
- There is a failure to effectively track progress and to intervene when the project gets off course.”<sup>168</sup>

### **3.7 Governance Issues in Project Management: A Conceptual Framework**

Governance in project management implies adoption of governance values, principles and indicators in every stages of project cycle. As a result, project resources can be utilized more properly and desired objectives of the project can be achieved. Ross Garland has described a framework of project governance which reveals that

- “Project governance framework must be clear in its objectives. It must fundamentally address project decision making but must also address the structure that enables stakeholder management to be addressed.
- It must enable efficient and effective project decision making. In doing so, it must address issues such as multi-layered decision making resulting from organizational chain of command considerations as well as the tendency towards consensus decision making.
- It must provide clarity of accountability and clear and correct assignment of accountability.
- It must resolve the relationship between the organization’s structure and temporary structure put in place to deliver project.
- It must support the project delivering a service rather than just an asset, since an asset is only a platform for delivering a service.

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<sup>168</sup> Graham Oakes, *Project Reviews, Assurance and Governance* (Hampshire: Gower Publishing Limited, 2008), pp.15-16. (hereafter, Graham Oakes, Project Reviews)

- It must ensure that those stakeholders not included within the decision-making forum have their needs adequately met by the project governance framework.
- The project governance framework must support the efficient and effective initiation of projects”.<sup>169</sup>

But this framework gives a limited explanation of governance perspectives with regard to project management. For promoting an effective development project, every stage of project management needs to adopt some governance values, principles, methods and strategies. While some governance values could be applicable to all stages of project management, some specific governance issues are more appropriate and suitable according to need of project’s nature and activities of project management. Following conceptual analysis highlighting governance issues in different stages of project management could be helpful for better understanding of governance in project management in government sector.

#### *Governance Issues in Project Selection Stage*

Governance issues in the project selection stage could be different project to project based on project nature, scope, focus, jurisdiction and so on. Generally, it is emphasized in the government sector that project idea or proposal needs to be identified based on assessing priority of needs and demands of citizens or society. As government projects involve public money,<sup>170</sup> project ideas have to be evaluated in terms of ‘value

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<sup>169</sup> Ross Garland, *Project Governance: A practical guide to effective project decision making* (London: Kogan Page Limited, 2009), pp. 54-55.

<sup>170</sup> Public money includes government fund created from any sources, such as taxes, fees, credit, credit or any other sources which is used for citizens’ benefit.



for money' and cost-benefits analysis, not only in terms of financial analysis, but also socio-economic analysis.<sup>171</sup> Accurate estimate of cost of the project needs to be determined based on proper design of the project.

Conventional project identification method based on top-down approach would be replaced by bottom-up participatory approach involving all level of stakeholders to be benefited by the intended project, so that a sense of project ownership grows among all stakeholders. Participatory approach in project selection promotes ownership of projects among stakeholders and makes a clear understanding of goals and objectives. Participatory tools and techniques, such as open community meeting, consultation need to be applied, so that voices and views of locality or beneficiaries or are reflected in project selection or design. In the context of Bangladesh, it is observed that fulfilling interests of 'powerholders' (elected members, local influential persons) in the project selection process has become a growing concern of governance.<sup>172</sup>

#### *Governance Issues in Project Implementation Stage*

A strong system or mechanism of accountability has to be established in the process of project implementation. Accountability mechanism in governance theory focuses not only hierarchical accountability, but also provides more attention to social or public or beneficiaries-focused accountability. A number of good practices regarding social or beneficiaries-focused accountability have been evolved across the world. For

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<sup>171</sup> Some common financial tools, such as IRR, BCR, NPV are adopted to make financial analysis. On the other hand, socio-economic analysis include employment generation, equity in benefit distribution, social benefits and so on. For detailed discussion, see Prasanna Chandra, *Projects Planning, Analysis, Selection, Financing, Implementation and Review*, 6<sup>th</sup> Edition (New Delhi: Mcgraw Hill Publishing Company Limited: 2006)

<sup>172</sup> Noore Alam Siddiquee, *Decentralisation and Development – Theory and Practice in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: The University of Dhaka, 1997), p. 196-199.

example, in Uganda, project management committee elected from benefiting communities which oversees project implementation and independent expenditure tracking system has been adopted to identify whether project resources have reached their intended destination.<sup>173</sup> Who will be responsible for failure with regard to achieving desired outcome or results of the project need to be spelt out clearly. Ross Garland expressed that “[a] project without a clear understanding of who assumes accountability for its success has no clear leadership.”<sup>174</sup> In addition, proper dissemination of project related information such as cost of project, duration of project, project activities is also essential for effective project implementation.

Generally, a project is implemented through project director(s) or project team or authority that performs day-to-day management, success of project, to large extent, depends on their capability. In the implementing stage, skilled project personnel and appropriate persons need to be deployed in the right post because skills, competencies and personalities of the project personnel contribute significantly to the success of the project. Project director should have project management skills as well as good understanding of the project development process. Therefore, selection of appropriate project director or project implementation committee consisting is one of the critical factors of ensuring effective project governance.

Timely completion of project activities with quality is an important indicator of effective project governance, which requires efficient mobilization of resources and

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<sup>173</sup> Nick Devas, “The Challenges of Democratic Decentralisation,” in Munawar Alam and Andrew Nickson (ed.) *Managing Change in Local Governance* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006), pp. 40-4.

<sup>174</sup> Ross Garland, *Project Governance*, pp. 27-28.

procurement system. Governance theory emphasizes decisions relating to procurement process should be open and transparent. Timely release of fund accelerates smooth implementation of the project. Project director should have adequate skills in preparing procurement documents and methods of procurement.

A strong accountable relationship between different actors is essentially important in the process project implementation. Effective project governance may be constrained, if there exists a conflicting relationship among different actors in the process of project implementation. Project steering committee, project director and project manager will maintain a very close relation and cooperation. Project management team would employ its efforts to develop a strong working relationship with, and between various stakeholders.

#### *Governance Issues in Project Monitoring and Evaluation Stage*

Monitoring is a continuous process from the inception and ending of the project in order to ensure effective project management. Evaluation means assessing whether desired results or outcome of the project have been achieved or not achieved. Project monitoring and evaluation aim at assessing whether the project is going on according to objectives, compare status and performance with planed schedule and identification of risks that might jeopardize project performance and take corrective measures accordingly. An effective project monitoring and evaluation process helps to assess ground reality of project achievements in terms of quality as well as check the project failure. It ensures allocation of resources properly and, thereby reduces scope of over expenditure or corruption.

Project performance and activities can be reviewed monthly, quarterly and annually as periodical ways of review. Audit, post project evaluation and benefit realization review are some of evaluation tools adopted generally at the end of the project cycle.<sup>175</sup> In addition, community-based participatory monitoring and evaluation techniques are being applied in many donor-funded projects.<sup>176</sup>

Table 3.1: Key Governance Issues in Different Stages of Project Management

Different Stages of Project Management	Key Governance Issues
Project Formulation and Selection Stage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❑ Identifying proposal based on priority of needs and demands of citizens or society</li> <li>❑ Ensuring Value for money in terms of financial and socio-economic analysis</li> <li>❑ Adopting a participatory approach through open community meeting, consultation</li> <li>❑ Ensuring flow of information</li> <li>❑ Promoting community ownership</li> <li>❑ Selecting projects openly</li> <li>❑ Social equity</li> <li>❑ Efficiency</li> </ul>
Project Implementation Stage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❑ Establishing a strong accountability mechanism based on hierarchical accountability as well as social and beneficiaries-focused accountability</li> <li>❑ Adopting a proper dissemination system of project related information</li> <li>❑ Engaging skilled project personnel</li> <li>❑ Defining responsibilities</li> <li>❑ Timely mobilization of project resources (money, materials etc.)</li> <li>❑ Cooperation among all actors related to project implementation</li> <li>❑ Efficiency in project implementation</li> <li>❑ Effectiveness in project implementation</li> </ul>

<sup>175</sup> Graham Oakes, *Project Reviews*, pp. 29-46.

<sup>176</sup> Marisol Estrella (ed.) *Learning from Change: Issues and Experiences in Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation* (Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2000).

Project Monitoring and Evaluation Stage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❑ Planning of proper monitoring and supervision</li> <li>❑ Adopting participatory monitoring</li> <li>❑ Providing scope of citizen's petition</li> <li>❑ Conducting audit properly</li> <li>❑ Adopting institutional mechanism (for example, public hearing, dialogue)</li> <li>❑ Collecting accurate information on project performance</li> <li>❑ Efficiency</li> <li>❑ Effectiveness</li> </ul>
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Source: Author's views.

### 3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a theoretical discourse on governance concepts and its application in the project management. Though governance is a broad concept, in this study, governance implies a manner or process through which the actors (both formal and informal) of governance become engaged in a complex interaction for the pursuit of promotion of efficient and effective decision making regarding managing state affairs and proper utilization of public resources in projects. Moreover, governance as a normative concept (good or bad governance) is measured through a wide range of indicators which might vary in accordance with objects of governance. However, some common indicators of governance, such as participation, accountability, transparency, effectiveness and efficiency are being extensively used in governance related studies. As a whole, these values provide some basic ideas to construct a framework for understanding effectiveness of overall governance process.

Governance theory suggests that success or failure of a particular mode of governance depends on how far governance values, mechanisms and strategies work

effectively and efficiently. In this regard, efficient project management demands a better mode of governance that involves effective engagement of community participation, a clear line of accountability, open and free flow of information, absence of corruption and other key governance indicators to be reflected in different stages of project management (Table 3.1). In this study, project management as an object of governance will be analyzed in the following chapters based on this conceptual framework.

## Chapter 4

### Upazila Annual Development Project and Its Legal-Institutional Framework: Examining Governance Issues

#### 4.1 Prelude

Existing acts, rules, regulation, guidelines, directives and circulars provide a basis of legal-institutional framework for managing any affairs of state. In Bangladesh, the governing framework of development projects funded by public money both at national and local level is, to a large extent, based on centrally designed acts, rules directives and circulars. These directions and guidelines specify how to deal with different stages of project management (i.e. project formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). Project-initiating organizations, either at national or local level, have to abide by these prescribed rules and instructions. In Bangladesh, at the national level project-initiating organization include ministries/divisions, departments, directorates, autonomous bodies of the central government, and at the local level different local government institutes (district, sub-district and union). This chapter attempts to highlight existing legal-institutional framework (hard-wire of governance) meaning acts, rules, guidelines, directives and instructions with regard to working system of the Upazila Parishad as well as project governance of ADP-projects<sup>177</sup> at the local level. In addition, the legal-institutional issue has been reviewed and analyzed in order to understand

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<sup>177</sup> ADP-projects are called that project which are financed from public money and are included in the list of Annual Development Programme. At the Upazila level, central government provides an annual grant, known as 'block grant' to the Upazila Parishad for undertaking development projects which are also called as ADP-projects of Upazila Parishad.

reflection of some governance issues, such as participation, accountability and transparency in project governance of ADP-projects.

#### **4.2 Legal Framework of Upazila Parishad**

The Constitution of Bangladesh endows with much impetus on establishing a democratically elected local government system to manage local affairs as an integral part of national governance. The Article 59 in the constitution of Bangladesh states that every administrative unit shall have a elected local government system which will be responsible for doing functions related to administration and works of public officers; maintenance of public order and preparation and implementation of plans for public services and economic development. According to the Article 60, local government will be conferred power through law to perform its assigned functions including power to impose taxes for local purposes, to prepare their budgets and to maintain funds. In addition, Article 9 states, “The State shall encourage local Government institutions composed of representatives of the areas concerned and in such institutions special representation shall be given, as far as possible, to peasants, workers and women”. Article 11 of the Constitution provides as a Fundamental Principle of State Policy that ‘the Republic shall be a democracy in which... effective participation by the people through their elected representatives in administration at all levels shall be ensured’.

In Bangladesh, the Upazila Parishad (UZP) was first introduced by a military regime through an ordinance in 1982. But whether Upazila would be an administrative unit or not was not declared in the ordinance. Therefore, legitimacy of creation of Upazila Parishad was



challenged by the mainstreaming political parties.<sup>178</sup> The Upazila Parishad Act, 1998 has removed this constitutional confusion, and has declared Upazila as an administrative unit of Bangladesh and has re-introduced Upazila Parishad.

### *Composition of Upazila Parishad*

The present Upazila Parishad consists of a Chairman, two-vice chairmen (one male and one female), all UP Chairmen under the Upazila, Mayor of Pourashava (municipality) within the boundary Upazila and women members.<sup>179</sup> Chairman (known as Upazila Chairman) and two-Vice-Chairmen will be elected directly by all voters of whole Upazila. It is noted in the existing law that a Upazila Parishad is to be considered legally established to start its working as an elected body when election of 75% of its total members including the chairman and vice-chairmen of UZP have been completed.<sup>180</sup> Upazila Parishad is headed by Chairman who acts as the chief executive. Every Upazila Parishad has one Upazila Chairman (UZC) and two Vice-Chairmen, but number of UP Chairmen may vary Upazila to Upazila because number of unions under an Upazila differs from Upazila to Upazila. All UP Chairmen are ex-officio members of UZP... Tenure of an Upazila Parishad is five years.

The nature of composition of the present Upazila Parishad is different from the previous Upazila Parishad while it was introduced in 1982. Previously the Upazila

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<sup>178</sup> For details, see Nizam Ahmed, *Bureaucracy and Local Politics in Bangladesh- A Study in Roles and Relationships* (Dhaka: A H Development Publishing House, 2009), pp.163-175.

<sup>179</sup> There are no fix women members of Upazila Parishad, but the number will be determined based on number of Union Parishads and Pourashava existing under the Upazila. Women members will be elected from all women members involved with UP and Pourashava. Previously three women members became nominated by the government from amongst the residents of the Upazila.

<sup>180</sup> Government of Bangladesh (GOB), *Upazila Parishad Manual* (Dhaka, Local Government Division, 2010), p. 6.

Parishad was composed by voting and non-voting members. Voting members include elected representatives (Upazila Chairman, UP Chairmen), nominated and appointed members (three women members and one male member nominated by government). Non-voting members include a number of government officials belonging to different national government departments including Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO).<sup>181</sup> But the present Upazila Parishad is composed of only by elected representatives. These changes give a sense that the present Upazila Parishad is more democratic than before.<sup>182</sup> But the present Act has made a new provision which allows local MP to be an adviser of the Upazila Parishad. It is mandatory for the Upazila Parishad to consult with MP before taking any decision, although MP is not considered as a member of Upazila Parishad. This has created a lot of debates among the scholars regarding effective functioning of UZP.<sup>183</sup> Part of reason is that MPs in Bangladesh are seen more devoted to local development activities, though constitutionally their main responsibility is to make policies and legislations as well as make parliament more functional.

The rules suggest that any members will lose his/her membership in the Upazila Parishad, if he/she remains absent in three subsequent meetings of UZP without reasonable grounds, and/or involves in misconducts specified in the rules such as misuse of power, corruption, nepotism and any performed activities for which convicted, and/or refuses to perform responsibilities, and/or becomes physically or mentally unfit for

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<sup>181</sup> UNO acts as Secretary in the Upazila Parishad as well as works as the chief executive officer on behalf of central government at the Upazila level in Bangladesh.

<sup>182</sup> Nizam Ahmed, *Bureaucracy and Local Politics in Bangladesh- A Study in Roles and Relationships* (Dhaka: A H Development Publishing House, 2009), p. 174.

<sup>183</sup> Mustafizur Rahman, "MP's Preoccupation with Development Work Not Desirable for either JS or Local Government", *New Age* (Dhaka), 1 April 2010; Tofail Ahmed, "Constituency Development, Local Government and Constitution" (in Bengali), *Prothom Alo* (Dhaka), 19 March 2010.

performing responsibilities. In addition, any member could be removed by impeachment, if four-fifths members of Upazila Parishad bring no confidence against him/her on the basis of some gross allegation and subsequently is proved by investigation and approved by the central government.

### ***Functions of Upazila Parishad***

Upazila Parishad has been entrusted with a wide range of functions (Table 4.1) which could be divided into three categories – developmental, coordination and motivational. Development functions are related to development of agriculture, livestock, fisheries and forest resources, development of irrigation facilities; development of public health (for example, supply of pure drinking water and improvement of sanitation and sewerage); development of nutrition; and increasing adoption rate of family planning; development of road; social forestry and afforestation, self-employment generation and poverty reduction and so on. Coordination functions include a coordination role with regard to transferred departments (Appendix 4.1), development activities of UPs, cooperative organizations and non-government voluntary organizations. Motivational activities include creating public awareness against terrorism, stealing, black-marketing, drugs related crimes, women and children torture and other crimes. In addition, Upazila Parishad will prepare a five-year plan and other development plans and projects. Through performing these activities, it is expected that Upazila Parishad might be able to play a significant role in improving local socio-economic conditions, result in helping national government in realizing national goals.

Table 4.1: Functions of the Upazila Parishad

1. Prepare five years plan and other development plans for different duration.
2. Implement programmes of different departments transferred to the Upazila Parishad and supervise as well as coordinate activities of those departments.
3. Construct, repair and maintain roads connecting Unions.
4. Undertake and implement small irrigation projects according to central government's guidelines focussing efficient use of surface water.
5. Ensure public health, nutrition and family planning related activities.
6. Supply pure drinking water and improve sanitation and sewerage.
7. a) Motivate and assist regarding education at the Upazila level; b) Monitor and assist Secondary and Madrasha educational institutes for their improvement.
8. Undertake activities regarding small and cottage industry development.
9. Assist as well as coordinate activities of Cooperative Associations and Non-government voluntary organizations.
10. Cooperate and implement regarding activities of women's children, social welfare, youth sports and cultural development.
11. Undertake and implement activities related to development of agriculture, livestock, fisheries and forest resources.
12. Discuss regularly activities of police department as well as report to higher authorities in order to improve law and order situation.
13. Undertake own programmes and implement for self-employment generation and poverty reduction and cooperate government to implement activities taken by the government in this regard.

14. Coordinate, monitor and provide necessary assistance regarding development activities of the Union Parishads.
15. Undertake preventive measures as well as motivational programmes regarding women and children torture and other crimes.
16. Create public awareness against terrorism, stealing, black-marketing, drugs related crimes as well as take preventive measures.
17. Undertake social forestry and afforestation for development and preservation of environment.
18. Other activities to be taken as per government instruction in times.

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(Source: Upazila Parishad Manual, Local Government Division, Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives, 2013, p. 20.)

The list of functions of the Upazila Parishad indicates that Upazila Parishad has been mainly entrusted with performing a developmental role, but it has less regulatory role since the functions of maintaining law and order, administration of land management and major development activities of national and regional coverage (for example, distribution of electricity, gas) have been retained with the central government.

### ***Decision Making Process in the Upazila Parishad***

The existing Act and rules suggest that Upazila Parishad (UZP) is the final legal entity to make all decisions with regard to its assigned functions. According to rules, the UZP will arrange at least one meeting in every month which will be presided over by the

Upazila Chairman (UZC) or in his absence one of the Vice-chairs will preside over the meeting. The quorum of monthly meeting is to be formed by the attendance of half of the members, but quorum is not essential for an adjourn meeting. Heads of transferred departments to the Upazila Parishad are legally bound to be present in the monthly meeting in order to assist UZP, though they do not have any voting rights. In addition, UZP may invite concerned officials or experts to attend the meeting. UNO who acts as the secretary of UZP who provides necessary supports in conducting meeting (e.g. notification, working papers of meeting).

It is observed that existing rules do not state specifically anything about setting of agenda for the meeting in general, however, the UZC as the head of the UZP is responsible for setting agenda and theoretically enjoys freedom to include any issues in the agenda as s/he considers necessary. Notice and working papers of meeting need to be circulated before conducting meeting. Issues not included in the working papers will not be discussed in the meeting. According to rules, issues to be presented in the Upazila meeting are divided into five broad categories – financial, developmental, operational, coordination and miscellaneous (Table 4.2).

Table – 4.2: Nature of Issues Placed in the UZP Meetings According to Legal Provisions

Major Issue	Specific Issues
a) Financial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ All issues related fund of UZP</li> <li>▪ Proposals related to ascribing tax, rate, toll and fees on sources assigned to UZP</li> <li>▪ Annual budget of UZP</li> <li>▪ Revised budget of UZP</li> <li>▪ Expenditure proposal which is not included in the current budget</li> <li>▪ Annual Accounts Statement</li> <li>▪ Estimate of works that to be implemented by UZP</li> <li>▪ Investment proposals by the fund of UZP</li> <li>▪ Expenditure audit of UZP</li> </ul>
b) Developmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Development proposals/projects and their estimated cost of the transferred departments</li> <li>▪ Five years plan and annual development plan</li> <li>▪ preparation of plan book and its updating</li> <li>▪ Review of monthly progress, monitoring and evaluation of all development projects under the fund of UZP</li> <li>▪ Other development projects given to UZ P by the government time to time</li> </ul>
c) Operational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Personnel matters of all officers/staff transferred/deputed to UZP by the government</li> <li>▪ Review and approval of suggestions of standing committees and formation of different committees and their terms of reference accordingly</li> <li>▪ Review and approval of suggestions given by vice-chair</li> </ul>
d) Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Periodic review of activities of transferred departments of the government including monthly review of development activities of NGOs working within the Upazila and sending reports to all according to law</li> <li>▪ Quarterly review of performance of regulatory departments and sending reports to all according to law</li> </ul>
e) Miscellaneous	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Any matters as considered to be useful by UZP in order to implement objectives of the Act</li> </ul>

Source: Government of Bangladesh, Upazila Parishad Manual (Dhaka: Local Government Division), pp. 32-33.

It is stated in the rules that issues presented in the meeting have to be decided on basis of consensus of the elected members as possible. However, if difference of opinion arises, issue will be decided through majority votes of elected members (UZC, Vice-Chairs, UP Chairmen, Mayor of municipality and women members). Every elected members of UZP enjoys equal power (one vote), but the Chairman of UZP can exercise his/her casting vote when votes become equal. A member, if s/he wants, can refrain from voting. In that case, his/her opinion has to be recorded in the proceedings of meeting. These legal provisions reflect that decision-making process in the UZP is based on some sort of openness, transparency and participation and encourages a deliberative process as well. In addition, the Act allows the UZP to set up 17 standing committees<sup>184</sup> which may likely to promote scope of more community participation in the decision-making process and might help the UZP to perform its functions in a participatory way.

A standing committee is to be formed by 5 to 7 members. The law restricts UZC to be a chairman of any standing committees, while no such restrictions exist in case of other members. Concerned government official at the Upazila level will act as member secretary of the committee. A committee, if wants, can co-opt an expert in its committee,

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<sup>184</sup> 17 Standing Committees of Upazila Parishad are: law and order committee; communication and physical infrastructure development committee; agriculture and irrigation committee; secondary and Madrasha Education committee; Primary and mass education Committee; health and family planning committee; youth and sports committee; women and children development committee; social welfare committee; freedom fighters committee; fisheries and livestock committee; rural development and cooperative Committee; cultural committee; environment and forest committee; market price observation, monitoring and control Committee; money, budget, planning and local resource mobilization committee; and public health, sanitation and pure drinking water committee.



but co-opt member and member-secretary do not have voting rights. Before implementation recommendations of the committee, the UZP will approve those in its monthly meeting. But detailed guidelines have not yet available with regard to functioning and working process of the standing committees. In addition, Upazila Parishad can form other committees and sub-committees as many as required for functioning of the parishad.

On the other hand, every government departments at the Upazila level can form departmental committees according to central government's instructions in order to take and implement decision on departmental issues. A study shows that Upazila Social Welfare Department has formed four committees, such as old allowance implementation committee; freedom fighters allowance implementation committee; acid victims and physically tortures rehabilitation implementation committee; and disable education scholarship implementation committee.<sup>185</sup> The study also found that 39 departmental committees were formed in various government departments at one Upazila. Almost all committees were headed by UNO. Committee members were mainly government officials belonging to different government departments. However, some committees are headed by UZC and include community people (for example, local respectable persons, such as headmaster, teacher) who are nominated either by District Commissioner or UNO. Upazila Parishad is not legally allowed to select members of committees. In some committees, local MP acts as an adviser. The study observed that departmental committees have organized meeting while it required taking immediate decision to carry out some specific activity assigned by the central government, and thereby Upazila

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<sup>185</sup> Abdul Karim and S.M. Humayun Kabir, *Working of Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh: A Study of Dumki Upazila* (Comilla: BARD, 2012), p.25.

governance becomes heavily dependent on departmental committees' decision for performing their departmental activities<sup>186</sup>.

Apparently the existing legal framework allows the UZP to form standing committees in order to work through a participatory and transparent way for managing its local affairs, but this depends much on its ability and power to exercise independently. Some rules and regulations of the existing legal framework might act as limiting or thwarting factors in the way of participative and transparent decision-making process. First, the concerned local MP has to be consulted by the UZP for taking any decision which is mandatory for the UZP. Second, every aspects of UZP is guided or regulated by a strong government control. As a result, it may be difficult for a UZP to take decision independently. Even Upazila Parishad cannot take decision, where government rules, circulars are not available. On the other hand, any decision taken by the UZP is found inconsistent with the existing rules and regulations, central government can challenge if, even can dissolve the Upazila Parishad. As a result, decision-making according to preferences of UZP as well as local community seems to be difficult in the existing legal framework.


#### **4.3 Legal and Institutional Framework: ADP Project of Upazila Parishad**

Upazila Parishads usually receive an annual grant from the central government for taking development projects (popularly known as ADP-projects). In the financial year of 2011-12, all the Upazila Parishads (485) received Tk. 4000 million. On an average, an Upazila receives nearly Tk. 8 million in every year. Allocation of central government

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<sup>186</sup> Ibid., pp.27-28.

grant to Upazila Parishad ranges between 0.47 percent and 1.51 percent from 2007-08 to 2011-12 (Figure 4.1). Upazila Parishad receives grant from the central government in quarterly installments in a financial year. Fund is jointly operated by UZC and UNO.



#### *Rationale of ADP-Projects*

The rationale of ADP- projects financed by the central government is to promote decentralization, peoples' participation in local development and community needs and demands in the local development process. To realize these aims, central government has promulgated directives or guidelines regarding how to use central government's grants in

the Upazila ADP-projects.<sup>187</sup> Central government expects that these directives will possibly ensure transparency and accountability for efficient uses of public resources.

### *Basic Criteria of Project Selection*

In undertaking projects, Upazila Parishad has to put emphasis on those projects which will be directly or indirectly supplementary in achieving the national development plans.<sup>188</sup> In addition, Upazila Parishad will give utmost priority on fulfilling local preference and needs during selection of projects. Apart from this, Upazila Parishad put emphasis on those projects which have a significant impact on generation of self-employment and income, development of local markets, local roads connecting Upazila headquarters with growth centers, developing irrigation facilities small culverts and bridges. The grant will not be used for any projects which are only related to earthen works.<sup>189</sup> In addition, existing directives prohibit 22 types of works that are not allowed for the Upazila Parishad under this grant (Table 4.3).

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<sup>187</sup> The guidelines are issued by Local Government Division under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives through a circular (circular no. Upa -2/M-02/2010/1253, dated 28/04/2010). The guidelines were first introduced in 1983 by the Planning Commission. Time to time central government amends or revises the guidelines.

<sup>188</sup> In Bangladesh, central government generally prepares an Annual Development Programme (ADP) which contains a huge number of projects. The number of projects listed in 2011-12 was 1039, in 2010-11 it was 1185 and 1062 in 2009-10. The ADP helps to realize goals and objectives of the Five Year Plan of the government. For example, the Sixth Five Year Plan (2011-2015) emphasizes on reduction of poverty through various strategies, such as generation of productive employment, promotion of small enterprises, diversification of agriculture, reduction of population growth.

<sup>189</sup> There are some other food-assisted programmes (e.g. Food for Works Programme, Test Relief) under the central government's assistance to implement earthen projects, such as digging/re-digging of ponds/canals, construction/reconstruction of roads/ embankments, removing water logging, digging/re-digging irrigation channels, earth filling in the ground. Therefore, government generally discourages to take earthen projects under ADP.

Table – 4.3: List of Works That Not to Be Taken by Upazila Parishad under the Upazila Development Fund

1. Construction of cafeteria, restaurant or shopping centre.
2. Expenditure related to payment of any outstanding charges to any department of government, for example, arrear salaries or other dues.
3. Construction or repair entrance point/boundary wall of Upazila Parishad, *Shahid Minar*, mosque/temple/church etc.
4. Purchase of electric generator.
5. Construction of new school/college/*Madrassa*.
6. Construction of building for club or society.
7. Construction/repair or expansion of building for banks or any other government or autonomous organization.
8. Construction of tennis court.
9. Providing credit to any individual, family or organizations.
10. Expenditure in the activities reserved for national government.
11. Expenditure in the revenue sector of the Upazila Parishad.
12. Purchase of land for the purpose of digging of ponds, play ground for school, establishment of new markets etc., however, decision of purchasing land needs to be rationally and carefully taken for construction of roads, if it is essential.
13. Business projects in order to increase income of the Upazila Parishad.
14. Expensive decoration items, furniture or luxury goods.
15. Any projects to be implemented in the municipal areas.
16. Establishment of kindergarten schools.
17. Not mix Upazila fund with part of national project's allocation at the same project.
18. Appraisal schemes related to feasibility study, priority assessment, study on hindrance to local resources etc.
19. Purchase of any sort of vehicles.
20. Establishment of telephone, land development tax, municipality tax, electric charges.
21. Employment of any staff or payment of any allowances.
22. Observation of days, weeks, organizing fairs.

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Source: Government of Bangladesh, Upazila Parishad Manual, 2013 (Dhaka: Local Government Division), p. 109.

Upazila Parishad can adopt two approaches to spend the grant, either programme based projects (for example, sanitary programme), or sector-wise projects. Grant allocation in different sectoral projects follows minimum and maximum limits set by the central government (Table 4.4). However, cost of a single project in a particular sector will not more than 50 percent of the total allocation specified for that sector.

The ADP-projects are categorized in three broad sectors– (a) agriculture and small irrigation; (b) physical infrastructure; and (3) socio-economic infrastructure. These sectors are again divided into a number of sub-sectors having a minimum and maximum limit of resource allocation. During selection of sectoral projects, Upazila Parishad will put much emphasis on fulfilling greater community interest in the project's outcome, environmental impact as well as issues of public health protection. Above all, in selecting development projects whole Upazila will be treated as a single entity.

Table 4.4: Minimum and Maximum Share of ADP Allocation to Different Sectors in  
Upazila Parishad

Sectors	Minimum Share	Maximum Share
<b>1. Agriculture and Small Irrigation</b>	<b>20.0%</b>	<b>32.0%</b>
a) <i>Agriculture and Irrigation:</i> Intensive crop programme, demonstration farm, seed distribution, social forestry, plantation on both sides of road, cultivation of vegetables and fruits, drainage and irrigation channels, small flood control embankments and small irrigation structure	10%	15%
b) <i>Fisheries and Livestock:</i> Preservation and development of fisheries, duck, hen and cattle development, digging of pond and maintenance of pond, rural fish farm	5%	10%
c) <i>Small and Cottage Development:</i> Workshop for small and cottage industry, skill development, training and expansion, income generating activities etc.	5%	7%
<b>2. Physical Infrastructure</b>	<b>32.0%</b>	<b>47.0%</b>
a) <i>Transport and Communication:</i> Road construction, rural works programme, construction/repair of small bridges, culverts	15%	25%
b) <i>House construction and Physical Planning:</i> Development of <i>Hats- Bazars</i> , <sup>190</sup> developing facilities of storage, community centre	5%	7%
c) <i>Public Health:</i> Supply of pure drinking water, low cost sanitary latrine, mitigating arsenic problem	10%	15%
<b>3. Socio-economic Infrastructure</b>	<b>37.0%</b>	<b>48.0%</b>
a) <i>Development of Education:</i> Development of class room, play ground of educational institutes and supply of education materials	10%	15%
b) <i>Health and social welfare:</i> Family planning, primary health care, EPI programme, medical services to arsenic affected persons, welfare activities including youth and women welfare	10%	15%
c) <i>Sports and Culture:</i> Promoting of sports, games, cultural activities, physical, mental and cultural development of children	5%	10%
d) <i>Others:</i> Birth and death registration services, post disaster relief activities, solving climate change related problems and promotion of girls guide	5%	8%

Source: Local Government Division, Upazila Parishad Development Fund Utilization Directive (Dhaka, 10 April 2010), pp. 9-10.

<sup>190</sup> *Hat-Bazar* means local market. Hats in rural areas of Bangladesh sit once or twice in a week while Bazar sits every day.

### *Process of Project Selection*

Existing rules suggest that every Upazila Parishad will prepare an Annual Development Plan containing a list of development projects (i.e. ADP-projects) within 31 March in every financial year.<sup>191</sup> Project selection process starts from Union Parishad and ends at Upazila Parishad (Figure 4.2). Actors involved in project selection process involve peoples' representatives (members of UZP, UP Chairmen, local MP), government officials at Upazila level (UNO, UE and others) and local government units (Union Parishad and Upazila Parishad).

Theoretically, project proposals have to be submitted to Upazila Parishad by the Union Parishads.<sup>192</sup> In this regard, Union Parishad has to take a collective decision regarding selection of project proposals and to make a resolution. Nation building departments<sup>193</sup> at the Upazila level are also allowed to submit project proposals. Before submitting the project proposals to the Upazila Parishad, proposed projects have to be reviewed and evaluated by a Project Selection Committee consisting of 12 members headed by the Chairman of the Upazila Parishad and Upazila Engineer acts as its member secretary. The other members include male and female vice-chairmen of Upazila Parishad, UNO, UAE, UHFOW, ULO, UPHO, PIO, UEO, concerned UP Chairman. Quorum of the committee will formed at the presence of two-thirds members of

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<sup>191</sup> In Bangladesh, a financial year starts from 1 July and ends at 30 June.

<sup>192</sup> A Upazila consist of more than one union and every union has a elected local government namely Union Parishad. Elected Chairman, chief of Union Parishad is an ex-officio member of Upazila Parishad who has voting rights.

<sup>193</sup> Nation building departments refer to central government departments which are mainly engaged in development works. The departments, among others, include Upazila Primary Education Department, Upazila Health and Family Planning Office and so on.



committee. Moreover, Upazila Parishad can form additional sub-committee to assess technical analysis of projects, if it thinks necessary.

During project selection, Upazila Parishad will verify any overlapping and duplication with other projects being implemented by other departments or under any other national programmes. But before final approval of project proposals by the Upazila Parishad, the list of projects is required to send to local MP for his advice or recommendation. After receiving approval of MP, the project list has to be finally approved in the meeting of the Upazila Parishad. The approved project list has to be sent to the Local Government Division and to be disseminated to local people. Later, the approved project proposals have to be described in a project format as designed by the central government (Appendix 4.2). Respective government department will assist in this regard.




Figure 4.2: Institutional Process of Project Selection and Approval of ADP-Projects of Upazila Parishad

### ***Project Implementation Process***

Existing legal framework states two ways of project implementation modalities with regard to ADP-projects of UZP. One is community contracting system and another is open tender system. Community contracting system means projects to be implemented through Project Committee (PC). The rules state that a project costing less than Tk. 100,000<sup>194</sup> can be implemented by a PC, consisting of 7-9 members headed by an elected member of UZP, but Upazila Chairman will not eligible to become chairman of any PC.

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<sup>194</sup> Over the years, this amount has been increased. In 2008, the amount was Tk. 75,000. During 1980s, the amount was Tk. 30000.

Not more than 16 projects<sup>195</sup> are allowed to be implemented by PCs. The same person would not be selected as Chairman more in than one project in a financial year. The committee-members will be appointed from Vice-Chairs of UZP, UP Chairmen, concerned female member of the reserved seat, concerned ward members, concerned Upazila Officials, school teacher, social workers and local respected persons. PC has to be approved in the meeting of the UZP. For proper implementation of project the committee is accountable to Upazila Parishad. In addition, the committee will submit a financial statement to Upazila Parishad after completion of assigned project.

However, Upazila Parishad can also implement any ADP-project through open tender method. The rules specify that projects involving cost more than Tk. 100,000 must be implemented by a commercial contractor who will be selected through a competitive process.<sup>196</sup> According to rules, Upazila Parishad will circulate tender in one local newspaper and different notice board in case of projects costing more than Tk. 100000. In case of project expenditure more than Tk.100000 but less than Tk. 500000, tender has to be published in one local and one national *Bangla* newspaper. Projects costing more than Tk. 500000 have to be circulated as per government rules, the PPR 2008.

A Tender Evaluation Committee, headed by the UNO, is responsible for scrutiny of tender documents. The Upazila Engineer (UE) acts as the member secretary of the committee and takes all necessary process of tendering. UE is responsible to UZP for

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<sup>195</sup> When Upazila system was first introduced, this sort of fixed project committee was not imposed. It was started since 2004. At that time, the number was 13.

<sup>196</sup> The Upazila Parishad (Contract Agreement) Rules, 2010 provides detailed guidelines regarding advertisement of tender, evaluation of tender and approval, signing contract etc. Moreover, it has to follow Public Procurement Act, 2006 and Public Procurement Rules, 2008.

ensuring the quality of work and timely completion of projects. If any problem arises, UE has to report the matter to the UZP. The rules specify that Upazila Engineer will provide technical assistance to make estimate cost of projects according to standard rate fixed by the central government. He is directly responsible for project monitoring, supervision and implementation. As a result, UE plays an important role in the management of ADP-projects.

### *Project Monitoring and Supervision*

The existing directives mention some mechanisms to oversee the implementation process of projects. First, the UZC and/or UNO may visit any project at any time and can propose to take corrective measures in case of any lapses or irregularities are observed.

Second, a Project Supervision Committee will be established in each Union to monitor projects and it will report to the Upazila Parishad about the progress of projects time to time. However, no detailed guidelines are yet available regarding composition of committee and its responsibilities. The existing guidelines state that Chairman of Project Committee and Chairman of the Project Supervision Committee will not be the same person.

Third, in special circumstances, officials of government department will be engaged to monitor project's activities.

Fourth, Upazila Parishad will meet once a month in order to review progress of the projects and take necessary measures for effective supervision.

Fifth, higher level officials such as Deputy Commissioner<sup>197</sup> and Divisional Commissioner<sup>198</sup> can inspect projects and make comments, advices and observations and send them to concerned authorities including Upazila Parishad.

Sixth, at the project site, a signboard will be displayed which will show information related to project name, amount of project cost, duration of project period in order to inform to community people.

Seven, every Upazila Parishad will prepare an annual report highlighting project-wise expenditure and its progress of implementation which is to be completed by June 30. The report will be sent to higher authorities within July 30 and to be displayed in notice boards of Upazila Parishad and Union Parishads.

#### **4.4 Existing Legal and Institutional Framework: Review from Governance Perspective**

A review showing some strengths and weaknesses from the governance perspective, especially project governance through analyzing the existing Act, rules and regulations related to functioning of the Upazila Parishad have been highlighted in the following sections.

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<sup>197</sup> Deputy Commission acts as Chief district officer representing central bureaucracy.

<sup>198</sup> S/he represents central bureaucracy and acts as controlling officer of Deputy Commissioners.

### *Conditionality, Limited Autonomy and Rigidity*

In Bangladesh, it is observed that the local government including the Upazila Parishad are mostly guided and controlled by rules, regulations and circulars made by the central government which are generally thought 'one size fits to all'. But in reality, local governments at different levels are not same in terms of size of population, area and socio-economic conditions. It is observed that area of Upazilas varies from 56 sq km to 1,968 sq km and size of population varies from 0.013 million to 0.71 million.<sup>199</sup>

The Upazila Parishad is, to a large extent, dependent on central government rules and regulations, and enjoys a limited autonomy in carrying out its functions including project management. In most cases, central government tends to adopt an approach of rigidity and paternalistic attitude. The local government bodies are bound to follow these rules and regulation in their decision-making process, which tends to contradict with real values of establishing self-managed local government including wider people's participation, local accountability, expressing local needs and preferences and so on.

It is observed that in most of the developed societies, local government generally enjoys considerable autonomy in managing their local affairs<sup>200</sup> which has some inherent advantages, such as closeness to community, better understanding of local conditions, mobilization of local resources etc. In Bangladesh, the existing legal framework

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<sup>199</sup> Kamal Siddiqui (ed.), *Local Government in Bangladesh (Revised Third Edition)* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2005), pp. 295-296.

<sup>200</sup> Tofail Ahmed, *Decentralisation and the Local State under Peripheral Capitalism- A Study in the Political Economy of Local Government in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1993), p. 365.

apparently proposes to promote decentralization (meaning transferring power and authority to local authority), but a variety of conditionality and restrictions embodied in the Acts, rules and regulations make project management of the Upazila Parishad more centralized. As a result, the Upazila Parishad seems less effective and efficient with regard to project management. In addition, the effect of central control through different conditionalities (for example, centrally determined sectoral priorities with a minimum and maximum limit, ban on undertaking any profitable or income generating project) tends to limit decentralized planning process, and thereby regains ‘rebureaucratization’, ‘regulation’, ‘restatisation’ and ‘recentralisation’ instead of increasing capacity of self-governance.<sup>201</sup>

#### *Less Scope of Wider People’s Participation*

People’s participation as an element of governance adds values for effective project management in different ways such as proper selection of projects, ownership of projects, effective use of project resources, realization of project objectives, mobilization of local resources, thereby increases efficiency and effectiveness in project management. Concept of people’s participation includes a wide range of meaning as discussed in conceptual section (chapter 3). From the governance point of view, people’s participation implies wider engagement of community people in the planning as well as implementation of development projects, as they would not be only passive actors in any stages of project cycle.

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<sup>201</sup> For details, see Tofail Ahmed, *Decentralisation and the Local State Under Peripheral Capitalism- A Study in the Political Economy of Local Government in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1993), pp. 180-204.

The existing legal-institutional framework of Upazila Parishad suggests that active local community participation is poorly incorporated. Theoretically it is assumed that local peoples' representatives will represent, protect or secure interests of local community, but in reality it is observed in the context of Bangladesh that in many cases local representatives do not act according to community wishes or preferences as most of the elected representatives in rural-Bangladesh, come from local rich or elite families and their socio-economic status is relatively well-off compared to mass people. They usually think that they are in position to know better local situation than the common people.<sup>202</sup> In the context of rural Bangladesh, generally local influentials exercise more authority and power in the social decision-making process. A study found that in the Union Parishad, a local government unit below Upazila Parishad, Chairman of Union Parishad UP members and local respectable persons exert more influence in project selection.<sup>203</sup> Even in the national level, active people's participation in project selection is poor. Some studies observe that composition of different committees involved in project selection process is mostly dominated by high-level bureaucrats. Project selection process is basically based on top-down approach. As a result, desired benefits of the project do not

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<sup>202</sup> Waheduzzaman and Charles H. B. Mphande, "Gaps in Pursuing Participatory Good Governance: Bangladesh Context", *Administration & Society*, Vol. 46(1), 2014

<sup>203</sup> Local Government Division, *Upazila Parishad Manual* (Dhaka: Local Government Division, 2010), p. 99.



reach to targeted project beneficiaries in many cases <sup>204</sup> and community interests are likely less reflected in project selection.<sup>205</sup>

In order to engage community people in the management of local government, many countries have adopted some innovative methods for promoting active participation in managing its affairs as well as developmental efforts. For example, local government in Japan has initiated a number of mechanisms (such as consultation windows, citizen monitors and local public opinion survey) for expressing citizen concern to local government, thereby creates a scope of changing relationship between residents and local government, making a more inclusive public policy through providing citizens to express collective preference and avoiding tyrannies of functionaries of local council.<sup>206</sup> In India, the 73<sup>rd</sup> Constitutional Amendment Act, 1993 has made a provision which has become a mandatory for *Panchayat* system to include representation of poor and marginalised, particularly women and lower caste members with a view to reducing the dominance of traditional powerful elites in the decision-making process of local government.

Scope of active community participation in the project implementation process is poor due to some conditionalities imposed in the rules. Previously Project Committees, had more community involvement in project implementation process, but the new rules

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<sup>204</sup> Z.A. Nazneen, “Popular Participation in Local Administration: A Case Study of Bangladesh”, (Dhaka: Gyan Bitarani, 2004) cited in Sheik Noor Mohammad, “People’s Parturition in Development Projects at Grassroot level: A Case of Alampur and Jagannathpur Union Parishad”, Masters Thesis (Dhaka: North South University, 2010); Mahmudul Alam, *State-Intervention In The Secondary Education Sub-Sector Of A Developing Country: Impact Of Secondary Science Education Sector Project (SSEP) of Bangladesh, 1985-1991*, Research Report 166 (Dhaka: BIDS, 2000); S.J. Anwar Zahid, *Rural Development Planning and Project Management in Bangladesh*, Second Edition (Comilla: BARD, 2010), pp. 185-186;

<sup>205</sup> Nazrul Anwar, “Government Budgeting in Bangladesh: The Changes and Challenges”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Rajshahi: IBS, 2009), pp.123-125; The Daily Ittefaq, 29/10/2011, p. 1.

<sup>206</sup> Michio Muramatsu, Farrukh Iqbal and Ikuo Kume (ed.) *Local Government Development In Post-War Japan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 46-57.

suggest that an Upazila Parishad will not be allowed to implement more than 16 projects through this method. Even the Tender Evaluation Committee lacks any scope of direct participation of community people. As a result, existing legal bindings tend to limit scope of active community participation.

In addition, a mandatory condition for the Upazila Parishad to take approval from local MP before taking any final decision could not be a conducive factor in the overall process of participatory project management. Previous experiences show that MP tends to take a dominant role in the decision-making process of Upazila administration instead of advising the affairs of local government especially in the development activities.<sup>207</sup> Part of reason is that existing rules do not mention clearly about roles and responsibilities of an MP as an adviser with regard to Upazila affairs. On the other hand, generally it is very difficult for a local government body to override MP's advices due to his supremacy among the elected representatives. In addition, involvement of MP might create a pro or anti alliances among the actors (both elected and non-elected) in Upazila Parishad's decision-making process which might tend to involve them in interest-conflicts. As a result, it might have negative effects on project governance.

### *Poor Transparency*

Transparency as one of the governance indicators generally means openness of decision making and access to accurate information as part of citizen's rights. It seems that the existing legal-institutional framework of the Upazila Parishad provides some

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<sup>207</sup> Kamal Siddiqui (ed.), *Local Government in Bangladesh (Revised Third Edition)* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2005), p. 443.

windows of transparency in its decision-making process. Existing rules and regulations specify that all matters related to working of Upazila Parishad have to be decided in the meeting of the Upazila Parishad which likely indicates that secrecy has not been encouraged in its decision-making process. But some other legal provisions might be contradictory in ensuring transparency. For example, one provision which compels the Upazila Parishad to consult with local MP before taking any decision may be a threat for ensuring transparency. Because the existing rules do not specify clearly how MP will give his/her advices to the Upazila Parishad, which results in confusions. On the other hand, presence of MP in the meeting of Upazila Parishad has not made compulsory. As a result, MP's role behind the scene in the decision-making process may make transparency less clear.

With regard to dissemination of information regarding projects, the directives specify that a signboard has to be displayed at the project site showing information related to project name, amount of expenditure, duration of project period in order to inform to community people. In addition, every Upazila Parishad will prepare an annual report highlighting project-wise expenditure and its progress of implementation, and the report will be sent to higher authorities as well as to be displayed at the premise of Upazila Parishad and Union Parishads. These arrangements can be thought as useful mechanisms of transparency with regard to project implementation.

But the existing directives have not specified how community people are to be informed with regard to project allocation as well as project activities. As a result, it may make the Upazila Parishad as well as its members less encouraged or motivated to share

information with community people. In Bangladesh, there is a general tendency of keeping information secret about the state affairs. To reduce this tendency in India, *Panchayat* system has adopted a practice to conduct *Gram Sabha* (meeting at community level) for dissemination of information of local government affairs.

### *Problematic Accountability*

An effective mechanism of accountability has an important role in effective implementation of a development project. A multidimensional accountability approach combining various internal and external as well as informal mechanisms can ensure a better performance in a project management. Better performance of a project implies whether the project generates quality goods or services; and whether project resources are utilized properly without any misuse or corruptions. In Bangladesh, a practice exists that departments receiving government money have to face financial audit yearly. This ensures a kind of financial accountability. But governance theory also focuses not only financial audit, but also emphasises on citizen centric accountability.

The review of existing legal framework reveals that some directives ensure some sort of accountability directly or indirectly in the process of project implementation of ADP-projects. These are:

- UZC and/or UNO may visit any project at any time and can order corrective measures, if any lapses or irregularities are observed.
- Deputy Commissioner and Divisional Commissioner or higher-level officials above that Upazila, can inspect projects under his area of jurisdiction, and make comments, advices and observations.

- A Project Supervision Committee to be existed at the Union level is to be responsible to monitor implementation of projects and it will report to the Upazila Parishad from time to time with regard to on-going projects. In special circumstances, government officials can also be engaged to monitor development projects.
- Upazila Parishad will meet once a month in order to review progress of ADP-projects and will provide necessary directions.
- Information of project has to be displayed at the project site in order to inform to community people.
- Every Upazila Parishad will prepare an annual report highlighting descriptions of each project's expenditure and its implementation status. The report will be disseminated in Upazila Parishad and Union Parishads.
- Central government can assign any official to conduct investigate on any irregularities (including mismanagement of project) of Upazila Parishad through receiving complain from any persons or by the self-initiative of government.
- Upazila Parishad can form sub-committees for any purposes including accountability issues.<sup>208</sup>

Upazila Parishad adopts two methods for project implementation – Project Implementation Committee (PIC) and open tender. PIC method is adopted for a project less than Tk. 100000 while tender method is adopted for the project, costing more than

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<sup>208</sup> Dumki Upazila, a Upazila of Patuakhali district, formed a sub-committee for evaluating performance of government departments in order to ensure accountability. see Abdul Karim and S. M. Humayun Kabir, Working of Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh: A Study of Dumki Upazila (Comilla: BARD, 2012), p.25.

Tk. 100000. But which method is more effective for ensuring accountability is a debatable issue. However, from the view of ‘public accountability’ or ‘social accountability’, project implementation through PIC could be considered a more citizen centric approach compared to tender method because tender method provides a less scope of community accountability due to lack of community participation in project implementation. The rules suggest that contractors need not to be accountable to local community or the Upazila Parishad directly.

Moreover, the legal framework suffers some vagueness or limitations which could make accountability process weak or problematic. First, oversight of project activities involves a variety of actors and institutions, but in the existing project management system clear line of ensuring accountability among the actors has not been clearly specified. As a result, accountability might become diluted.

Second, there are some legal limitations resulting in less scope of wider people’s participation in the project selection process as well as project implementation as discussed before. This could make accountability process less effective.

Third, involvement of MP as adviser in the Upazila Parishad can make accountability process either stronger or weaker. Theoretically an MP can perform accountability role through exercising his/her oversight function. It would be better, if MP restricts his/her roles in oversight function for accountability purposes.<sup>209</sup> But how MP will play his advisory role in the Upazila Parishad has not yet spelled out in the rules.

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<sup>209</sup> Kamal Siddiqui (ed.), *Local Government in Bangladesh (Revised Third Edition)* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2005), p. 441.

There is a high possibility to materialize self-interests of by MP in project selection. Therefore, if the same person involves project selection and evaluation, effective accountability might be problematic.

Fourth, the existing rules do not mention anything about performance evaluation of the Upazila Parishad based on project success or failure which is essential for ensuring effective accountability. If a good performing Upazila Parishad is rewarded and bad performing Upazila is punished, an inner pressure of accountability in the Upazila Parishads might be created, but the prevailing legal framework lacks this sort of incentive structure.

Fifth, the existing legal framework allows that the same person can act as decision maker and at the same time a decision implementer. For example, an UP Chairman involved in the project selection and approval process, and s/he is illegible to be involved in project implementation either as a Chairperson or a member of project implementation committee, even as a contractor. As a result, it might create scope of realizing self-interest which may distort the effective accountability process.

Sixth, the Upazila Parishad approves project proposals, but fund release is controlled by central government as assigned to UNO. This sort of dual control in project management might weaken effective accountability process.

Seventh, the existing legal framework does not encourage active participation of cross section community people in the project selection process. In addition, funds of

ADP-projects are mostly dependent on central government; naturally accountability of the actors of project management might tend to up-ward, not down-ward. As a result, it would be difficult to establish a citizen centric accountability in the project management.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has highlighted existing legal-institutional issues on management of ADP-projects of Upazila Parishads according to Act, rules, regulations and directives designed by the central government. These rules and regulations provide a structural basis of governance of Upazila Parishad including a governance structure of project management. Much of the focus of this chapter concentrates on how far the existing rules and regulations create a scope of better governance in terms of wider community participation, transparency and accountability perspectives. The chapter reveals that the governance structure of project management has some strengths as well as weaknesses.

The strength could be understood through openness and engagement of democratic institutions in the decision-making process with regard to ADP-projects of Upazila Parishad. According to the existing rules, Upazila Parishad is bound to make decision openly and is legally empowered to discuss any issue where local representatives can express their views. At least there is no scope of making a closed-door decision which ensures some transparency. As a democratic institute Upazila Parishad has been provided a potential opportunity to exercise local accountability role with regard to project-management. In addition, display of information at least in the project implementation stage of ADP-projects is really a strong point because it has play



a significant role in ensuring transparency and accountability to local citizen to some extent.

However, there are some weaknesses and limitations in the existing legal-institutional framework might not be conducive to effective governance of Upazila Parishad as whole, project-management in particular. Too much conditionalities and restrictions imposed by the central government based on top-down approach may act as barriers in the way of capacity development of Upazila Parishad as well as to make Upazila Parishad less responsive to local needs and preferences. Undefined roles of MP as adviser in the Upazila Parishad may create a lot of confusions in the operation of the Upazila Parishad which may produce conflict of interests. Involvement of MP in local level project selection might encourage building a patronage network and tension between MP and local government representatives with regard to capture public resources as well. To make the legal-institutional framework more productive, it needs a thorough overhauling so that it promotes wider people's participation, more transparent and more citizens' accountability.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Development Projects under ADP Allocation of Two Upazilas: An Analysis**

#### **5.1 Prelude**

This chapter attempts to analyze utilization of ADP allocation, types of projects and characteristics of ADP projects as well as distribution of ADP allocation in different sectoral and sub-sectoral projects under the studied two Upazilas. The analysis focuses mainly to find out gaps between theories and practice regarding distribution of allocation in local development projects according to guidelines of the central government. It also attempts to understand characteristics of ADP-projects of the two studied Upazilas of Bangladesh.

#### **5.2 Receipts and Expenditure of ADP Allocation**

From 2008-09 to 2012-13, the two Upazilas have shown a remarkable efficiency in spending of their ADP allocation (Figure 5.1). It was observed that they had spent almost the total allocation (nearly 100 percent) as shown in Table 5.1. It gives a good impression that the two Upazila Parishads have better ability to spend their allocation compared to central government. In Bangladesh, generally it is observed that in most

cases central government shows a poor capacity to spend their ADP-allocation according to expected targets.<sup>210</sup>




Table 5.1: Received and Expenditure of ADP Allocation (Tk.) by Adarsha Sadar and Homna Upazila Parishad from 2008-09 to 2012-13

Year	Adarsha Sadar		Homna	
	Received	Expenditure	Received	Expenditure
2008 - 09	2236000	2205183 (98.6)	1468000	1466943 (99.9)
2009 -10	4821000	4816936 (99.9)	6479000	6477333 (99.9)
2010 - 11	7900000	7881849 (99.8)	7448000	7446333 (99.9)
2011 - 12	6372000	6359602 (99.8)	6200000	6199671 (99.9)
2012- 13	9029424	9020394 (99.9)	5910000	5898180 (99.8)

Source: Office Records of Upazila Engineer Office.

Note: Figure in parenthesis indicates percentage.

<sup>210</sup>For details see Saleh Ahmed, “Problems of ADP Implementation in Bangladesh: An Analytical Review”, Masters Thesis (Dhaka: Institute of Governance Studies, BRAC University, 2010), p. 16.

### **5.3 Sector-Wise Projects and Allocation in Adarsha Sadar Upazila**

Generally Upazila Parishads have to spend their ADP-allocation in a number of projects under different sectors and sub-sectors as specified in the directives set by the central government (discussed in chapter 4). These sectoral projects are divided into three major heads, such as agriculture and small irrigation; physical infrastructure; and socio-economic infrastructure development. The directives specify that sectoral allocation is again distributed into sub-sectors receiving a minimum and maximum share of the total fund.

In the last five years, the Adarsha Sadar Upazila has implemented 299 projects in the three major sectors (Table 5.2). On an average, every year it has implemented about 60 projects. The highest number of projects (103) was implemented in 2009-10 and the lowest number of projects (45) in 2011-12. In 2012-13, the Upazila also implemented same number of projects. A sample of local development projects along with project cost in different sectors under ADP allocation has been presented in the Table 5.3.

Table 5.2: Distribution of ADP-Projects in Three Major Sectors of Adarsha Sadar  
Upazila Parishad from 2008-09 to 2012-13

Year	Sectors			Total
	Agriculture and Small Irrigation	Physical Infrastructure	Socio-economic Infrastructure and Others	
2008-09	3 (5.7)	44 (83.0)	6 (11.3)	53 (100.0)
2009 –10	8 (7.8)	90 (87.4)	5 (4.8)	103 (100.0)
2010 – 11	4 (8.5)	39 (83.0)	4 (8.5)	47 (100.0)
2011 – 12	7 (13.7)	37 (72.6)	7 (13.7)	51 (100.0)
2012 –13	3 (6.7)	36 (80.0)	6 (13.3)	45 (100.0)
Total	25 (8.4)	246 (82.3)	28 (9.3)	299 (100.0)

Source: Office Records of Upazila Parishad, 2013.

Note: Figure in parenthesis indicates percentage.

Table 5.3: A Sample of ADP Project List in Different Sectors and Estimated Project Cost, Adarsha Sadar Upazila Parishad in 2012-13

Union of Adarsha Sadar	Sector	Name of Project	Estimated Project Cost (Tk.)
Kalirbazar	Agriculture and Irrigation	01: Construction drain for irrigation in Donuakhola	100000
	Communication	02: Construction of culvert near Anwar sader bari	35024
		03: Construction of culvert in front of Hafiz Mia's bari in Syedpur	35024
		04: Construction of culvert in front of Mobarak Moulana bari in Monshason	35024
		05: Brick soling on road behind Komolapur Girls School	100000
		06: Brick soling on road near Ballabpur Mir Bari mosque	73208
		07: Construction of returning wall in front of Pakamura Muznur bari	50000
		08: Brick soling on road in front of Salim Kabiraj Bari in Donuakhola	100000
		09: Brick soling on road in front of Purba Para Mukshat Ali Bari in Donuakhola	95000
		10: Brick soling on road near Hazi Siddiqure Rahman Bari in Krishnapur	81666
		11: Brick soling on road near Purba Para Hazi Ohed Ali Member's Bari in Krishnapur	45012
Durgapur (North)	Communication	12: Brick soling on road between Kuddos and Salim Mia Bari in Araiura	100000
		13: Returning wall near Bosir Member's Bari in Araiura	100000
		14: Construction of culvert near Hasem Member's Bari in Badarpur	100000
		15: Construction of returning wall on the bank of pond in Durgapur	100000
		16: Brick soling on road between Anwar Engineer Bari and Mostafizur Rahman Bari in Shasangaca	100002
		17: Brick soling on road near Hasem Mia Bari in Badarpur	100002
		18: Brick soling on road near Harun Bari in Gunanandi	100002
Durgapur (South)	Communication	19: Concrete on road between west Choumohoni mosque and Zakir Mia Bari	381097


Union of Adarsha Sadar	Sector	Name of Project	Estimated Project Cost (Tk.)
		20: Concrete on road between west Choumohoni mosque and Zakir Mia Bari in Chamnagar	323240
Amratali	Agriculture and Irrigation	21: Construction of irrigation channel in Gabtali	120000
	Communication	22: Brick soling on road between Anu Mia Bari and Julfu Mia Bari in Kuranapur	100000
		23: Brick soling between mosque and Mokles Mia Bari in Kuranapur	100000
		24: Construction of returning wall near Moheshpur mosque in Palpara	140000
		25: <i>Returning wall on the bank of pond near Professor Fazlur Rahman Bari in Shipur</i>	100000
		Public health	26: Installation of 5 tubewell in different places of union
		27: Construction of toilets in Amrathali Primary School	90019
	Panch thubi	Communication	28: Construction of road-side drain near Muslim Master bari in Mirpur
29: Construction of culvert near Basath Ali Bari in Motinagar			50014
30: Construction of box-culvert in front of DC Shaheb Bari in Chanpur			100000
31: Brick soling from Karaninagar mosque to shop of Alkas Mia			100000
32: Construction of returning wall in Shiber Bazar in Golabari			205004
Public Health		33: Construction of toilet and installation of tubewell in Chanpur primary school	100000
Jaganath pur	Communication	34: Construction of culvert near Ali Ahmed Bari in Khuchaitoli	250000
		35: Brick soling on road from Chittagong trunk road to Balai Chandra Bari	170000
	Public Health	36: Installation of tubewells in 4 wards – 1, 2, 3 & 4	100000
		37: Installation of tubewells in 5 wards – 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9	100000
	Agriculture and Irrigation	38: Construction of irrigation channel from bank of river Gumuti to Sahajahan Mia Bari	100000
		39: Construction of irrigation channel from bank of river Gumuti to Habib Sardar Bari in Aranypur	100000
For whole Upazila	Education	40: Supply of furnitures to educational institutes	500000
		41: Supply of ceiling fans to educational institutes	250000

<b>Union of Adarsha Sadar</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Name of Project</b>	<b>Estimated Project Cost (Tk.)</b>
		42: Supply of sports materials to educational institutes	200000
		43: Supply of musical instruments to educational institutes	300000
	Others	44: Distribution of sewing machine to poor households for income generation activities	300000
		45: Repair of residential building, internal roads and drains of Upazila Complex	3000000
<b>Total</b>			<b>9029424</b>

Source: Official records of Upazila Engineer Office.

The study reveals that majority of projects (83%) were related to development of physical infrastructures followed by socio-economic development (9%) and development for agriculture, small irrigation (8%) as shown in Figure 5.2. From 2008-09 to 2012-13, high trend in undertaking huge number of physical development projects and low trend in agriculture and irrigation as well as socio-economic infrastructure development was prevailing in the two Upazilas.





It was found that in Adarsha Sadar Upazila, from 2008-09 to 2012-13 the total allocation for the projects in agriculture and irrigation sector ranged from 3.4 percent to 11.7 percent (Table 5.4) which was far below than minimum share (20 percent) mentioned in the directives. In addition, according to directives, fund of agriculture sector has to be distributed in the three sub-sectors (agriculture and irrigation, small and cottage industries and fisheries and livestock) which will follow a minimum and maximum share.<sup>211</sup> The study found that most of the allocation in this sector was allocated to projects on irrigation development, though it received less than minimum share except in the year 2011-12. No allocation was given to projects related to fisheries and livestock sub-sector in five years (Table 5.4). Only one project was related to development of small and cottage industry in 2010-11.

<sup>211</sup> Share of agriculture and irrigation ranges from 10 to 15 percent; small and cottage industry 5 to 7 percent; and fisheries and livestock 5 to 10 percent.

It was found that under the physical infrastructure major share of ADP-allocation was provided to projects for development of road-based communication system, such as carpeting with bricks on earthen roads, construction of new small bridges, and culverts, construction of guide wall for protection damage of roads. From 2008-09 to 2012-13, the transport and communication sub-sector received 41 to 84 percent of total allocation which was much higher than maximum share as mentioned in the government directives,<sup>212</sup> but no projects were taken in the sub-sector on housing and physical planning (development of local markets, establishment of storage facilities or community centre), though legally it needs to be allocated at least 5 percent. Allocation to the projects on public health was found less than required share (at least 10 percent) as mentioned in the directives. It was found that Adarsha Sadar had spent less than 6 percent in the public health sector from 2009-10 to 2012-13 except in 2008-09.

Socio-economic infrastructure sector includes three main sub-sectors such as, development of education; health and social welfare; and sports and culture. In five years, Adarsha Sadar Upazila implemented 18 projects in socio-economic infrastructure sector, of which 12 projects (66.7 percent) were related to educational development and 4 projects (33.3 percent) for sports and cultural development, but no projects were taken in the sub-sector on health and social welfare. It was found that projects related to development of education received less than minimum share (10 percent) in every year except in 2011-12 and sports and culture received more than minimum share (5 percent), but did not exceed maximum limit (10 percent). Nature of educational development

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<sup>212</sup> Transport and communication, one of sub-sector of physical infrastructure is to receive 15 to 25 percent.

projects taken by the Adarsha Sadar Upazila includes construction of library room and sports, supply of educational materials. Projects on sports and cultural development include supply of musical instruments and sports materials to different educational institutes.

Table 5.4: Distribution of Projects and ADP-Allocation in Different Sub-Sectors, Adarsha Sadar Upazila Parishad from 2008-09 to 2012-13

Sectors and Sub-Sectors	Year-Wise Number of Projects and Allocation (Tk.)									
	2008-09		2009-10		2010-11		2011-12		2012-13	
<b>1. Agriculture and Small Irrigation</b>	P	Alloca tion	P	Alloca tion	P	Alloca tion	P	Alloca tion	P	Alloca tion
1.1 Agriculture and Irrigation	3	75000 (3.4)	8	463166 (9.6)	3	300000 (3.8)	7	749516 (11.7)	3	320000 (3.5)
1.2 Small and Cottage Industries	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	299440 (3.8)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1.3 Fisheries and Livestock	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
<i>Total</i>	3	75000 (3.4)		463166 (9.6)		599440 (7.7)		749516 (11.7)		320000 (3.5)
<b>2. Physical Infrastructure</b>										
2.1 Transport and Communication	37	1348773 (61.2)	85	405773 3 (84.2)	35	370582 5 (47.4)	35	4058574 (63.7)	31	366940 5 (40.6)
2.2 Housing and Physical	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil

Sectors and Sub-Sectors	Year-Wise Number of Projects and Allocation (Tk.)									
	2008-09		2009-10		2010-11		2011-12		2012-13	
Planning										
2.3 Public Health	7	281396 (12.8)	5	205000 (4.3)	1	100000 (1.3)	2	279918 (4.4)	5	490019 (5.4)
<i>Total</i>	44	1630169 (73.9)	90	426273 3 (88.5)	36	380582 5 (48.7)	37	4338492 (68.1)	36	415942 4 (46.1)
<b>3. Socio-economic Infrastructure</b>										
3.1 Development of Education	2	49500 (2.2)	2	20037 (0.4)	2	599643 (7.7)	4	700000 (11.0)	2	750000 (8.3)
3.2 Health and Social Welfare	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
3.3 Sports and Culture	1	15000 (0.7)	Nil	Nil	1	499490 (6.4)	2	550000 (8.6)	2	500000 (5.5)
<i>Total</i>	3	64500 (2.9)	2	20037 (0.4)	3	109913 3 (14.1)	6	1250000 (19.6)	4	125000 0 (13.8)
<b>4. Others</b>										
4.1 Repair of Upazila office complex	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	555376 (7.1)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
4.2 Repair of Upazila residence complex	1	396252 (18.0)	Nil	Nil	2	172971 5 (22.1)	Nil	Nil	1	300000 0 (33.2)
4.3 Birth registration	2	30122 (1.4)	1	10000 (0.2)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil

Sectors and Sub-Sectors	Year-Wise Number of Projects and Allocation (Tk.)									
	2008-09		2009-10		2010-11		2011-12		2012-13	
4.4 Stationeries	1	9140 (0.4)	1	21000 (0.4)	1	24900 (0.3)	1	31850 (0.5)		
4.5 Boundary wall for graveyard	Nil	Nil	Nil	40000 (0.8)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
4.6 Sewing machine	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	300000 (3.3)
<i>Total</i>	4	435514 (19.7)	2	71000 (1.5)	4	230999 1 (29.6)	1	31850 (0.5)	2	330000 0 (36.5)
<b>Grand Total</b>	53	2205183	10 3	481693 6	47	781438 9	51	6369858	45	902942 4

Source: Office records of Upazila Parishad.

Note: - Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage calculated on basis of grand total.

- P denotes number of projects undertaken by the Upazila.

As a whole, the nature of ADP-projects undertaken by the Adarsha Sadar Upazila indicates that most of projects were concentrated in construction works such as construction of irrigation channels, brick carpeting on earthen roads, construction of bridges, and culverts, construction of guide wall for roads etc. (Table 5.5). Very few projects were taken for social and human resource development or skill development. In fact, projects in non-physical development were found very few, which indicates that Upazila Parishad is relatively less interested to invest for non-visible projects. The general trend of the projects of Adarsha Sadar was to create infrastructure to make a

visible impact in the community. Compared with previous studies as elaborated in the Chapter 2, the research shows that tendencies and perceptions of the local elected representatives were not remarkably changed as they were more prone to visible projects related to construction. A comparison between physical and non-physical development shows that non-physical development were remarkably less than physical development projects (Figure 5.3). With regard to compliance of directives provided by the central government, it was found that both Upazila Parishads did not strictly apply them into practices which were also observed in many previous studies.




Table 5.5: Nature of ADP-projects of Adarsha Sadar Upazila from 2008-09 to 2012-13

Nature of projects	Year-Wise Number of Projects				
	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13
<b>Physical Infrastructure Development</b>					
Construction of irrigation channel	3 (5.7)	8 (7.8)	3 (6.4)	6 (11.8)	4 (8.9)
Carpeting with bricks on earthen road	11(20.8)	35 (34.0)	19 (40.4)	11(21.6)	14 (31.1)
Construction of concrete road	Nil	Nil	Nil	4(7.8)	2 (4.4)
Construction of bridge and culvert	8 (15.1)	16 (15.5)	6 (12.8)	7 (13.7)	7 (15.6)
Construction guide/retaining wall along road	8 (15.1)	17 (16.5)	5 (10.6)	6 (11.8)	6 (13.3)
Construction of road- side drain	4 (7.5)	16 (15.5)	5 (10.6)	7 (13.7)	1 (2.2)
Installation of RCC pipe in road	5 (9.4)	1 (1.0)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Construction of sanitary latrine and toilet	7 (13.2)	4 (3.9)	Nil	1 (2.0)	2 (4.4)
Construction of boundary wall along graveyard	Nil	1 (1.0)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Installation of tubewell for drinking water	Nil	1 (1.0)	1 (2.1)	1 (2.0)	3 (6.7)
Construction of library room in a school	Nil	Nil	1 (2.1)	1 (2.0)	1(2.2)
Repair of upazila office	1 (1.9)	Nil	1 (2.1)	Nil	Nil
Repair of upazila residence	Nil	Nil	2(4.3)	Nil	1(2.2)
<i>Sub-total</i>	47 (88.7)	99 (96.1)	43 (91.5)	45 (88.2)	41 (91.1)
<b>Non-Physical Development</b>					
Training on small and cottage industry	Nil	Nil	1 (2.1)	Nil	Nil
Distribution of sewing machine to poor family	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1(2.2)
Supply of sports materials to educational institutes	2 (3.8)	2 (1.9)	2 (4.3)	2 (3.9)	1(2.2)
Supply of ceiling fans to educational institutes	1(1.9)	Nil	Nil	1(2.0)	1(2.2)
Supply of musical instruments to educational institutes	Nil	Nil	Nil	1(2.0)	1(2.2)
Printing birth certificate	2 (3.8)	1 (1.0)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Procurement of stationeries for office	1(1.9)	1(1.0)	1(2.1)	1(2.0)	Nil
Procurement of agriculture equipments	Nil	Nil	Nil	1(2.0)	Nil

Nature of projects	Year-Wise Number of Projects				
	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13
<i>Sub-total</i>	6 (11.3)	4 (3.9)	4 (8.5)	6 (11.8)	4 (8.9)
Total	53 (100.0)	103 (100.0)	47 (100.0)	51 (100.0)	45 (100.0)

Source: Office Records of Upazila Parishad.

#### 5.4 Size of ADP-Projects of Adarsha Sadar Upazila

The study reveals that in Adarsha Sadar, from 2008-09 to 2012-13 it was found that size of majority of projects (about 82 percent) which were implemented by the Adarsha Sadar Upazila were below the cost of Tk. 100000 (Table 5.6). It was also found that out of 299 projects, two-thirds projects ranged between Tk. 25000 and Tk.100000. In 2008-09 and 2009-10, all the projects were below Tk. 75000. In 2008-09, it was found that 83 percent of the total projects were below the amount of Tk. 50000, which declined to 63 percent in 2009-10. But from 2010-11 the size of projects started becoming larger. In 2010-11, nearly 77 percent projects were belonging to more than Tk. 75000, which increased to 88 percent in 2011-12. However, it is observed that small-sized projects in terms of cost were mostly preferred by the Adarsha Sadar Upazila. According to project-cost, distribution of five years' projects across the unions of the Upazila is presented in the Appendix 5.3.






Table 5.6: Distribution of ADP-Projects according to Cost of Project of Adarsha  
Sadar Upazila from 2008-09 to 2012-13

Cost of Projects (Tk.)	Year-Wise Number of Projects					
	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	Total
Below 25000	22 (41.5)	20 (19.4)	2 (4.3)	Nil	Nil	44 (14.7)
25001–50000	22 (41.5)	45 (43.7)	3 (6.4)	1 (2.0)	5 (11.2)	76 (25.4)
50001 – 75000	8 (15.0)	38 (36.9)	6 (12.8)	5 (9.9)	2 (4.4)	59 (19.7)
75001 – 100000	Nil	Nil	23 (48.8)	22 (43.1)	21 (46.7)	66 (22.1)
100001 – 125000	Nil	Nil	3 (6.4)	9 (17.6)	4 (8.9)	16 (5.4)
125000 – 150000	Nil	Nil	Nil	2 (3.9)	1 (2.2)	3 (1.0)
150001 – 175000	Nil	Nil	Nil	3 (5.9)	1 (2.2)	4 (1.3)
175001 – 200000	Nil	Nil	2 (4.3)	4 (7.8)	1 (2.2)	7 (2.3)
200001 – 225000	Nil	Nil	Nil	3 (5.9)	2 (4.4)	5 (1.7)
225001 – 250000	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	2 (4.4)	2 (0.7)
250001 above	1 (2.0)		8 (17.0)	2 (3.9)	6 (13.4)	17 (5.7)
Total	53 (100.0)	103 (100.0)	47 (100.0)	51 (100.0)	45	299 (100.0)

Source: Document Survey of Upazila Parishad,

Note: Figure in parenthesis indicates percentage.

An analysis on project cost on the basis of nature of projects taken by Adarsha Sadar in 2012-13 shows that some projects involved less project cost which include carpeting bricks on earthen road, construction of irrigation channel, construction of guide wall and construction sanitary toilet. Usually projects related to supply of furniture, sport materials and musical instruments to educational institutes across the whole upazila involved higher project cost. But one remarkable deviation was observed that the largest project cost involved on repair of Upazila residence which was not supposed to be funded by ADP allocation as per existing directives (Table 5.7)

Table 5.7: Range of Project Cost according to Nature of Projects of Adarsha Sadar, 2012-

13

Nature of Projects	Number of Projects	Range of Project Cost (Tk.)
Construction of irrigation channel	4	1,00,000 – 1,20,000
Construction of concrete road	2	3,23,240 – 3,81,087
Carpeting with bricks on earthen road	14	45,012 – 1,70,003
Construction of guide wall	7	35,024 – 2,50,000
Construction of road-side drain	1	2,00,063
Construction of sanitary toilet	2	90,019 – 1,00,000
Installation of tubewell	3	1,00,000
Supply furniture to educational institutes	1	5,00,000
Supply ceiling fans to educational institute	1	2,50,000
Supply musical instruments to educational institutes	1	3,00,000
Supply sports materials to educational institutes	1	2,00,000
Supply sewing machine	1	3,00,000
Repair of Upazila Residence	1	30,00,000

Source: Office records of Upazila Parishad.

In addition, descriptive statistics show that average size of ADP-projects of Adarsha Sadar Upazila was Tk. 41,607 in 2008-09 and Tk. 46,766 in 2009-10 which increased to Tk. 1, 66,262 in 2010-11, Tk. 1, 24,834 in 2011-12 and Tk. 2, 00,653 in 2012-13 (Table 5.8). It was observed that in 2012-13 average size of project increased about five times compared to the project size in 2008-09 (Figure 5.5). On the other hand, standard deviation was found very high which indicates that variation among the project size was also high. The gap between minimum and maximum project-size was found remarkably high.




Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics of ADP-Projects of Adarsha Sadar from 2008-09 to 2012-13

<b>Year</b>	<b>2008-09</b>	<b>2009-10</b>	<b>2010-11</b>	<b>2011-12</b>	<b>2012-13</b>
<b>Statistics</b>					
Number of projects (N)	53	103	47	51	45
Mean	41607.2	46766.4	166262.7	124834.7	200653.9
Std. error of mean	7293.4	2014.6	29082.1	9694.6	65241.4
Median	30000.0	40000.0	100000.0	100000.0	100000
Mode	30000	75000	100000	100000	100000
Standard Deviation	53096.8	20445.8	199377.1	69233.2	437652.7
Skewness	5.95	.11	3.19	2.79	6.220
Minimum cost of a project (Tk.)	9140	7382	7500	31850	35024
Maximum cost of a project (Tk.)	396252	75000	1135674	450000	3000000
Gap between minimum and maximum	43.4	10.2	35.7	14.1	85.7

Note: SPSS was used for statistical analysis.

## 5.5 Sectoral Allocation and Nature of Projects in Homna Upazila

During five years (2008-09 – 2012-13), Homna Upazila Parishad implemented a total of 270 projects under ADP-allocation (Table 5.9). The highest (77) and lowest (31) number of projects were implemented in 2009-10 and in 2008-09 respectively. Majority of projects (69 percent) were undertaken in the sector of physical infrastructure development followed by agriculture and small irrigation development (20 percent), and socio-economic infrastructure development (11 percent) (Figure 5.6). In every year, on an average, Homna Upazila implemented 37 projects in the sector of physical infrastructure development, about 11 projects in the sector of agriculture and small irrigation and 6 projects in the sector of socio-economic development. A sample of project list of the financial year, 2012-13 and their estimated cost has been shown in the Table 5.10.




Table 5.9: Number of ADP-Projects in Different Sectors of Homna Upazila Parishad  
from 2008-09 to 2012-13

Year	<u>Sectors</u>			Total
	Agriculture and Small Irrigation	Physical Infrastructure	Socio-economic Infrastructure and Others	
2008 – 09	8 (25.8)	20 (64.5)	3 (9.7)	31 (100.0)
2009 – 10	13 (16.9)	54 (70.1)	10 (13.0)	77 (100.0)
2010 – 11	12 (19.7)	45 (73.7)	4 (6.6)	61 (100.0)
2011 – 12	12 (21.4)	36 (64.3)	8 (14.3)	56 (100.0)
2012 – 13	9 (20.0)	30 (66.7)	6 (13.3)	45 (100.0)
Total	54 (20.0)	185 (68.5)	31 (11.5)	270 (100.0)

Source: Document Survey of Upazila Parishad, 2013.

Note: Figure in parenthesis indicates percentage.

Table 5.10: A Sample of ADP Project List in Different Sectors and Estimated Project Cost, Homna Upazila Parishad in 2012-13

Name of Union	Sector	Name of Project	Project Cost (Tk.)
Mathabanga	Agriculture and Irrigation	01: Construction of Pucca drain for irrigation in Joydebpur Chak	100000
	Communication	02: Construction of guide-wall on the north side of Mathabanga Union Complex	100000
		03: Construction of <i>Ghatla</i> (stairs) on the bank of river Mudhugopi near Darigaon	100000
	Education	04: Supply of furniture to Joydebpur Government Primary School	50000
	Sanitation	05: Supply of low-cost latrine to all wards of Mathabanga Union	100000
Gagutia	Agriculture and Irrigation	06: Construction of Pucca drain for irrigation in south Alipur	100000
	Communication	07: Repair of road from Darichar Pucca road to Guchugram	100000
		08: Concrete of road from Darichar Helal Bari to Mojib Bari	100000
	Sanitation	09: Supply low-cost latrine	100000
Dulalpur	Agriculture and Irrigation	10: Construction of Pucca drain for irrigation in Doulatpur	100000
	Communication	11: Construction of <i>Ghatla</i> (stairs) near pond	100000
	Development of market	12: Construction of shed on fish market of Dulalpur Bazar	100000
	Education	13: Supply of furniture to Vitikalmina low-cost primary school	100000
	Sanitation	14: Supply of low-cost latrine	50000
Chanderchar	Agriculture and Irrigation	15: Construction of Pucca drain for irrigation in Chanpur	100000
	Communication	16: Construction of pucca <i>Ghatla</i> on the bank of river near Rampur Madrasha	100000
	Development of market	17: Construction of Pucca drain in fish-market of Ramkrishnapur Bazar	100000
	Education	18: Supply of furnitures to Shovarampur Government Primary School	100000
	Sanitation	19: Supply of low-cost latrine in different places of Chanderchar Union	50000
Asadpur	Agriculture and Irrigation	20: Construction of Pucca drain for irrigation in Kalaghachia	100000
	Communication	21: Brick saling on earthen road between Asadpur and Ghoniachar	100000



Name of Union	Sector	Name of Project	Project Cost (Tk.)
		22: Construction of approach road to Ghoniachar Baro bridge	50000
	Development of market	23: Construction of shed over fish-market in Ghoniachar Bazar	150000
Nilokhi	Communication	24: Construction of guide wall near Lalbhag primary school	100000
		25: Construction of pucca <i>Ghatla</i> near Ojoodanagar mosque and <i>Eidghah</i>	150000
	Education	26: Construction of guide wall in Nilokhi to protect registered primary school	100000
	Sanitation	27: Supply of low-cost latrine to villages of Nilochi	100000
Vashaniea	Agriculture and Irrigation	28: Construction of pucca drain for irrigation in 5 Irri blocks	250000
	Communication	29: Repair of road between Kazirgaon and Machimpur	100000
	Sanitation	30: Installation of 5 tubewell in different places of Union	100000
Garmora	Agriculture and Irrigation	31: Repair and extension of irrigation channel near Kalipur Irri Scheme	100000
	Communication	32: Construction of guide wall on the bank of river near Fozorkhandi Mizan Bari	100000
		33: Construction of <i>Ghatla</i> for Shoto Garmora Bagerbhahi mosque	100000
	Development of market	34: Construction of concrete road on south side of Garmora Bazar	100000
	Education	35: Supply of furniture and repair of building of Shot Garmora Forkania Hafezia Madrasha	50000
Joypur	Education	36: Supply of furniture to different educational institutes in Garmora Union	100000
	Sanitation	37: Construction of pucca <i>Ghatla</i> on bank of pond of Jaypur Bhonja Bari	100000
	Agriculture Development	38: Construction of pipe culvert in Sripur north para Bill for drainage	800000
For whole Upazila	Education	39: Supply of furniture to different educational institutes of Homna Upazila	350000
	Communication	40: Repair of bridges and culvers of different Unions under Homna	335000
	Sanitation	41: Construction of toilets for students and teachers of Tulip School in Upazila complex	130000
	Others	42: Distribution of blankets to disaster affected people or destitutes	150000
		43: On line registration of all old birth registration of all Unions under Homna	185000

<b>Name of Union</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Name of Project</b>	<b>Project Cost (Tk.)</b>
		44: Purchase of formalin kit for Upazila Parishad	130000
		45: Repair and painting of Upazila Fisheries Office and Samoybai Office	80000

Source: Office Records of Upazila Parishad.

From 2008-09 to 2012-13, it was found that total allocation of the sector of agriculture and irrigation was spent in the sub-sector of agriculture and small irrigation while no money was spent in other two sub-sectors, such as small and cottage industries, fisheries and livestock. During five years except in 2008-09, 12 percent to 26 percent of total allocation under the sector of agriculture and small irrigation was allocated, though it was less than lower limits as specified in the directives. All the agricultural development projects were related to construction of irrigation channels (Table 5.11).

In Homna Upazila, the sub-sector of transport and communication under the sector of physical infrastructure development received allocation from 22 percent to 55 percent, and the sub-sector of housing and physical planning received allocation of 6 to 19 percent in different years (Table 5.11). It received more than minimum share as indicated in directives. All the projects in this sub-sector were on construction shed for local market development. Allocation to sub-sector of public health was ranged from 12 to 24 percent which was higher than minimum share as mentioned in the directives. Projects in this sector include supply of sanitary latrines, installation of tubewells for drinking water.

In five years, Homna Upazila implemented 31 projects in socio-economic infrastructure sector, of which 25 projects (about 81 percent) were related to educational development and 2 projects (6 percent) related to sports and cultural development and 4 projects (13 percent) related to health and social welfare. However, education development received less than minimum share in every year except in 2009-10 and 2011-12 (Table 5.8). Educational development projects were on construction room and boundary wall for educational institute, repair of educational institute, supply furniture to educational institutes. Sports and cultural development projects were on supply sports materials to educational institutes. Projects on health and social welfare were related to distribution of blankets among poor, distribution of sewing machine to poor family, and supply furniture to Upazila health complex

Table 5.11: Distribution of Projects and ADP-Allocation in Different Sub-Sectors of Homna Upazila Parishad from 2008-09 to 2012-13

Sectors and Sub-sectors	Year-Wise Number of Projects and Allocation (Tk.)									
	2008-09		2009-10		2010-11		2011-12		2012-13	
	P	Alloca-tion	P	Alloca-tion	P	Alloca-tion	P	Alloca-tion	P	Alloca-tion
<b>1. Agriculture and Small Irrigation</b>										
1.1 Agriculture and Irrigation	8	380000 (25.9)	13	740400 (11.5)	12	785000 (17.2)	12	880000 (17.0)	7	850000 (14.4)
1.2 Small and Cottage Industries	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1.3 Fisheries and Livestock	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
<i>Total</i>	8	380000 (25.9)	13	740400 (11.5)	12	785000 (17.2)	12	880000 (17.0)	7	850000 (14.4)
<b>2. Physical Infrastructure</b>										
2.1 Transport and Communication	10	572812 (39.0)	22	1358500 (21.1)	32	2530000 (55.4)	16	1675000 (32.4)	12	2185000 (37.0)
2.2 Housing and Physical Planning	Nil	Nil	17	1237700 (19.2)	3	300000 (6.6)	10	930000 (18.0)	9	1000000 (16.9)
2.3 Public Health	10	355500 (24.2)	13	737400 (11.5)	10	730000 (16.0)	11	870000 (16.8)	8	710000 (12.0)
<i>Total</i>	20	928312 (63.2)	52	3333600 (51.8)	45	3560000 (77.9)	37	3475000 (67.3)	29	3895000 (65.9)

Sectors and Sub-sectors	Year-Wise Number of Projects and Allocation (Tk.)									
	2008-09		2009-10		2010-11		2011-12		2012-13	
<b>3. Socio-economic Infrastructure</b>										
3.1 Development of Education	2	115000 (7.8)	7	713800 (11.1)	4	225000 (4.9)	6	510000 (9.9)	6	750000 (12.7)
3.2 Health and Social Welfare	Nil	Nil	1	30000 (0.5)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	150000 (2.3)
3.3 Sports and Culture	1	44688 (3.0)	2	122700 (1.9)	Nil	Nil	1	250000 (4.8)	Nil	Nil
<i>Total</i>	3	159680 (10.9)	10	866500 (13.5)	4	225000 (4.9)	7	760000 (14.7)	7	900000 (15.2)
<b>4. Others</b>										
4.1 Repair of Upazila office complex	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	80000 (1.4)
4.2 Repair of Upazila residence complex	Nil	Nil	2	1498340 (23.3)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
4.4 Birth registration	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	185000 (3.1)
4.6 Sewing machine	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	50000 (1.0)	Nil	Nil
<b>Grand Total</b>	31	1468000	77	6438840	61	4570000	57	5165000	45	5910000

Source: Office records of Upazila Parishad.

Note: - Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage calculated on basis of grand total.

- P denotes number of projects undertaken by the Upazila.

During five years, it was found that in Homna Upazila 80 to 97 percent of total projects were related to development of physical infrastructure. Most of the construction projects were related to irrigation channel, roads, bridges and culverts, guide walls, shed in local markets, construction of *Ghatla* etc. (Table 5.12). Projects in non-physical development were found very few. Some of the non-physical development projects include tree plantation, distribution of blankets among poor, digitization of birth registration information, and supply furniture to Upazila health complex.




Table 5.12: Nature of ADP-projects of Homna Upazila from 2008-09 to 2012-13

Nature of projects	Year-Wise Number of Projects				
	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13
<b>Physical Infrastructure Development</b>					
Construction of irrigation channel	8 (25.8)	13 (16.9)	12 (19.7)	11 (19.3)	7 (15.6)
Putting bricks on earthen road	Nil	Nil	3 (4.9)	Nil	1 (2.2)
Construction of concrete road	Nil	1 (1.3)	Nil	4 (7.0)	2 (4.4)
Construction of bridge and culvert	3 (9.7)	6 (7.8)	11 (18.0)	5 (8.8)	
Repair bridge and culvert	Nil	Nil	5 (8.2)	Nil	2 (4.4)
Construction guide/returning wall along road	7 (22.6)	11 (14.3)	10 (16.4)	5 (8.8)	4 (8.9)
Construction of road- side drain	Nil	1 (1.3)	3 (4.9)	1 (1.8)	
Repair of road	Nil	2 (2.6)	Nil	Nil	2 (4.4)
Construction of new road	Nil	1 (1.3)	Nil	Nil	1 (2.2)
Construction of <i>Ghatla</i>	Nil	16 (20.8)	Nil	6 (10.5)	6 (13.3)
Construction of shed in local market	Nil	1 (1.3)	3 (4.9)	3 (5.3)	3 (6.7)
Construction of sanitary latrine and toilet	8 (25.8)	2 (2.6)	9 (14.8)	9 (15.8)	6 (13.3)
Installation of tubewell for drinking water	1 (3.2)	11 (14.3)	1 (1.6)	1 (1.8)	1 (2.2)
Construction room for educational institute	1 (3.2)	1 (1.3)			
Construction of boundary wall for educational institute	Nil	Nil	Nil	1 (1.8)	Nil
Repair of educational institute	1 (3.2)	1 (1.3)	Nil	1 (1.8)	Nil
Repair of upazila residence	Nil	2 (2.6)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Repair of upzila office	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1 (2.2)
Sub-Total	30 (96.8)	71 (92.2)	57 (93.4)	48 (84.2)	36 (80.0)
<b>Non-Physical Development</b>					
Tree plantation	Nil	Nil	Nil	2 (3.5)	Nil
Procurement of instrument for fish poison test	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1 (2.2)
Test of arsenic of tubewell water	1 (3.2)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil



Supply furniture to educational institutes	Nil	5 (6.5)	4 (6.6)	5 (8.8)	6 (13.4)
Supply sports materials to educational institutes	Nil	Nil	Nil	1 (1.8)	Nil
Distribution of blankets among poor	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1 (2.2)
Distribution of sewing machine to poor family	Nil	Nil	Nil	1 (1.8)	Nil
Digitization of birth registration information	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1 (2.2)
Supply furniture to Upazila health complex	Nil	1 (1.3)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Sub-total	1 (3.2)	6 (7.8)	4 (6.6)	9 (15.8)	9 (20.0)
Total	31 (100.0)	77 (100.0)	61 (100.0)	57 (100.0)	45 (100.0)

Source: Office Records of Upazila Parishad,

## 5.6 Size of ADP-Projects of Homna Upazila

In Homna, it was found that majority (93 percent) of projects was below Tk. 100000 while in 2008-09 and 2009-10 all projects were below than Tk. 75000 (Table 5.13). One-fourth of the projects were between Tk. 25000 and Tk. 50000. Projects costing more than Tk. 250000 were 3 percent (Figure 5.8). It indicates that in terms of project-cost ADP-projects of Homna Upazila were predominantly small size. Distribution of projects across the unions of the Upazila according to project-cost for five years is presented in the Appendix 5.4.








Table 5.13: Distribution of ADP-Projects of Homan Upazila according to Cost of Project, 2008-09 to 2012-13

Cost of Projects (Tk.)	Number of Projects					Total
	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	
Below 25000	Nil	3 (3.9)	Nil	Nil	Nil	3 (1.1)
25001–50000	21 (67.7)	22 (28.6)	21 (34.4)	Nil	6 (13.3)	70 (25.9)
50001 – 75000	10 (32.3)	49 (63.6)	14 (22.9)	14 (24.5)	Nil	87 (32.2)
75001 – 100000	Nil	Nil	25 (41.1)	39 (68.3)	28 (62.3)	92 (33.9)
100001 – 125000	Nil	Nil	1 (1.6)	1 (1.8)	Nil	2 (0.7)
125000 – 150000	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	5 (11.1)	5 (1.8)
150001 – 175000	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
175001 – 200000	Nil	Nil	Nil	1(1.8)	2 (4.4)	3 (1.1)
200001 – 225000	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
225001 – 250000	Nil	Nil	Nil	1 (1.8)	1 (2.2)	2 (0.7)
250001 above	Nil	3 (3.9)	Nil	1 (1.8)	3 (6.7)	7 (2.6)
Total	31 (100.0)	77 (100.0)	61 (100.0)	57 (100.0)	45 (100.0)	271 (100.0)

Source: Document Survey of Upazila Parishad,

Note: Figure in parenthesis indicates percentage.

An analysis on project cost on the basis of nature of projects taken by Homna Upazila in 2012-13 shows that projects involved less cost were related to carpeting bricks on earthen road, construction of irrigation channel, construction of guide wall, construction of *ghatla* and construction of sanitary toilets. On the other hand, projects involved higher costs were related to bridges and culvers and supply of furniture to educational institute (Table 5.14).

Table 5.14: Range of Project Cost according to Nature of Projects of Homna, 2012-13

<b>Nature of Projects</b>	<b>Number of Projects</b>	<b>Range of Project Cost (Tk.)</b>
Construction of irrigation channel	1	1,00,000 – 2,50,000
Construction of road	3	50,000 – 2,00,000
Repair of road	2	1,00,000
Carpeting with bricks on earthen road	1	1,00,000
Construction of guide wall	4	1,00,000
Construction of bridge and culverts	2	3,35,000 – 8,00,000
Construction of <i>ghatla</i>	6	1,00,000 – 1,50,000
Construction of shed	3	1,00,000 – 1,50,000
Repair of Upazila office	1	80,000
Construction of sanitary toilet	6	50,000 – 1,30,000
Installation of tubewell	1	1,00,000
Supply furniture to educational institutes	6	50,000 – 350,000
Supply formalin test equipments	1	1,30,000
Digitization of birth registration	1	1,85,000

Source: Office records of Upazila Parishad.

In addition, descriptive statistics show that in 2008-09, the average cost of a project of Homna Upazila was Tk. 47354 which was increased to Tk. 131333 in 2012-13 (Figure 5.9). It indicates that average cost of project became double within five years (Table 5.15). Median and mode was found close in the last few years, although standard deviation was remarkably high. In addition, gap between minimum and maximum size of project was remarkably high as observed in every year (Figure 2.10). The highest gap was observed in 2009-10. In that year the largest size of project was 52 times bigger than small size of project.

Table 5.15: Descriptive Statistics of ADP-Projects of Homna from 2008-09 to 2012-13

<b>Year</b> <b>Statistics</b>	<b>2008-09</b>	<b>2009-10</b>	<b>2010-11</b>	<b>2011-12</b>	<b>2012-13</b>
Number of projects (N)	31	77	61	57	45
Mean	47354.8	84108.3	74918.0	108771.9	131333.3
Std. error of mean	3328.7	13250.4	2992.5	19060.1	17808.9
Median	40000.0	75000.0	75000.0	100000.0	100000
Mode	75000	75000	100000	100000	100000
Standard Deviation	18533.5	116271.9	23371.8	143900.6	119464.7
Skewness	.51	5.29	.02	7.02	4.406
Minimum cost of a project (Tk.)	27000	15000	35000	50000	50000
Maximum cost of a project (Tk.)	75000	783267	125000	1150000	800000
Gap between minimum and maximum	2.7	52.2	3.6	23.0	16.0

Note: SPSS used for statistical analysis

## **5.7 Geographic Distribution of ADP-Projects and ADP Allocation of Adarsha Sadar Upazila**

The study reveals that 278 projects (93 percent) were distributed across the six Union of Adarsha Sadar and 21 projects (7 percent) covered the whole Upazila from 2008-09 to 2012-13 as shown in Table 5.16. It was also observed that projects were distributed unevenly among the unions. Findings of the study show that the Amratholi Union received the highest number of ADP-projects (65 projects) while the Durgapur (North) received the lowest number of ADP-projects (31). But gap between distribution of allocation and number of projects across the Unions was found very narrow. It indicates that projects were distributed unevenly, but allocation was distributed evenly. In addition, it was found that distribution of projects and allocation varied year to year among the six Unions. On an average, every year a union received 7 to 10 projects and received allocation around Tk. 8, 00,000.

Table 5.16: Distribution of Projects and ADP Allocation (in Tk.) among Unions and Whole Upazila of Adrsha Sadar Parishad from 2008-09 to 2012-13

<i>Unions of Adarsha Sadar</i>	<b>Projects and ADP Allocation (Tk.)</b>	<b>Year</b>					<b>Total</b>
		<b>2008-09</b>	<b>2009-10</b>	<b>2010-11</b>	<b>2011-12</b>	<b>2012-13</b>	
Kalibazar	No. of Projects	9	22	9	9	10	59
	ADP Allocation	310605 (14.1)	875900 (18.2)	868977 (11.1)	859930 (13.5)	749958 (8.3)	3665370 (12.1)
Durgapur (North)	No. of Projects	4	10	3	7	7	31
	ADP Allocation	247000 (11.2)	715000 (14.8)	600000 (7.7)	774169 (12.2)	700006 (7.8)	3036175 (10.0)
Durgapur (South)	No. of Projects	9	11	5	5	2	32
	ADP Allocation	220596 (10.0)	646000 (13.4)	561195 (7.2)	750954 (11.8)	704337 (7.8)	2883082 (9.5)
Amratholi	No. of Projects	12	27	7	12	7	65
	ADP Allocation	331590 (15.0)	813287 (16.9)	701959 (9.0)	1433219 (22.5)	750000 (8.3)	4030055 (13.3)
Panchthubi	No. of Projects	7	13	7	7	6	40

<i>Unions of Adarsha Sadar</i>	<b>Projects and ADP Allocation (Tk.)</b>	<b>Year</b>					<b>Total</b>
		<b>2008-09</b>	<b>2009-10</b>	<b>2010-11</b>	<b>2011-12</b>	<b>2012-13</b>	
	ADP Allocation	355000 (16.1)	859000 (17.8)	729179 (9.3)	754904 (11.9)	755067 (8.4)	3453150 (11.4)
Jaganathpur	No. of Projects	12	20	8	5	5	50
	ADP Allocation	740392 (33.6)	907749 (18.8)	670246 (8.6)	609832 (9.5)	820000 (9.1)	3748219 (12.4)
Whole Upazila	No. of Projects	Nil	Nil	8	6	7	21
	ADP Allocation	Nil	Nil	3682793 (47.1)	1186850 (18.6)	4550056 (50.4)	9419699 (31.2)
Total No. of Projects		53	103	47	51	45	299
Total ADP Allocation		2205183 (100.0)	4816936 (100.0)	7814389 (100.0)	6369858 (100.0)	9029424 (100.0)	30235750 (100.0)

Source: Monthly proceedings and office records of Upazila Parishad.

Note: Figure in parenthesis indicates percentage.



## 5.8 Geographic Distribution of ADP-Projects and ADP Allocation of Homna Upazila

In Homna, in five years, 255 projects (94 percent) were distributed to nine Unions and 16 project (6 percent) were distributed to whole Upazila from 2008-09 to 2012-13 (Table 5.17). It was observed that the projects were distributed almost evenly across the Unions which ranged between 22 and 31, though the number of projects varied year to year. On an average, every year a union received 3 to 6 projects and received around Tk. 6, 50,000 in every year.

Table 5.17: Distribution of Projects and ADP Allocation (in Tk.) among Union and Whole Upazila under Homna Upazila Parishad from 2008-09 to 2012-13

Unions of Homna Upazila	No. Projects and ADP Allocation	Year					Total
		2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	
Mathabanga	No. of Projects	3	7	7	7	5	29
	ADP allocation	138000 (9.4)	445400 (6.9)	500000 (10.9)	580000 (9.3)	450000 (7.6)	2113400 (8.6)
Gagutia	No. of Projects	3	9	9	6	4	31
	ADP allocation	138000 (9.4)	439800 (6.8)	570000 (12.5)	510000 (8.2)	450000 (7.6)	2107800 (8.6)

Unions of Homna Upazila	No. Projects and ADP Allocation	Year					Total
		2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	
Dulalpur	No. of Projects	5	9	7	5	5	31
	ADP allocation	215500 (14.7)	518800 (8.0)	500000 (10.9)	500000 (8.1)	450000 (7.6)	2184300 (8.9)
Chanderchar	No. of Projects	4	10	5	6	5	30
	ADP allocation	191312 (13.0)	450000 (6.9)	500000 (10.9)	570000 (9.2)	450000 (7.6)	2161312 (8.8)
Asadpur	No. of Projects	3	3	6	6	4	22
	ADP allocation	144500 (9.8)	397400 (6.1)	500000 (10.9)	500000 (8.1)	400000 (6.8)	1941900 (7.9)
Nilokhi	No. of Projects	3	7	9	6	4	29
	ADP allocation	138000 (9.4)	445000 (6.9)	500000 (10.9)	600000 (9.7)	450000 (7.6)	2133000 (8.7)
Vashania	No. of Projects	3	11	6	6	3	29
	ADP allocation	138000 (9.4)	700800 (10.8)	500000 (10.9)	500000 (8.1)	450000 (7.6)	2288800 (9.3)

Unions of Homna Upazila	No. Projects and ADP Allocation	Year					Total
		2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	
Garmora	No. of Projects	2	6	6	6	5	25
	ADP allocation	111000 (7.6)	430000 (6.6)	500000 (10.9)	540000 (8.7)	450000 (7.6)	2031000 (8.2)
Joypur	No. of Projects	3	9	6	8	3	29
	ADP allocation	152000 (10.4)	625000 (9.7)	500000 (10.9)	750000 (12.1)	1000000 (16.9)	3027000 (12.3)
Whole Upazila	No. of Projects	2	6	Nil	1	7	16
	ADP allocation	101688 (6.9)	2024140 (31.3)	Nil	1150000 (18.5)	1360000 (23.0)	4635828 (18.8)
Total No. of Projects		31	77	61	57	45	271
Total ADP allocation		1468000 (100.0)	6476340 (100.0)	4570000 (100.0)	6200000 (100.0)	5910000 (100.0)	24624340 (100.0)

Source: Monthly proceedings and office records of Upazila Parishad.

Note: Figure in parenthesis indicates percentage.

## 5.9 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted some generic characteristics of ADP-projects of the two Upazila Parishads in Bangladesh. The analysis shows that directives of central government regarding distribution of allocation in different sectoral projects were poorly followed. The ground realities indicate that there was a gap between theories and practices. Two reasons could be identified in this regard. One, local policy makers put less emphasis on government directives. Two, directives centrally formulated are less suitable to fulfill local demands or priorities.

The study reveals that the two Upazilas have shown a remarkable efficiency in spending their ADP-allocation through implementing a huge number of projects. It was found that on an average; about 60 projects were being implemented by an Upazila Parishad. Majority of projects were related to physical infrastructure development or construction. Projects on social development, skill development and women development were less focused in the project lists. It seems that generally Upazila Parishads are more interested to create infrastructure development as it has a visible impact in the community as well as voters easily recognize contribution of local government seeing infrastructure development.

In addition, the study reveals that in terms of monetary value, the size of ADP-projects taken by the Upazila Parishad is predominantly small which ranged between Tk. 25000 and Tk.100000. On the other hand, it was found that ADP-allocation was

distributed among the Unions almost evenly while number of projects was distributed unevenly. In Adarsha Sadar, averagely a Union receives 7 to 10 projects and allocation around Tk. 8,00,000 while in Homna, a union received 3 to 6 projects and around Tk. 6,50,000 in every year. Projects covering community of whole Upazila or wider area were less prioritized. One reason might be that small projects are more preferred than larger projects because local representatives feel more comfort to manage small projects and/or their traditional outlook has not yet changed.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Quality of Governance in ADP-Project: An Analysis of Views of Respondents of Two Upazilas**

#### **6.1 Prelude**

This chapter attempts to investigate some key governance issues in the management of local development projects in Bangladesh based on perceptions of opinion survey conducted on village-level respondents, key-informants, focus group discussion with different categories of respondents as well as researcher's observations. Issues investigated include reflection of community priorities, nature of community participation in project selection, transparency meaning access to information on project related activities, how far central government directives effective in governance of projects, and how far key governance elements or principles such as participation, transparency and accountability reflected in project management, nature of existing governance problems in project cycle, measures for improving governance in project management. The chapter argues that ADP-projects of Upazila Parishads suffer from low quality of governance in different stages of project-cycle. Finally, factors of poor quality of governance in ADP-projects have been identified.

#### **6.2 Community Priorities Reflected in Project Selection**

According to existing guidelines, ADP-projects of the Upazila Parishads have to be selected on the basis of local needs and priorities, and they will be complementary in

the way to achieve objectives<sup>213</sup> mentioned in the central government's five years plan. The directives also state that Upazila Parishad will select project proposals annually on priority-basis from a five-year plan. It was learnt from the key informants that the policy planners (elected representatives) who were mainly involved in ADP-projects did not have adequate knowledge about the guidelines for identification, selection criteria, sectoral allocation and national priorities. It was learnt that in most cases projects have not been selected from five years plan as five year planning at the local level was not done. One of the reasons was that central government did not yet provide a detailed guidelines regarding formulation of a five-year plan.

On the other hand, village level respondents expressed that community's priorities in selection of ADP-projects were poorly reflected due to their less access in the project selection process. In both Upazilas, twenty-three percent respondents expressed 'no priority' of community demands and about 30 percent stated 'less priority' of community's demands reflected in the ADP-funded projects ( Table 6.1). In this regard, the weighted average also indicates that most of the projects were categorized as less priority projects.

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<sup>213</sup>Objectives of The Sixth Five Year Plan –2011-2015, include accelerating growth and reducing poverty through sustainable productive employment, promoting small enterprise in rural areas, enhancing income-earning opportunities and productivity of land, reducing growth of population as well as infrastructure and human development constraints. (see Planning Commission, Sixth Five Year Plan FY 2011- FY 2015 – Accelerating Growth and Reducing Poverty, Part – 1 Strategic Dissection and Policy Framework, Ministry of Planning, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.

Table 6.1: Extent of Community's Priorities Reflected in Selection of Projects under ADP Allocation: Views of Villagers of Two Upazilas

Extent of Priorities	Number of Respondents		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
No priority	50 (28.1)	39 (18.8)	89 (23.1)
Less priority	54 (30.3)	60 (29.0)	114 (29.6)
Moderate priority	64 (36.0)	85 (41.1)	149 (38.7)
High priority	9 (5.1)	23 (11.1)	32 (8.3)
Highest priority	1 (0.5)	-	1 (0.3)
Total	178 (100.0)	207 (100.0)	385 (100.0)
Weighted Average	2.2	2.4	2.0

Note: 1) Weighted average calculated on the basis of scores given between 1 and 5.

2) Scores of no priority was 1, less priority 2, moderate priority 3, high priority 4 and highest priority 5.

3) Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage.

Source: Field survey, 2013

It was asked to village-level respondents which was the most demanding projects for the development of their community need to be taken by the Upazila Parishad. In Adarsha Sadar Upazila, most of the respondents (about 34 percent) expressed that improvement of underdeveloped roads was their top priority because poor road



infrastructure was impeding transportation of their products to market centres and caused difficulties to go to urban areas for various reasons. Second priority projects in Adarsha Sadar were improvement of drainage and sewerage system because they had been suffering problem of water-logging during rainy season. The third project-priority was development of education institutes. Other priority-projects were related to development of agriculture, improvement of health facilities, employment generation locally and establishment of agro-based industry as shown in Table 6.2.

A comparison between list of projects implemented in 2012-13 and priority expressed by the community people shows that community's priority was not adequately reflected in the selected project list of Adarsha Upazila Parishad. The village-level respondents pointed out some projects which they considered essential for their development as well as development of the community. Those were generation of employment opportunities, development infrastructure of agriculture market, expansion of agriculture technology, increasing coverage of irrigation, development of infrastructure of local market, skill development on cattle rearing and tailoring, establishment of agro-based small industry, supply of natural gas to villagers for cooking, supply electricity to villagers and improvement of facilities in local health clinic. More than 40 percent community's demands were found left out by the Upazila Parishad. However, projects on production and distribution of electricity or gas were not fall in the jurisdiction of the Upazila Parishad as this sector was remained in the central government.

Table 6.2: Priority Projects Identified by Villagers of Adarsha Sadar Upazila


Priority Projects	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Improvement of underdeveloped roads	116	33.8
Improvement of drainage and sewerage system	48	14.0
Development of education institutes	37	10.8
Generation of employment opportunities	31	9.0
Development of agriculture, such as development infrastructure of agriculture market, expansion of agriculture technology, increasing coverage of irrigation	29	8.5
Development of infrastructure of local market	27	7.9
Skill development on cattle rearing and tailoring	14	4.1
Establishment of agro-based small industry	14	4.1
Improvement of sanitary conditions	9	2.7
Supply of natural gas to villagers for cooking	5	1.4
Supply of electricity to villagers	5	1.4
Improvement of facilities in local health clinic	5	1.4
Development of community graveyard	3	0.9
	343	100.0

Note: 1) More than one responses given by same respondent.

2) Percentage calculated on the basis of total responses.

Source: Field Survey, 2013

In Homna Upazila, according to priority and demands of the village level respondents, five top ranking projects were improvement of underdeveloped roads, construction of *Ghatla* (concrete stairs) at the bank of rivers or ponds, development of education institutes, supply of natural gas to villagers for cooking and supply of electricity to villagers. Other demanded projects were generation of employment opportunities, development of agriculture through providing irrigation facilities, canal digging for solving water logging, improvement of facilities in local health clinic, improvement of sanitary conditions, training for unemployed youths on skill development and development of community graveyard.



Compared to Adarsha Sadar, Homna had a high demand for construction of *Ghatla*. It is a local name of concrete stairs. In Homna, river is the main source of water,

but in the dry season villagers face serious water crisis for household activities as well as cultivation. For convenience of using river-water mainly for household activities, *ghatla* was a highly demanding project concept among the community people as also observed by the researcher. Though the Upazila Parishad paid some attention on construction of Ghatla, other demands of community were less reflected in selection of projects. For example, projects related to self-employment generation, solving water-logging and youth development were less focused by the Homna Upazila Parishad. Hence, more than 50 percent local priority demands were not included in the project list of Homna Upazila in 2012-13 (Figure 6.1).

Table 6.3: Priority Projects Identified by Villagers of Homna Upazila

Priority Projects	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Improvement of underdeveloped roads	95	27.1
Construction of <i>gatla</i> (concrete stairs) at the bank of rivers/ponds	43	12.3
Development of education institutes	41	11.7
Supply of natural gas to villagers for cooking	37	10.5
Supply electricity to villagers	30	8.5
Generation of employment opportunities	28	8.0
Development of agriculture through providing irrigation facilities	25	7.1
Canal digging for solving water logging	17	4.8
Improvement of facilities in local health clinic	15	4.3
Improvement of sanitary conditions	8	2.3
Training for unemployed youths on skill development	6	1.7
Improvement of drainage and sewerage system	4	1.1
Development of community graveyard	2	0.6
Total	351	100.0

Note: 1) More than one responses given by some respondents.

2) Percentage calculated on the basis of total responses.

Source: Field Survey, 2013

### 6.3 Extent of Community Participation in Project Identification

Participation in the process of project selection has been taken as a variable to assess level of governance in the project management. Here participation was focused how far the villagers who are the ultimate clientele of project outputs were provided opportunity to express their views in the process of project selection. In this regard, it was asked to the village-level respondents whether community people were consulted before selection of ADP-projects. It was found that in both Upazilas, majority of the respondents (65 percent) answered negatively, meaning they were not consulted in the process of project selection (Table 6.4).

Table 6.4: Whether Community People Consulted Before Selection of ADP Projects

Response	Number of Respondents		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
Yes	60 (33.7)	74 (35.7)	134 (34.8)
No	118 (66.3)	133 (64.3)	251 (65.2)
Total	178 (100.0)	207 (100.0)	385 (100.0)

Note: 1) Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage.

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On the other hand, regarding extent of community participation that more than one-fourth of total respondents expressed that in the process of project selection there was ‘no participation at all’ and fifty percent respondents mentioned ‘less participation’ (Figure 6.2). The score of weighted average indicates that extent of community participation in identification of ADP-projects in both Upazila was found below average which was 1.9 and 2.0 in Adarsha Sadar and Homna respectively (Table 6.5).




Table 6.5: Extent of Community Participation in Identification of ADP Projects:

Response of Villagers

Level of Participation	Number of Respondents		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
Not at all	53 (29.8)	55 (26.6)	108 (28.1)
Less	99 (55.6)	99 (47.8)	198 (51.4)
Average	25 (14.0)	51 (24.6)	76 (19.7)
Much	1 (0.6)	2 (1.0)	3 (0.8)
Total	178 (100.0)	207 (100.0)	385 (100.0)
Weighted Average	1.9	2.0	1.9

Note: 1) Weighted average calculated on the basis of scores given between 1 and 4.

2) Scores for 'not at all' was 1, 2 for 'less', 3 for 'average', and 4 for 'much'.

3) Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage.

Source: Field survey, 2013

It was asked to the village-level respondents whom consulted in the process of project selection. In this regard, most of the respondents (about 36 percent in Adarsha Sadar and 57 percent in Homna) mentioned that they did not know whom consulted before taking ADP-projects. Consultation with local common people was very poor as found around 4 percent in Adarsha Sadar and 5 percent in Homna. According to villagers' perception, UP Chairman and members, local elite and political persons were mainly consulted in the process of project selection (Table 6.7).



Table 6.6: Whom Consulted Before Taking ADP Projects: Response of Villagers

Whom Consulted	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
UP member	33 (18.5)	31 (15.0)	64 (16.7)
With local elite	41 (23.0)	35 (16.9)	76 (19.7)
UP Chairman	24 (13.5)	11 (5.3)	35 (9.1)
Local common people	7 (3.9)	10 (4.8)	17 (4.4)
Political persons	10 (5.6)	2 (1.0)	12 (3.1)
Not known	63 (35.5)	118 (57.0)	181 (47.0)
Total	178 (100.0)	207 (100.0)	385 (100.0)

Note: 1) Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage.

Source: Field Survey, 2013

Key informants also expressed similar views that local representatives (UP Chairmen, UP Members, Upazila Chairman and Vice-Chairs), local Parliament Member (MP) and officials of nation-building departments including UNO were actively involved in the process of project selection and approval. In addition, local MP and local politician especially associated with ruling political party were directly or indirectly were involved in project selection process. In Adarsha Sadar Upazila, involvement of local MP was predominantly high as he was belonging to the governing party. In an interview with the Upazila Chairman of Adarsha Sadar, it was reported that he was compromising with the influential actors for the sake of use of government resources, such influence was less

available in Homna. Part of reason might be MP who was not belonging to governing party. In addition, the researcher observed that among the government officials, UNO and Upazila Engineer were actively involved in the project selection process in various ways, such as informing directives for project selection, checking legal violations in the project selection process.

Regarding citizen's participation in identification of ADP-projects, in some cases local representatives held some sort of negative notions. Some UP Chairmen who are members of Upazila Parishad have expressed that community participation was being ensured through their participation as they were formally representing community people. They augured that they consulted usually with local community with regard to matters of Upazila Parishad. But in a number of FGDs conducted with villagers and UP members, it was found that generally they did not consult with local community especially the poor, in selection of projects' priority or site selection of project. In most cases, they mentioned that in most cases they became able to know while they saw project started implementing in their locality.

On the other hand, village-level respondents identified some reasons of poor consultation with community people. These include negligence of leaders, less interest of people's representatives in local consultation and unawareness of community people (Table 6.7). Apart from, some UP Chairmen and members argued in favour of poor community participation. According to them, if all villagers were consulted, it would be difficult for them to take decision regarding selection of projects because open discussion

might create a chaotic situation or inviting troubles. As a result, decision-making might delay, even be possibility of postponed. In addition, they also argued that it could be difficult for them to satisfy to all demands of community with having a small ADP-allocation provided by the central government.

It was observed that a perception prevailing in many local elected representatives was that they were the guardians of the society and they were much knowledgeable than common people. So they were enough to represent local people and acted as spokespersons in the decision-making instead of people. On the other hand, a traditional perception prevailing in local community people, particularly less advantaged or poor section was that they did not have much power to influence local decisions. It was also observed that they were not more interested to know about local development activities. However, some respondents blamed attitude of negligence of local representatives including government officials for not listening them. In addition, existing legal provisions do not compel the local representatives to consult with local community in the process of project selection.

Table 6.7: Reasons of Not Consulting with Community People: Views of Villagers of Two Upazilas

	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
Less interest of people's representatives in local consultation	35	43	78 (20.3)
Negligence of leaders	25	29	54 (14.0)
Unawareness of people	16	21	37 (9.6)
Project officials not interested to consult	N/A	16	16 (4.2)
Not known	102	98	200 (51.9)
Total	178	207	385 (100.0)

Note: 1) Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage.

Source: Field Survey, 2013

Generally, the proposed ADP-projects were presented in the monthly meeting of Upazila Parishad and recorded in the proceedings of meeting (Box 1). But many expressed that there was a very short discussion on the project proposals due to shortage of time to discuss all the project proposals along with huge agenda in a meeting. As a result, examining or reviewing or assessing viability of projects was less possible to do

properly. Moreover, meeting of Upazila Parishad was generally conducted without preparing working papers. Many expressed that meeting was just like a formality to legalize activities of Upazila Parishad.

**Box 3: Submitting ADP-Project Proposals in Homna Upazila Parishad: An Existing Practice**

After receiving first installment of ADP allocation from the government, Upazila Engineer Office circulates a notice asking project proposals from the Union Parishads under its jurisdiction. Accordingly, respective Union Parishads submit project proposals assuming how much money of ADP allocation they could receive from the Upazila Parishad for the whole financial year. Project proposals submitted to Upazila Parishads on behalf of their Union Parishads were approved in the meeting of Upazila Parishad and recorded in the proceedings.

In order to increase community participation in different stages of project management, village-level respondents have suggested a number of measures. In this regard, more than two-thirds of respondents mentioned organization of village-level meeting for selection of projects could be organized. One-tenth respondent recommended for open meeting or planning conference at Union as well as Upazila level. Some respondents put emphasis on citizen's awareness, sharing information of project activities and formation of a broad-based project identification committee at the local level and motivational programme on people's participation (Table 6.8)

Table 6.8: Measures Needed to Increase Citizen Participation in Different Stages of Project Management: Views of Villagers of Two Upazilas

Measures for Increasing Peoples' Participation	Number of Responses		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
Organizing meeting at village level for selecting project proposals	142 (57.9)	68 (28.5)	210 (43.4)
Organizing open meeting at Upazila and Union level to select project proposals	24 (9.8)	29 (12.1)	53 (11.0)
Organising planning conference by the Upazila Parishad at Upazila level before finalization of project proposals	21 (8.6)	32 (13.4)	53 (10.9)
Raising awareness of people	12 (4.9)	37 (15.5)	49 (10.1)
People need to be informed about project activities	12 (4.9)	29 (12.1)	41 (8.5)
Formation of a broad-based village level committee consisting of cross-section of community people	14 (5.7)	17 (7.1)	31 (6.4)
Motivation of UP members regarding contribution of peoples' participation	13 (5.3)	13 (5.4)	26 (5.4)
Establishing close relation between local government functionaries and community	7 (2.9)	14 (5.9)	21 (4.3)
Total	245 (100.0)	239 (100.0)	484 (100.0)

Note: 1) More than one responses given by some respondents.

2) Percentage calculated on the basis of total responses.

Source: Field Survey, 2013

#### 6.4 Extent of Transparency in ADP-Projects

Transparency meaning openness and sharing information has been investigated in the study through collecting information on a wide range of aspects related to transparency in project selection and implementation. According to views of village-level respondents, more than one-fifth respondents mentioned that transparency was not adequately available in overall project management. More than two-fifths respondents stated that less transparency was available in ADP-project selection and implementation. The score of weighted average also indicates that in both Upazilas extent of transparency was found below average as found 2.2 and 1.9 in Adarsha Sadar and Homna Upazila respectively (Table 6.9). According to views of village-level respondents, reasons of less transparency in ADP-project selection and implementation were identified as less consultation with community people, projects not selected openly and less dissemination of information on project.




Table 6.9: Extent of Transparency in ADP-Project Selection and Implementation

Level of Transparency	Number of Respondents		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
Not at all	20 (11.2)	73 (35.3)	93 (24.1)
Less	101 (56.7)	79 (38.2)	180 (46.8)
Average	56 (31.5)	51 (24.6)	107 (27.8)
Much	1 (0.6)	4 (1.9)	5 (1.3)
Total	178 (100.0)	207 (100.0)	385 (100.0)
Weighted Average	2.2	1.9	2.1

Note: 1) Weighted average calculated on the basis of scores given between 1 and 4.  
 2) Scores for 'not at all' was 1, 2 for 'less', 3 for 'average', and 4 for 'much'.  
 3) Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage.

Source: Field survey, 2013

Majority of respondents (around 61 percent) pointed out that ADP-projects were not undertaken on correct information. In most cases, UP members, local respectable and influential persons, UP Chairman and political workers of ruling party provided information regarding project-selection (Table 6.10). Local people were less engaged as information providers.



Table 6.10: Information Providers for Identifying ADP Projects

Responses	Number of Respondents		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
UP members	48 (26.9)	37 (17.9)	85 (22.1)
Local respectable influential persons	35 (19.7)	35 (16.9)	70 (18.1)
UP Chairman	17 (9.6)	36 (17.4)	53 (13.8)
Local people		9 (4.3)	9 (2.3)
Political workers or leaders	2 (1.1)	9 (4.3)	11 (2.9)
Not known	76 (42.7)	81 (39.2)	157 (40.8)
Total	178 (100.0)	207 (100.0)	385 (100.)

Note: 1) Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage.

Source: Field Survey, 2013

It was asked to the village-level respondents whether they had have information about ADP allocation for their own Union or Upazila, and known Chairperson of any Project Implementation Committee (PIC) in their locality. It was found that more than ninety percent respondents did not know ADP-allocation and majority of respondents (around 68 percent) did not know Chairperson of a PIC working at their locality. In addition, the researcher visited some project sites where no signboards were found at the project-sites. On the other hand, web sites of the respective Upazila did not provide

information on current ADP-projects and their allocation of approved projects. Even the notice boards of Upazila Parishad did not show any information related to ADP-projects.

Some respondents mentioned that project committees were not formed openly. They stated that they did not know the Chairman of project committee, let alone other members of the project committee. Some respondents expressed that poor community participation in project selection results in poor transparency. Some respondents pointed out political influence as a barrier of ensuring transparency in project selection and implementation. In order to ensure transparency in different stages of project management, the respondents have suggested a number of measures (Table 6.11). Most of the respondents suggested that community involvement in project selection, dissemination of project information through leaflets, and signboard at project sites, formation of PIC openly could be helpful for increasing transparency.

Table 6.11: Measures Needed for Ensuring Transparency in Different Stages of Project Management: Views of Villagers of Two Upazilas

Measures for Transparency	Number of Responses		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
Community people need to be involved in project management	25 (11.5)	53 (22.8)	78 (17.3)
To make community informed about ADP-projects through leaflets, <i>miking</i> and signboard at project site	25 (11.5)	44 (19.0)	69 (15.3)
Project Implementation Committee (PIC) to be formed openly	26 (11.9)	39 (16.8)	65 (14.5)
Selection of project based on top priority of community	45 (20.6)	10 (4.4)	55 (12.2)
Remove political interfere in project selection and implementation	29 (13.3)	24 (10.3)	53 (11.8)
Arrange consultation with local community before project selection	17 (7.8)	25 (10.8)	42 (9.3)
Monitoring and supervision need to be increased	24 (11.0)	16 (6.9)	40 (8.9)
Accountability need to be ensured	16 (7.4)	13 (5.6)	29 (6.5)
Increase integrity of local representatives	11 (5.0)	8 (3.4)	19 (4.2)
Total	218 (100.0)	232 (100.0)	450 (100.)

Note: 1) More than one responses given by some respondents.

2) Percentage calculated on the basis of total responses.

Source: Field Survey, 2013

## 6.5 Extent of Accountability in ADP-Projects

Some issues of accountability such as overall accountability, extent of accountability, legal aspects of accountability and measures of ensuring accountability were investigated in the study. Regarding extent of accountability in the ADP-projects of Upazila Parishad, the village-level respondents expressed that overall accountability was very poor (Figure 6.4). One-fourth respondents mentioned ‘no accountability at all’ and more than two-fifths expressed ‘less accountability’ in the project management. The score of weighted average indicates that extent of accountability in ADP-projects was less than average which was 2.0 and 2.1 in Adarsha Sadar and Homna respectively (Table 6.12).




Table 6.12: Extent of Accountability in ADP-Project Management: Response of Village-level Respondents

Extent of Accountability	Number of Respondents		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
Not at all	42 (23.6)	55 (26.6)	97 (25.2)
Less	97 (54.5)	79 (38.2)	176 (45.7)
Average	39 (21.9)	73 (35.3)	112 (29.1)
High	0	0	0
Total	178 (100.0)	207 (100.0)	385 (100.0)
Weighted Average	2.0	2.1	2.0

Note: 1) Weighted average calculated on the basis of scores given between 1 and 4.  
 2) Scores for 'not at all' was 1, 2 for 'less', 3 for 'average', and 4 for 'much'.  
 3) Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage.

Source: Field survey, 2013

The existing legal framework with regard to management of ADP- projects of the Upazila Parishad provides a number of means which can likely to establish a system of accountability in the project management. These are:

- Upazila Parishad will meet once in a month to review progress of the projects.
- Upazila Chairman and/or UNO may visit any project at any time and can order corrective measures regarding any malpractices in the project management.
- Upazila Parishad will form a Project Supervision Committee to monitor ongoing ADP-projects in each Union. This committee will report to the Upazila Parishad from time to time.

- Deputy Commissioner, chief bureaucrat of the District, can inspect projects under his jurisdiction at anytime and make comments, advices and suggestions to the Upazila Parishad, Divisional Commission and Local Government Division.
- During implementation of projects, some information such as project name, amount of expenditure, duration of project will be displayed at the project site.

The researcher observed during the field survey that Upazila Parishad rarely conducted monthly review meeting on the on-going ADP-projects. In most cases, Project Supervision Committee at the Union level was not available. High officials (for example, Deputy Commission) rarely visited project-sites, even UNO could not monitor regularly. But an interesting case was found in Adarsha Sadar Upazila where local MP organised a public hearing at the Union level to review performance of development works including ADP-projects (Box 2).

**Box 4: MP's Oversight on Development Activities through Public Hearing**

In the initial year after elected as Member of Parliament (MP) under the Adarsha Sadar Upazila of Comilla a local level meeting of MP was conducted under his Chair at Kalirbazar Union Parishad, one of the remote Union Parishads from the Upazila headquarters, . The meeting was organised at a local school ground. Different sections of community people including elected representatives of Union Parishad and Upazila Chairman attended the meeting. In this meeting, development activities of various departments including projects of ADP discussed and reviewed. As an outcome of the public hearing, a project committee had to compel to reconstruct bridge again in response to local community complain of poor quality of project implementation. The local people appraised the initiative of MP.

In addition, as per guidelines, Upazila Parishad will prepare an annual report on the performance of projects which were completed by June 30. The report is to highlight title, objective, cost, number of intended beneficiaries, achievement of target, labour man-days created (skilled/un-skilled), quality of project etc. According to guidelines, the report will be completed within July 15 and later to be sent to DC within July 30. It will also be disseminated in notice board of Upazila Parishad and Union Parishads. But in practice, no such report was found in the studied two Upazilas.

It was asked to key informants and local government representatives regarding which method of project implementation was more for ensuring effective accountability in the project management effectively. Some UP members have augured that project implementation through Project Committee is more effective because members of the Project Committee remains responsive to local community while most of the contractors were not accountable to local residents because they were not local people. On the other hand, some respondents have argued that open tender system of project implementation ensures more accountability because contractors are selected openly. Yet most of the respondents have expressed that project committees are more effective for timely and quality implementation of projects than contractors.

With regard to ensuring accountability in project management, the village –level respondents have mentioned a number of measures. Most of the respondents have recommended for making people aware of project activities through leaflets, signboards

and other ways of communication (Table 6.13). Many respondents have stressed on monitoring and supervision through community-based project monitoring committee, formation of monitoring cell, and community-based evaluation before final payment. It seems that the respondents put much emphasis on ‘social accountability’ in different stages of project management in order to ensure accountability.

Table 6.13: Measures Needed for Ensuring Accountability in Project Management:

Views of Villagers of Two Upazilas

Measures for Ensuring Accountability	Number of Responses		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
People to be made informed through leaflets, miking, signboard, newspapers etc.	37 (19.7)	68 (23.6)	105 (22.1)
Community participation in project management	31 (16.5)	64 (22.2)	95 (19.9)
Increase external monitoring and supervision	10 (5.3)	32 (11.2)	42 (8.8)
Building awareness in community	12 (6.4)	29 (10.1)	41 (8.6)
Project monitoring by village-based committee	28 (14.9)	11 (3.8)	39 (8.2)
Reporting of project performance to community by Project Committee	8 (4.2)	28 (9.7)	36 (7.6)
Formation PIC without political affiliation	20 (10.6)	13 (4.5)	33 (6.9)
Formation of monitoring cell at the local level	9 (4.8)	11 (3.8)	20 (4.1)
Wider community participation in project implementation process	10 (5.3)	8 (2.8)	18 (3.8)
Punishment of persons involved in corruption in project implementation	9 (4.8)	8 (2.8)	17 (3.6)
Community evaluation before payment of project-cost	8 (4.3)	7 (2.4)	15 (3.2)
Programmes needed for Increasing integrity of local representatives	6 (3.2)	9 (3.1)	15 (3.2)
Total	188 (100.0)	288 (100.0)	476 (100.0)

Note: 1) More than one responses given by some respondents.

2) Percentage calculated on the basis of total responses.

Source: Field Survey, 2013



## 6.6 Extent and Nature of Corruption in ADP-Project

Control of corruption is considered as one of the assessing quality of governance. To what extent corruption was prevailing in the ADP-projects was enquired in the survey. One-third village-level respondents mentioned that corruption was prevailing in the ADP-project management to a large extent (Figure 6.5). The score of weighted average also indicates that level of corruption in ADP-projects was higher than average level which was 3.3 in both Upazilas (Table 6.14).




Table 6.14: Extent of Corruption in ADP-Projects: Response of Villagers

Level of Corruption	Number of Respondents		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
Not at all	11 (6.2)	8 (3.9)	19 (4.9)
Less	22 (12.4)	25 (12.1)	47 (12.2)
Average	57 (32.0)	102 (49.3)	159 (41.3)
Much	78 (43.8)	49 (23.6)	127 (33.0)
Very much	10 (5.6)	23 (11.1)	33 (8.6)
Total	178 (100.0)	207 (100.0)	385 (100.0)
Weighted Average	3.3	3.3	3.3

Note: 1) Weighted average calculated on the basis of scores given between 1 and 5.

2) Scores for 'not at all' was 1, 2 for 'less', 3 for 'average', 4 for 'much' and 5 for 'very much'.

3) Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage.

Source: Field survey, 2013

Key informants expressed that corruption happened in ADP-projects in many different ways, such as low quality of materials used in project, full amount of project money not spent, forfeit of project money by project implementation committee, project left incomplete, payment of project money having some activities left uncompleted, hiding information of project cost (Table 6.15). In addition, different malpractices in tendering process, such as unholy association of contractors, less competition in bidding,

political influences in tendering, adoption of other's license for bidding by fake contractors were identified by the respondents as corruption patterns in ADP-projects. Moreover, it was reported by some members of project committees that a sizeable proportion of project resources (30 percent to 40 percent) was siphoned off as bribes to 'rent seeking' persons (government officials and others) at different levels of project management<sup>214</sup>.

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<sup>214</sup> Undue expenditure means unofficial expenditure paid to government departments for processing of project documents, work orders and bill processing. Official deduction from the total project-cost includes vat, income tax and security money which is around 18 percent.

Table 6.15: Nature and Pattern of Corruption in ADP-Projects: Perceptions of Villagers

Nature and Pattern of Corruption	Number of Responses		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
Low quality of materials used in project implementation,	123 (49.0)	85 (36.3)	208 (42.9)
Hiding information of project cost	54 (21.5)	32 (13.7)	86 (17.7)
Not full spent of project money	16 (6.4)	30 (12.8)	46 (9.5)
Forfeited money by committee members	17 (6.8)	27 (11.6)	44 (9.1)
Providing bribe in different stages of project-cycle	5 (2.0)	17 (7.3)	22 (4.5)
PIC involved in corruption	10 (4.0)	7 (3.0)	17 (3.5)
Complicated bureaucratic process	5 (2.0)	11 (4.7)	16 (3.3)
Project not completed in time	6 (2.4)	9 (3.8)	15 (3.1)
Adopting malpractice in tendering process	4 (1.5)	9 (3.8)	13 (2.7)
Project activities left incomplete	8 (3.2)	2 (0.9)	10 (2.1)
Payment without full completion of project activities	3 (1.2)	5 (2.1)	8 (1.6)
	251 (100.0)	234 (100.0)	485 (100.0)

Note: 1) Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage.

2) Percentage calculated on the basis of total responses.

Source: Field Survey, 2013

In order to improve quality of governance in ADP-project management, the village-level respondents have emphasized on preventing corruption in different stages of project-cycle. In this regard, they mentioned a number of measures, such as better access to information on project allocation, increasing monitoring and supervision, involving community people in different stages of project-cycle, avoiding involvement of political workers in project implementation and so on (Table 6.16). The respondents mentioned mainly preventive anti-corruption measures. Preventive measures include access to information, increased monitoring and supervision, and access to community participation in every stage of project-cycle and formation of local project monitoring committee.

Table 6.16: Measures for Preventing Corruption in Project Management: Views of Villagers of Two Upazilas

Measures	Number of Responses		
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila	Total
Having display of signboard on project cost and other relevant information at the project site.	57 (23.4)	61 (16.5)	118 (19.3)
Increasing monitoring and supervision.	33 (13.6)	53 (14.4)	86 (14.0)
Engaging honest persons in Project Implementation Committee (PIC).	26 (10.7)	34 (9.2)	60 (9.8)
Informing of community people of project allocation.	23 (9.5)	30 (8.1)	53 (8.7)
Ensuring accountability of actors involved in project implementation	10 (4.1)	41 (11.1)	51 (8.3)
Ensuring punishment for corruption	18 (7.4)	31 (8.4)	49 (8.0)
Involving community people in every stages of project-cycle.	13 (5.3)	23 (6.2)	36 (5.9)
Avoiding involvement of UP members or political workers in project implementation.	14 (5.8)	24 (6.5)	38 (6.2)
Formation of a broad-based local project monitoring committee for overseeing project activities	16 (6.6)	19 (5.2)	35 (5.7)
Ensuring honesty of government officials	14 (5.8)	20 (5.4)	34 (5.6)
Building awareness in people about local government activities	10 (4.1)	21 (5.7)	31 (5.1)
Avoiding political motivation in project selection	9 (3.7)	12 (3.3)	21 (3.4)
Total	243 (100.0)	369 (100.0)	612 (100.0)

Note: 1) More than one responses given by some respondents.

2) Percentage calculated on the basis of total responses.

Source: Field Survey, 2013

## **6.7 Unfair Political Influence in Project Management**

Quality of governance in ADP-projects was poor due to unfair political influence. The researcher observed that local MP, political leaders especially of ruling parties exerted much influence in project selection as well as site selection for project implementation. Sometimes, less priority projects got approval on basis of demands of political workers. In some cases, formation of project implementation committees as well as appointment of contractors was done by political linkages. As a result, unfair political influence acted as a constraint of quality of governance in project selection and implementation.

## **6.8 Constraints in Monitoring and Supervision**

Effective monitoring and supervision is essentially important for ensuring quality of project implementation. The researcher observed that ADP-projects of the two Upazila Parishads were not strongly monitored and supervised. As a result, quality of project implementation suffered seriously. It was observed that UNO was so much busy with many activities, it was difficult for him to monitor all the projects. On the other hand, legal provision to form Project Supervision Committee to monitor and supervise ADP-projects was rarely found at the ground. Sometimes progress of ADP-projects was discussed in the monthly meeting, but members of Upazila Parishad were found less interested to discuss quality of implementation of projects.

## 6.9 Governance Problems in Project Selection

Quality of ADP-project's suffers from a variety of governance problems as mentioned by the village-level respondents. According to views of village-level respondents, in both Upazilas, the top most governance problem was political patronage at the selection stage of ADP-projects. Other governance problems in project selection stage were identified as like as projects selected by the desire of local government leaders instead of local community demands or priorities, projects not scrutinized properly before selection, projects not selected neutrally and so on (Table 6.17). It indicates that selection process of ADP-projects is poor due to some governance crisis.

Table 6.17: Governance Problems in Selection of ADP projects: Views of Villagers of Two Upazilas

Governance Problems in Selection of ADP-Projects	Percentage	
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila
Political patronage in project selection	60.6	61.8
Projects selected by desire of UP Chairman/Member	36.5	11.6
Projects not selected based on local community demands or priorities	17.4	16.4
Projects selected sitting at Upazila Office	12.9	5.8
Projects not scrutinized properly	10.7	5.8
Projects not selected neutrally	7.9	N/A
Less importance on high priority projects in project selection	7.3	N/A
Giving priority to own election area in project selection	5.1	N/A
Weak role of government to ensure proper selection of project	3,4	N/A
Project site not selected properly	3.4	N/A

Note: 1) More than one responses given by some respondents.

2) Percentage calculated on the basis of total respondents.

Source: Field Survey, 2013



On the other hand, to what extent ADP-projects were analyzed on the basis of financial, economic and social indicators or cost-benefit analysis was asked to the village-level respondents. Based on perceptions of the respondents the study reveals that in the project selection process low priority was being given on a number of indicators, such as cost-benefit analysis, employment of local area, agriculture production, fulfillment of election pledges of local representative, while medium priority found on fulfillment of UZP Chairman and Vice-Chairmen as well as UP Chairman interests (Table 6.18).

Table 6.18: Extent of Financial and Socio-Economic Analysis in Selection of ADP-Projects according to Assessment of Villagers

Indicators of socio-economic Analysis in Project Selection	No priority	Low priority	Medium priority	High Priority	Weighted Average
Cost benefit analysis	54 (30.3)	71 (39.9)	51 (28.7)	2 (1.1)	2.0
Priority of UZP Chairman's interest in project selection	27 (15.2)	66 (37.1)	83 (46.6)	2 (1.1)	2.5
Priority of UZP Vice- Chairs' interest	24 (13.5)	24 (13.5)	130 (73.0)		2.6
Priority of UP Chairman's interest in project selection	7 (3.8)	63 (35.5)	108 (60.7)		2.6
Priority to employment of local area in project selection	65 (36.5)	31 (17.4)	82 (46.1)		2.1
Priority to agriculture production in project selection	75 (42.1)	43 (24.2)	60 (33.7)		1.9
Priority to fulfillment of election pledges of local representatives	8 (4.5)	108 (60.7)	62 (34.8)		2.3
Priority to interest of local political leaders in project selection	6 (3.4)	105 (59.0)	63 (35.4)	4 (2.2)	2.4
Priority to large benefit of community in project selection	8 (4.5)	80 (45.0)	90 (50.5)		2.5

Note: 1) Weighted average calculated on the basis of scores given between 1 and 4.

2) Scores 1 for 'no priority', 2 for 'low priority', 3 for 'medium priority', and 4 for 'high priority'.

3) Figure in the parenthesis indicates percentage.

Source: Field survey, 2013

## **6.10 Governance Problems in Project Implementation**

Project implementation suffers from a number of governance problems (Table 6.19). According to views of the village-level respondents, the problems include involvement of political workers in project implementation, ineffective monitoring and supervision, poor access to project information by the community people, use of low quality materials, corruption and so on (Table 6.19). In Adarsha Sadar Upazila, involvement of political workers in project implementation was the top most problem followed by low quality of materials used in the project implementation, poor supervision and monitoring of project implementation, corruption and low quality of work. In Homna, the top leading problem was poor access to information of project implementation by the community followed by low quality of materials used in project implementation, poor supervision and monitoring of project implementation and corruption .

Table 6.19: Governance Problems in Implementation of ADP projects: Views of Villagers of Two Upazilas

Governance Problems in Implementation of ADP-Projects	Percentage	
	Adarsha Sadar Upazila	Homna Upazila
Projects implemented by political workers	23.6	8.7
Poor supervision and monitoring of project implementation	15.2	12.1
Poor access to information of project implementation	9.0	15.9
Low quality of materials used in project implementation	17.8	11.1
Corruption in project implementation through forfeiting project money and/or less spent of project money and/or getting monetary benefit from project	11.2	9.7
Low quality of work	10.1	8.7
Project cost not informed to local community	7.9	
Members of project implementation committee selected by UZP Chairman	N/A	2.9
Project not implemented timely	N/A	2.4

Note: 1) More than one responses given by some respondents.

2) Percentage calculated on the basis of total respondents.

Source: Field Survey, 2013

In addition, the researcher learnt from key informants that sometimes implementation of projects delayed due to delay of fund release from the central government. It was reported that Homna Upazila Parishad received first installment of ADP-allocation in

the month of October, in 2011-12, though it was to receive in September. Generally, an Upazila Parishad receives its ADP-allocation in four installments. It was reported that usually final installment comes in the month of June of the financial year, which is the last month of financial year in Bangladesh. As a result, quality of project implementation partly suffers from delay of fund release.

### **6.11 Conclusion**

Findings of this chapter show that quality of governance in the development projects under ADP-allocation of the two Upazila Parishads was not adequately satisfactory. A number of factors were directly or indirectly involved in this regard. First, directives of central government which were formulated based on the approach ‘one size fits to all’ were not adequately conducive for reflecting community’s priorities in selection of ADP-projects. These directives have imposed some sorts of conditionality with regard to utilization of ADP-fund. On the other hand, ADP-projects selected by the two Upazila Parishad were less reflected priority in terms of fulfilling community demands and aspirations as majority of projects were found mismatched with demands and aspirations expressed by the village-level respondents.

Secondly, poor participation of local community in the process of project selection affects quality of governance. Opinion survey and researcher’s observations reveal that direct community participation or engagement through consultation or by any other means in the project selection process was found limited. It was observed that local government representatives, local influentials especially politically affiliated persons

including local MP were found more actively involved in project selection. Part of the reason was negative attitude among the local policy makers towards active community participation. Other constraints as found in the study include less opportunity for participation, monopoly of elites in decision-making and poor legal provisions or mechanisms retarding ensures participatory approach in decision-making process. In addition, local representatives perceive wider community participation in the project selection process as a problematic matter while community people do not take participation issue seriously.

Thirdly, quality of governance in ADP-projects suffers from poor transparency not only in project selection but also in project implementation. Access to information to community people on project related activities were very limited. In this regard, reasons were poor community participation, hiding attitude of local government leaders and weakness of government directives as found in the study.

Fourthly, weak accountability in the ADP-project implementation process weakens quality of governance. Institutional mechanisms mentioned in the directives in order to ensure answerability or monitoring and supervision were less practiced in both Upazilas. In addition, poor accountability was caused by poor participation and transparency in the project management. The study suggests that visits of higher authorities as well as oversight function of local MP could be effective means of ensuring accountability along with access to information, providing scope of direct community participation.

Fifthly, quality of governance of ADP-projects is, to a large extent, affected by corrupt practices in different stages of project cycle. Major corrupt practices were use of low quality of materials, not spending of full amount of project money, forfeiting of project money by project implementation committee, not completing project fully, paying full project money without completion of some activities and hiding information of project cost. In addition, different malpractices in tendering process, such as unholy association of contractors, less competition in bidding, political influences in tendering, adoption of other's license for bidding by fake contractors worsened quality of governance in ADP-projects.

Sixthly, local policy makers take less interest in project analysis based on financial and economic indicators in the project selection stage which weakens quality of ADP-projects. Local policy planner's especially local government representatives were more interested in realizing their vested interests through the development projects. As a result, projects were not effective to produce desired results as expected by the community. In fact, the existing project selection process is basically based on top-down approach of planning instead of bottom-up approach.

Seventhly, some institutional weaknesses such as weak monitoring and supervision, delayed fund release generate low quality of project output. Conducting community based monitoring and supervision system through forming Project Supervision Committee was rarely found at the ground. Sometimes the Committee was found less effective due to politicization and vested interests. As a result, project implementation process suffers from quality output.

## **Chapter 7**

### **Problems of Governance in Bangladesh and Suggestions to Overcome Those**

#### **7.1 Prelude**

Good governance for sound development is a campaign echoed in Bangladesh and it is now viewed as essential prerequisite for promoting economic growth and alleviating poverty. Governance in Bangladesh is still poor. Weak governance system attributes to poor performance in the overall development. Major bottlenecks of governance of Bangladesh are its slow non-transparent, bureaucratic process, rampant corruption in public offices, politicization, favoritism, nepotism and so on. A survey conducted by World Bank on six governance indicators reveals a fragile situation as all indicators negatively scored (Table 7.1). This chapter attempts to highlight some of the governance problems of Bangladesh and provides suggestions to overcome the problems.

Table 7.1: Bangladesh Governance Indicators

Governance Indicators	Scores	Year	Percentile Rank (0-100)	Governance Score (-2.5 to +2.5)
Voice and Accountability	14	2009	35.1	-0.37
	10	2004	26.9	-0.66
	5	1998	41.8	-0.25
Political Stability	8	2009	7.5	-1.55
	7	2004	13.0	-1.19
	5	1998	26.4	-0.49
Government Effectiveness	11	2009	16.7	-0.99
	9	2004	18.0	-0.86
	5	1998	28.6	-0.63
Regulatory Quality	11	2009	23.3	-0.79
	10	2004	14.6	-1.04
	6	1998	25.4	-0.59
Rule of Law	16	2009	27.8	-0.72
	13	2004	17.1	-0.99
	7	1998	19.0	-0.89
Control of Corruption	13	2009	16.7	-0.96
	10	2004	1.5	-0.57
	5	1998	30.1	-0.64

Total No of countries 215.

Source: Ishtiaq Jamil, Salahudding M. Aminuzzaman, Steinar Askvik and Sk. Tawfique M. Haque (ed.) *Understanding Governance & Public Policy in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Bengal Com-Print, 2011), p.64

## 7.2 Problems of Governance in Bangladesh

Problems related to governance are diverse and innumerable in the present context of Bangladesh. Nature and gravity of governance- problems are also different from sector



to sector. Problems of governance in Bangladesh have been generated from colonial historical legacy, weakness of policy, weak institutional capacity, incapability, structural and non-structural deficiencies and so on. However, some common governance problems in Bangladesh are elaborated in the following sections.

### ***Corruption***

Bangladesh is widely known for its corruption record as it has topped the list for the fifth successive years in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In 2013 and 2014, score of corruption perception index was 2.7 and 2.5 respectively which also represents as a highly corrupted country across the world. Khan (2013) stated, “Corruption is an inescapable fact of life in Bangladesh because the society is a highly complex network involving reciprocal favours and obligations; as a result, payoff is the lifeblood of the country”.<sup>215</sup> In fact, it is difficult to find any sector of the government free from corrupt practices (Table 7.2). Habib Zafarullah stated that “corruption was not limited to the more obvious branches of government, but was all pervasive and crept up even into the higher levels affecting policy formulation and system of redress”. He further expressed, “One and half decades later, it remains as ubiquitous as ever not only in administrative, finance, protective services and commercial sectors but also in the judiciary”.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, *from Government to Governance –Expanding the Horizon of Public Administration to Public Management*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2013), p. 178

<sup>216</sup> Habib Zafarullah, “Public Management Reform”, in Ishtiaq Jamil, Salahudding M. Aminuzzaman, Steinar Askvik and Sk. Tawfique M. Haque (ed.) *Understanding Governance & Public Policy in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Bengal Com-Print, 2011), p.35.

Table 7.2: Corruption in Different Sectors (Public and Private) 2005

<b>Most Corrupt</b>	<b>Very Corrupt</b>	<b>Moderately Corrupt</b>	<b>Lowly Corrupt</b>
Education, Police, Health & Family Welfare and the Private Sector	Land, Forest & Environment, Finance, Communication, and Power	Disaster Management & Relief, Water Resources, Home Affairs, Post & Telecommunication, Agriculture, Tax, Food, NGO, Fisheries & Livestock and Shipping	Energy & Mineral, Industry, Law & Justice, Housing & Public Works, Social Welfar, Civil Avaiation and Tourism, Election Commission, Information, youth & Sports, Jute, Cultural Affairs, Religion, Textile, Establishment, Foreign Affairs and Women & Children Affairs

Source: Habib Zafarullah, “Public Management Reform”, in Ishtiaq Jamil, Salahudding M. Aminuzzaman, Steinar Askvik and Sk. Tawfique M. Haque (ed.) *Understanding Governance & Public Policy in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Bengal Com-Print, 2011), p.35.

Almost all forms of corruption such as bribery, abuse of authority, nepotism, favoritism, patronage, theft, and deceit are ocured in administration of Bangladesh. A survey conducted by the TIB in 2004 in 55 districts of Bangladesh revealed that households paid a total amount of bribes of Tk. 6,796 crores to 25 public service institutions which was equivalent to 2.34 percent of GDP in 2004.<sup>217</sup> Leakage of resource

<sup>217</sup> Cited in Mihinder S. Mudahar and Raisudding Ahmed, *Government and Rural Transformation – Role of Public Spending and Politics in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: The University Press Lomited, 2010), P.197.

was 32-35 percent in Food-for Works, a government-funded programme.<sup>218</sup> Thirty five percent of resources did not actually reach the intended clients due to leakage in other government-sponsored programmes (for example, VGD, VGF, Relief).<sup>219</sup> It indicates that leakages through corrupt practices are, to a large extent, prevailing in development projects in the government sector.

Abuse of the office and tendency to the misuse of power for personal and political gain is widely prevailing. Surveys conducted by the TIB revealed that widespread corrupt practices were prevalent in education, health, the judiciary, police, land administration, banks, utility-providing institutions and local government institutions. Bribes were paid as ‘speed money’ to accelerate service delivery (Table 7.3). From one to five percent of amount of approved loan was paid as bribes for sanction of loan.<sup>220</sup> The comptroller and Auditor General’s Office has detected misappropriation and irregularities \$ 2,570 million in 24 ministries and government agencies between 1994 and 2001.<sup>221</sup>

The consequences of corruption are observed in many ways, such as high losses suffered by public-sector utilities; relief programmes not reaching their targets due to massive theft and a huge misuse of resources. Emphasizing negative impact of corruption on growth Khan stated, “[A] vicious cycle of corruption has created a class of extremely rich people who dominate politics and business in Bangladesh and continue to

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<sup>218</sup> Ibid., p.197

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., p. 198

<sup>220</sup> Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, *from Government to Governance –Expanding the Horizon of Public Administration to Public Management*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2013), p. 179

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., p.179.

plunder the wealth of the country at the cost of increasing the misery of the people-at-large.”<sup>222</sup>

Table 7.3: Bribe and Unauthorized Money Paid by Households in Different Service Sectors in 2010

Name of Sectors	Bribe and Unauthorized Payments (%)	Amount of Average Bribe and Unauthorized Money (Taka)
Law-Enforcement Agency	68.1	3,352
Land Administration	67.0	6,116
Judiciary	59.6	7,918
Tax and Customs	43.9	6,734
Agriculture	38.1	310
Local Government	36.7	913
Electricity	27.6	1,834
Education	15.0	168
Insurance	15.0	3,949
Banking	12.7	1,928
Health	13.2	463
NGO	7.2	549
Others	35.5	6,804
Overall	71.9	5,365

Source: N. Islam, *Corruption, Its Control and Drivers of Change: The Case of Bangladesh* (Dhaka: BIDS, 2014).

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<sup>222</sup> Ibid., p. 186

In fact, petty corruption adversely affects the poor who like to receive services from the government. Efficiency and effective utilization of public resource hampers due to corruption. Grand corruption costs the country from US\$300 million to \$450 million in a year.<sup>223</sup> As Khan stated, “It has been estimated that if Bangladesh could reduce its corruption level to that in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands and Sweden it could have among other things, increased its per capita income by between 2.1 and 2.9 percent per annum.”<sup>224</sup>

Corruption has engulfed the whole society. Many reasons could be identified for corruption, which include, among others, low salary, weak implementation of rules and regulation, weak capacity of anti-corruption organization, weak democratic institutions, and greedy attitude of service providers. In the present context of Bangladesh, it seems that most people have come to accept it as a fate. The citizens have adopted it as a segment of their daily life practice, and they feel themselves powerless to address it. The reason for such helplessness is due to the presence of corruption in almost all levels of government. It is usually known that almost all kinds of corruption perpetuate in politics and administrative culture in Bangladesh.

### ***Politicization***

Politicization meaning undue and unfair partisan political interference in the process of decision making creates a problem of governance in many cases. Administrative decisions, for example, promotion and transfer in the civil servants of

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<sup>223</sup> Ibid., p.217.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid., p. 217.

Bangladesh are dominated by party influence rather than criteria of neutrality and merit.<sup>225</sup> There are basically two aspects of politicization. One aspect relates to politicization of the service delivery system based on the clientelism. The other aspect relates to how public servants are politicized for petty party or sectional interests. In addition, in many cases it was observed that tendering process in government sector was politicized.<sup>226</sup> Since independence of Bangladesh, all governments have tried to attract civil servants for petty party interests. In doing so, they have inducted people under the spoils system, promoted people on party or other petty considerations, politicized the Public Service Commission by appointing people to this constitutional body based on party affiliations and tampered with the selection process to choose party loyalists. The culture of partisanship has infected the bureaucracy where professional advancement is unrelated to performance or integrity.

Effects of politicization in recruitment, placement, training and promotion have been the erosion of morality and poor productivity. The successive governments placed incompetent people in various key posts in the civil service because of their political "loyalty". Politicization brings nepotism in politics and administration. The rulers give privilege and unfair advantages to their family members, kiths and kens on public resources. As a result, the common people become deprived from those opportunities. In addition, politicization causes corruption directly or indirectly in the government

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<sup>225</sup> Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, *From Government to Governance –Expanding the Horizon of Public Administration to Public Management*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2013), p. 183-184.

<sup>226</sup> Abul Maal A. Muhith, *An Agenda for Good Governance –From lawlessness and corruption for a caring and prosperous democracy* (Dhak: Shahitya Prakas,2007). p. 232.

institutions. It has adversely affected efficiency of bureaucracy and reduced the quality of civil service of Bangladesh suffers from.<sup>227</sup>

### ***Lack of Accountability and Transparency***

Governance in Bangladesh is severely suffering from lack of accountability and transparency which act as major impediments to ensure effective governance. The governance structure is based not only on a lack of accountability meaning non-responsive and less answerable to citizenry, but also attitude of maintaining secrecy. Decision-making in the public sector as a whole is non-transparent.<sup>228</sup> Decisions taken by the cabinet, and the deliberations involved in reaching them, are not open to public viewing. These two factors have made governance in this country more unproductive, futile and costly. Poor accountability and transparency are attributed to many reasons. One of the reasons is weak democratic institutes both at national and local level because they are not strong enough to act as watchdog of government with regard to ensure accountability. As Khan stated,

In a parliamentary democracy the legislature plays an important oversight role to keep the executive in check. But this has not happened in Bangladesh. The executive controls the legislative agenda. The prime minister, the cabinet and the bureaucracy are closely involved in the legislative process leaving little role in it for individual MPs. Individual legislator have little political clout and as a consequence much less opportunity to introduce bills on their own. The passage of an anti-defection law by the fifth parliament as part of the 12<sup>th</sup> amendment incorporated into article 70 of the Constitution has considerable curbed the power of individual MPs. The MPs of the ruling party are debarred from voting against the party and are also discouraged from criticizing government failures and misstatement... parliamentary committees have

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<sup>227</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>228</sup> Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, *from Government to Governance –Expanding the Horizon of Public Administration to Public Management*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2013), p.181.

failed miserable to act as a watchdog of government actions and misuse of power.<sup>229</sup>

In a parliamentary system, legislature has a significant role in ensuring accountability of executive, commonly known as bureaucracy. Bangladesh has adopted parliamentary system of governance since independence, though presidential system was also replaced for some years. Dilara Chowdhury assessed performance of legislature of Bangladesh regarding how far it was able to effectively ensure good governance. She observed that parliament was dominated by the executive. Capacity of parliament in policy-making process or oversight activities was a great concern. Moreover, absence of an established Opposition created a serious drawback. Parliament acted as apogee of ‘rubber stamps’ parliament. Committees of the parliament were being non-effective due to lack of professional support. In some cases, it has been observed that the executive does not pay attention to provide information as required to committees as well as recommendations of the committees.<sup>230</sup> It was observed that the MPs did not have much interest in parliamentary responsibilities, but showed more interest in service delivery in their constituencies.<sup>231</sup> On the other hand, members of parliament did not have adequate skill, knowledge and expertise to perform oversight functions on bureaucracy, resulting in failure of checking the arbitrary actions of the executive will remain elusive.<sup>232</sup> Moreover, accountably role of parliament hampers due to lack of mutual respect between the Government and Opposition in the parliamentary activities. As K.M. Subhan stated,

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<sup>229</sup> Ibid., pp. 180-181.

<sup>230</sup> Abul Maal A. Muhith, *An Agenda for Good Governance*, p. 97.

<sup>231</sup> Sk. Tawfique M. Haque, “The Normative Roots of Governance Theories: Prospects and Challenges from Bangladesh Perspective”, in Ishtiaq Jamil, Salahudding M. Aminuzzaman, Steinar Askvik and Sk. Tawfique M. Haque (ed.) *Understanding Governance & Public Policy in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Bengal Com-Print, 2011), p.66.

<sup>232</sup> Dilara Chowdhury, “Legislature and Governance in Bangladesh”, in Hasnat Abdul Hye (ed.) *Governance –South Asian Perspectives* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2000), pp.49-68.



It is a common experience in Bangladesh that the respective roles of the Government and the Opposition are antagonistic to each other. The mutual respect between the majority and the minority has hardly been demonstrated in public. The majority and the minority are in constant verbal duel, at times punctuated by strikes and outbursts of violence. Such apathy between each other is detrimental to governance linked to development.<sup>233</sup>

Traditional internal mechanisms (hierarchy and supervision) have mostly failed to ensure accountability. It has been observed that the failure of administrative accountability mechanisms has contributed to the indifferent and arrogant attitudes among most bureaucrats towards citizens in general. In both the political and administrative spheres secrecy is highly guarded. The channels for ventilating grievance against wrong administrative action are not too complex for the citizen to ensure accountability and transparency in administrative actions. Certain acts and rules like the Official Secrets Act 1923 and Government Service Conduct Rules, 1979 has enabled successive governments to deny citizens' access to relevant files and documents. The tendency to mark files secret and top secret has prevented citizens from being more aware of how public decisions are arrived at. Citizens' rights have not yet fully ensured to the free flow of information in this age of globalization.

### ***Inefficiency of Bureaucracy***

All over the world bureaucracy plays a predominant role in bringing social change, transformation, modernization and development. In Bangladesh, bureaucracy is not efficient enough to play its proper role as it suffers from various ills. Absence of

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<sup>233</sup> K.M. Subhan, "Legislature and Good Governance", in in Hasnat Abdul Hye (ed.) *Governance –South Asian Perspectives* (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2000), pp.99-108.

efficiency, transparency, accountability, institutional weakness of political, social and economical apparatus and malfunction among those systems has made the bureaucratic system in Bangladesh despicable and disdainful. The role, function and responsibility of bureaucracy are not adequately effective for productivity and efficiency by creating an enabling condition for development.

The existing bureaucracy of Bangladesh suffers from ‘elitist orientation’ of civil servants, opaque nature of administrative decision making and actions, ubiquity of improbity, dereliction of obligation, deviation from prescribed regulation, ineffective inter-ministerial consultation and coordination, overlapping of functions, over-abundance of sinecures in the higher ranks, inveterate presence of specialist-generalist discord, partisan clique formations, unsound and politically-inclined recruitment and promotion processes, and variance in training needs and outcomes’.<sup>234</sup> Moreover, according to people’s perception, majority assume that civil servants in Bangladesh are not trustworthiness.<sup>235</sup>

The structural composition of today's bureaucracy -was inherited by the colonial rulers whose legacy continues till today. Despite some ominous features no substantive change is yet to take place. Most civil servants adopt a protectionist attitude toward the existing power configuration, which usually benefits vested interest groups including

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<sup>234</sup> Habib Zafarullah, “Public Management Reform”, in Ishtiaq Jamil, Salahudding M. Aminuzzaman, Steinar Askvik and Sk. Tawfique M. Haque (ed.) *Understanding Governance & Public Policy in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Bengal Com-Print, 2011), p.39.

<sup>235</sup> Steinar Askvik, “The Significance of Institutional Trust for Governance in Bangladesh”, in Ishtiaq Jamil, Salahudding M. Aminuzzaman, Steinar Askvik and Sk. Tawfique M. Haque (ed.) *Understanding Governance & Public Policy in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Bengal Com-Print, 2011), p.

themselves. In addition, successive governments have deliberately continued an inefficient, ineffective, corrupt and unproductive administrative system in Bangladesh.<sup>236</sup> As a result, the effectiveness of government agencies has deteriorated significantly in terms of public service delivery and regulator services.<sup>237</sup>

The tendency of most civil servants tends to preserve the status quo, and, if possible, extend their zone of influence within the public service system. The deep-seated factionalism has many dimensions: rivalry between the generalists and the specialists, spoils system entrants versus recruits through competitive examinations, freedom fighters versus non-freedom fighters, pro-Awami league versus pro-Bangladesh Nationalist Party civil servants, civil servants with a military background versus civil servants with civilian backgrounds, and factionalism based on district affiliation.

### **Centralized Governance**

Highly centralized system of governance is a major governance problem in Bangladesh. Due to excessive centralization of power, almost all major political and administrative decisions are taken in Dhaka, the capital city of Bangladesh. Hence people's participation in governance and administration is very limited. The headquarters of all ministries, divisions, departments, directorates, autonomous bodies and state

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<sup>236</sup> Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, "Governance in Administration and Judiciary in Bangladesh", in Joha Vartola, Ismo Lumijarvi and Mohammed Asaduzzaman (ed.) *Towards Good Governance in South-Asia* (Dhaka: Osder Publication, 2013), p.177.

<sup>237</sup> Sk. Tawfique M. Haque, "The Normative Roots of Governance Theories: Prospects and Challenges from Bangladesh Perspective", in Ishtiaq Jamil, Salahudding M. Aminuzzaman, Steinar Askvik and Sk. Tawfique M. Haque (ed.) *Understanding Governance & Public Policy in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Bengal Com-Print, 2011), p.65.

enterprises are located at Dhaka. The headquarters of all offices of GO's and NGO's are located at Dhaka.

When Bangladesh became independent in 1971, its population was 75 millions. Currently population has become double. Similarly after independence there were 19 ministries in the government and by 2003 the number of ministries was 52 excluding President's office and Prime Minister's secretariat. In Bangladesh there are 29 civil service cadres in government's administrative structure. The services and personnel of these cadres working at the centre and field administration throughout the country are controlled from Dhaka. Governing such a huge population of the country and administering the affairs of a big government from a centre is a difficult task.

Due to centralization, decisions often delayed in the government sector makes poor service delivery. Since independence, a number of efforts have been introduced to make governance more decentralized through local government system. In fact, in most cases local government in Bangladesh are highly dependent on central government for policy matters, financial matters and personnel matters. Local institutions enjoy very little decision-making power and central-local relations are bureaucratically controlled.<sup>238</sup>

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<sup>238</sup>Joha Vartola, Ismo Lumijarvi and Mohammed Asaduzzaman, "Decentralization and New Public Management- An Analysis in Bangladesh and Nepal" in Joha Vartola, Ismo Lumijarvi and Mohammed Asaduzzaman (ed.) *Towards Good Governance in South-Asia* (Dhaka: Osder Publication,2013), p.160.

### ***Weak Participation***

The system of governance in Bangladesh is basically based on top-down approach in which scope of people's participation is very limited. Historically Bangladesh owned a very centralized governance and decision-making process which was fully controlled by the top-bureaucrats who were usually detached from mass people. On the other hand, after independence, for a long time, Bangladesh was ruled by military government instead of democratic system of governance. Following the adoption of the Constitution, the spirit of people's participation in local bodies was not always adequately maintained due to frequent changes in the local government structure, even elections were not held at regular intervals. Citizen engagement in the planning process or project identification process is not widely accepted practice. Bureaucrats, professional planners and politicians played key roles in formulating development plans and projects, where the participation of people was negligible.<sup>239</sup>

### **7.3 Suggestions to Overcome Governance Problems of Bangladesh**

In Bangladesh, problems of governance are so complex which needs multidimensional measures to overcome. Over the years, a number of committees, commission were formed by government in order to provide measures and suggestion to improve governance system. However, some suggestions are provided below:

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<sup>239</sup> S.J. Anwar Zahid, *Rural Development Planning and Project Management in Bangladesh*, Second Edition (Comilla: BARD, 2010), pp. 161-170.

1. A number of measures could be helpful to reduce corruption in Bangladesh. At present, an Anti-Corruption Commission has been established in order to investigate corruption cases, filing corruption cases in the formal court as well as building awareness among the citizens. It seems that institutional capacity of the Anti-Corruption Commission needs to be improved. Access to government information has to be improved both at local and national level. A vigorous social campaign through government and non-government initiatives are highly essential to increase awareness among the citizens against corruptions. Application of law against the corrupted persons is also needed.
2. Politicization in the state affairs both at local and national level spoils efficiency in many ways. Awareness needs to be developed among politicians about negative effects of polarization.
3. All the democratic institutions and democratic process has to be strengthened through taking various initiatives. Free and open election is essentially important in this regard. More power has to be devolved to local government institutes. Local elected members need to be accountable to the community through various measures, such as public hearing, consultation with community. The bureaucracy must function under control of the elected representative of the peoples. Parliament and local government institutions should pay more attention to people's opinion. Free fair inclusive election needs to be organized for strengthening democratic institutions as well as effective governance in Bangladesh.

4. Colonial mentality of bureaucracy has to be changed to make it more efficient. Skills of bureaucrats need to be improved through imparting training. A department of the Ombudsman should immediately be created which will work as all-time watchdogs against misadministration, red-tapism and inefficiency in the bureaucracy. Improving the management of the public service delivery arrangement, restructuring the public segment organizations and administrative procedures to reach the poor and the disadvantaged. Accountability and transparency will have to be established in all the levels of administration. Both political leaders and government officials must be free from corruption. Introduction of e-governance could be useful to improve performance of bureaucracy. Accountability and transparency should be established at all levels of both administration and elected officials through applying the institutional mechanism.
5. A proper decentralization policy needs to be prepared through wide consultation with cross-section of community people including experts. Now-a-days, local government has been considered as one of effective instruments in the development process both in developed and developing societies. In Bangladesh, local government should be made autonomous with adequate financial power and maximum devolution of power as a part of decentralization effort.

## 7.4 Conclusion

Bangladesh has been facing a serious governance crisis in her political, administrative and economic spheres. Nature of governance problems are complex and multidimensional from sector to sector or institution to institutions or local to national level. This chapter has highlighted some common problems of governance which are recently much talked issues in different corners. Most talked governance issues are corruption, politicization, weaknesses of bureaucracy, lack of accountability and transparency, poor people's participation, too much centralization etc. As a result, performance in the government sectors has not been up-to the mark as expected by the common people. Many studies and reform commission have detected causes and factors of poor governance of Bangladesh and they have provided a number of recommendations and suggestions to overcome those problems. But very few measures have been taken accordingly. As a result, improved governance has remained a far.

It is obvious that the contemporary condition of governance is not satisfactory in Bangladesh. Various difficulties are the barricades to safeguard good governance, justice and social fairness. Exploitation, political intrusion in management, favoritism, misapplication of authority, lack of accountability and non-transparent government and administration etc. issues are the common features of our governance system. It is clear that there are powerful vested interests, which benefit from the status quo and make resistance to modification. Brave and bold political leadership along with cautious citizens are seriously needed.



## Chapter 8

### Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion

#### 8.1 Preamble

Ensuring quality of governance in project selection and implementation both at national and local level is essentially important for proper utilization of project resources as well as for economic development. Assessing quality of project governance includes a wide range of issues attribute to project success or failure. In this regard, in the context of Bangladesh, some studies reveal that factors contributing to poor project performance include delay in land acquisition; shortage of fund; inadequate estimates; weakness in the design of the project; inexperience of project managers; delay in signing contracts; delay in procurement processing; weak supervision; inadequate or inappropriate estimate; weak accounting system; underpayment of labourers; low quality of work; misappropriation; lack of fulltime project director or lack of separate project implementation authority; lack of effective coordination among different stakeholders; inefficient use of available resources; low utilization of project aid; and lack of effective monitoring and evaluation.

Sometimes projects were not selected based on proper demands of intended beneficiaries. Traditional top-down approach produces poor selection of development projects. Poor orientation of project planners influences in poor project selection. In addition, political biasness as well as other forms of patronages affects project governance. Sometimes priority in project selection of projects is changed with the changes of government. Apart from, some studies reveal that projects in Bangladesh

suffer from lack of expert project managers, delay in recruitment of project personnel, lack of knowledge of project managers on procurement rules and procedures, frequent transfer of project directors, reluctance of central authority to delegate power to project implementation authority, and weak monitoring. As a result, projects suffer from many negative consequences such as costs and time overrun, low and under-utilization of project-generated services and goods, low quality of project output and so on. However, finding of these studies could be helpful to understand, to some extent, the nature and pattern of governance in project management in Bangladesh as well as causes of success or failure of projects.

But key governance issues in the development projects have not been adequately studied so far. The design of the present study was enormously influenced by findings of these studies regarding selection some of some indicators. The important governance issues, such as participation, transparency, accountability and corruption were not adequately studied in different stages of project cycle. The present study has attempted to cover these issues as much as possible. As a whole, the study has attempted to understand development projects in governance perspective in a holistic approach covering governance issues as possible.

Other main focus of the study is to understand existing governance environment of Upazila system in Bangladesh through examining governance issues in development projects at the local level. In Bangladesh, Upazila system was studied so far in terms of development and political perspective, particularly its role in economic and political development. However, some studies explored development projects of local

government and attempted to analyse in the perspective of conflicts of interest among influential stakeholders community leaders, politicians, bureaucrats and local elites who get involved in project management. But governance issues in development projects at the Upazila level have not adequately explored. Therefore, the intended study has attempted to explore key governance issues in the development projects at the local level. The thesis argues that in Bangladesh, development projects of Upazila Parishads suffer from poor quality of governance due to poor governance environment in different stages of project cycle.

Research questions of the study were:

- whether the existing legal institutional framework of development projects at the Upazila level was suitable for ensuring effective governance;
- whether the key stakeholders were effectively involved in the different stages of project cycle;
- whether the resources of the development project under ADP allocation at the Upazila level were utilized properly;
- whether the existing practices adopted in project management at the local level were suitable for ensuring quality of governance;
- how far intended benefits achieved by the projects; and
- to what extent governance issues, such as participation, accountability, transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency are ensured in the local development projects.

The nature of the study is mainly qualitative. In addition, several methods such as survey of documents, interview, focus group discussions (FGDs), case studies and observation were applied. Data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data were collected from different level of respondents through administering different sets of semi-structured questionnaires and checklists. All the questionnaires were pre-tested before collecting of data. The researcher himself was involved in the data collection.

Two Upazilas (Adarsha Sadar and Homna) of Comilla, were selected purposively for collection primary information through a sample survey. Adarsha Sadar was selected as more urbanized, close to district headquarters and more improved in terms of socio-economic conditions. Homna was selected on the basis of its remoteness from the district headquarters (60 km away from Comilla district headquarters) and it is predominantly rural and less developed compared to Adarsh Sadar.

Fifty percent of the total Unions from each Upazila (three Unions from Adarsha Sadar Upazila and five Unions from Homna Upazila) were selected randomly. Then, three villages from three Union (each from one Union) under Adarsha Sadar and five villages from five Unions were randomly selected. A total of 385 villagers determined through a sampling formula were randomly selected to conduct an opinion survey. In addition, different categories of respondents were selected purposively to collect information on a wide range of issues. Respondents include government officials, Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the Upazila Parishads, UP Chairman and Members, civil society members, journalists, other local organisation's representatives including

MP. UNO, Upazila Chairman and Vice-Chairman, Upazila Engineer, UP Chairman from both Upazilas were selected as key informants.

In Bangladesh, available literatures indicate that very few researches attempted to study local development projects undertaken by the Upazila Parishads under the Annual Development Programme (ADP). Most of the previous studies focused on assessing role of the Upazila Parishads in different socio-economic-politico perspective. But governance perspectives in the management of local development projects have not been adequately studied at the Upazila level. Hence, this study has attempted to understand the local development process in the context of governance issues which may make up this knowledge gap and provide a better understanding of local development projects at the Upazila level. Knowledge acquired through the study might also be useful for developing countries to take reforms measures for further development in project governance.

## **8.2 Governance in Project: Conceptual Issues and Theoretical Framework**

Governance as a multidimensional concept and a multi-disciplinary crosscutting issue is defined and discussed by scholars, practitioners and development organization according to context and circumstances. Considering complexity of making a widely accepted definition of governance, chapter 3 attempts to survey theoretical issues of governance in the perspectives of project governance in order to develop a conceptual framework

Literally, governance denotes steering or directing. Many authors define governance in different perspectives. Hye described 'governance' as the undertaking of activities, management of resources, organization of men and women by groups of people, communities, local government bodies, business organizations and branches of the state through social, political, administrative and economic arrangements that meet the daily needs of people and ensure sustainable development including how the affairs of a state are administered and regulated – either good or bad as expressed in normative way, which is associated with 'correctness and efficiency'. Mills and Serageldin describe governance as 'how people are ruled, how the affairs of the state are administered and regulated'. Daniel Kuafmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido Lobaton pointed out three dimensions of governance – (a) the process, by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and formulate, implement and enforce sound policies and regulations; and (c) the extent of participation of the citizens in the affairs of the state.

Governance is also understood as a structure, a process, a mechanism and a strategy. Structure of governance is a 'hard-wire' part of governance process that provides basic foundation in the decision-making process. In this regard, structure includes laws rules and regulatory institutions. The process of decision-making is a 'soft-wire' part of governance based on application of laws, rules and institutional mechanisms. Process of governance involves both 'hard-wire' and 'soft-wire'. Soft-wire is somewhat related to art of governance which could be hierarchical or top-down based governance, or it could be collaborative, participatory and interactive.

Governance theory focuses on how the affairs of an organization are administered, managed and regulated- either good or bad. This is a normative way of explaining governance issues. Normative element of governance becomes most apparent when the term “good governance” is used, as it is increasingly in both academic and practitioner discourse. Perhaps most notably the World Bank has placed a great deal of emphasis on “good governance” as part of its program for development. In fact, how to ensure good governance has become a prime concern in the governance literature as well as development thinkers. Governance literatures suggest a wide range of indicators for assessing good or bad governance.

According to the World Bank, good governance is conceptualized as a process of ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in the management of public affairs and public resources through accountable, transparent and participatory process. This line of thinking indicates that governance is related to development administration and regeneration of economy with a vision to ensure a sound development management. Good governance could act as one of facilitating factors for achieving desired outcomes and it has some sort of causal relations with acceptable level of performance. Because good governance structure, process, mechanism and strategies can create an enabling environment that maximizes the opportunities of growth and efficient uses of resources for development. On the other hand, poor governance or bad governance or ineffective governance creates opportunities of misuse or waste of scarce resources. Poor governance can be reflected through many symptoms such as diversion of public resources for

private gain; arbitration in the application of rules and laws; misallocation of resources; corruption; and nontransparent decision making.

Theories reveal that governance has two main components, (a) actors of governance and (b) the manner or process. Actors include both individuals and institutions having different roles depending on circumstances as well as their capacity. Governance applied in this study refers to efficient and effective decision making for managing development affairs and proper utilization of public resources in the development projects through effective involving or relevant actors.

Effectiveness of governance is associated with a wide range of issues. It is not only a matter of structural issue, but also is related to values, process and outcomes. Weaknesses of any factors can make other factors weak due to a mutual dependency. For example, weak governance structure attributes to weak governance process. Therefore, effective governance includes effectiveness in structure, process, mechanisms and strategies of governance in order to accrue better results or desired outcomes. Effective governance also depends on efficient roles of actors engaged in the process of governance to deliver goods or services. Engagement of all stakeholders through cooperation, collaboration, and networks is essentially important for making governance more effective. This sort of thinking indicates that governance shifts from a hierarchic or bureaucratic top-down approach to interactive and deliberative approach that demands involvement and engagement of potential stakeholders in development process of the society. It is assumed that the more relationship exists among the actors, the more efficient and effective governance is ensured. Moreover, institutional capacity also



contributes in making effective governance which depends on many factors such as, organizational decentralization, professional work culture, strong monitoring system, use of information technology, leadership, team work, sense of mission and so on.

Existing literatures suggest a wide range of indicators of governance. A research report published by the World Bank has grouped a large number of governance indicators into six which are voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Voice and accountability means ability of citizens to participate in selecting their government, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Political stability and absence of violence means government will not be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. Government effectiveness means quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Regularity quality means ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Rule of law means the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Control of corruption means the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. However, governance indicators are commonly understood as participation, transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, although these

are also explained as principles or values in the governance perspectives. Governance indicators are directly or indirectly inter-related and influence each other to make desired results and outcomes especially efficient and effective decision-making.

Participation means engagement or involvement of stakeholders or citizens' voice through direct or legitimate intermediate institutions in the decision making process. Meeting, consultation, dialogue, public hearing are commonly used as means and tools to promote participative process of decision-making. Based on concept of participation, a mode of governance style (widely used as participatory governance) has been evolved as an effective mechanism of managing state affairs in different levels. It is argued that it has influential role in increasing "efficiency of programs (in terms of uses of resources) and effective projects (that achieve their intended outcomes) in the provision and delivery of services, in both developed and developing worlds. It is also argued that participatory governance contributes to the "development of communicative skills, citizen empowerment, and community capacity-building".

Moreover, in the context of project management, participation ensures efficient allocation of public resources and makes projects suitable to public needs and priorities. At local level, community participation is very essential because it is assumed that community people possess a better understanding of their local conditions and can provide a better feedback in decision making process related to local affairs, even take responsibilities to implement decisions effectively. Srilanka experience shows that people's participation in project implementation reduces estimated costs.

In many developing countries, participation of disadvantage section (for example, women, poor community, tribes) in decision-making process at the community level is a crucial challenge in governance discourse because local elite domination in the deliberative process acts as deterrent in effective engagement of citizens. Apart from that, ‘power gap’ between rich and poor created from resource inequalities tends to act as a barrier to meaningful participation. To make effective participation, it is essential to make an enabling condition for participatory decision making. Conceptually it is argued that powerful patriarchies are more prone to capture development benefits either by themselves, or by their patronage networks. In addition, it is assumed that weak capabilities of ordinary citizens or the lowest strata of society are regarded as an important obstacle in the process of participation. But, experience of participatory projects in Porto Alegre (in Brazil) and Kerala (in India) show that “citizens with less formal education can ... participate with surprisingly high levels of competence. In the case of Kerala, most of the members of local deliberative councils ... described as simple farmers. Nonetheless, they participated impressively in planning projects, the likes of which one very seldom finds in the advanced industrial world.

### ***Theoretical Dimensions of Project***

Literally, ‘project’ is a planed endeavour to achieve or accomplish specific objectives within a certain timeframe. The main purpose of a project is to generate services or goods or improving existing goods and services or changing current situation. Generally, in the private sector’s organizations, projects are taken to make or increase profit, but government’s priority is not to make profit rather to deliver a wide range of

services to the community. A project starts with the identification of a “challenging” problem or an opportunity and the decision to do something about it. In this study, project refers to a collective endeavor undertaken by government and local government organizations to achieve some sort of developmental goals through generating community goods and services or providing common good.

Based on geographical location, projects could be categorized as national level projects taken by central government to cover wide area, and local level projects which are taken by local government to cover small geographic area. Generally, projects undertaken by local government are small-sized. This study focuses small projects taken by mid-level local government unit (*Upazila Parishad*) in rural areas of Bangladesh.

Every project has a lifecycle from starting to end that follows a generic route map is called project cycle. The route involves a set of sequential activities which includes identification of project ideas, project appraisal, negotiation and approval, implementation, monitoring and control, evaluation and follow-up. These activities are broadly divided into three stages of project cycle, such as project selection, project implementation, and project monitoring and evaluation.

Activities in project selection stage include identification or selection of project ideas, project analysis or appraisal, pre-feasibility study (whether project is technically, socially, economically and financially viable and sound) stakeholder analysis, project documentation, negotiation and approval etc. Activities in implementation stage involves mobilizing resources, engaging project management, defining roles and responsibilities of project organization, making contract, procuring inputs, and making outputs from the

inputs according to goals and objectives of the project. Project monitoring and evaluation includes activities related to controlling of project performance according to its goals, objectives, targets through some project supervising authority and taking corrective actions based on feedback information, so that project goes in the right way to achieve desired results and outcomes.

Project's success or failure is associated with a wide range of issues, such as effective project management, sound organizational policy, and effective governance of project and so on. Effective project management is highly related to efficient decision making at every activities of project. Success of project is also related to other factors, such as sound organizational policy, capacity, coordination, supervision, adequate timely finance and integrity of procedures in the organizations and efficient performance of the project personnel. In addition, other governance factors have significant impact on effective project governance that include: dedicated, skilled, capable and experience project manager; effective review in project selection; appropriate methods of project management; organization's internal capabilities; effective control mechanism, sufficient freedom and authority to solve day-to-day issues and so on.

On the other hand, a number of reasons or factor may contribute to project failure. Project failure means that when the project could not make success in terms of inadequate achievement of its desired outcome and/or attained or maintained inadequate quality and/or not completion within planed period and so on. A review on a number of the World Bank funded projects implemented in different countries has mentioned some reasons which are related to poor governance that include pervasive corruption, effective

accountability system, lack of citizens' demand for good governance, weak monitoring of projects under public expenditure, poor access to and use of information, weak auditing and accounting system, lack of proper decentralization, less popular participation in the design and implementation of projects. Reasons of project failure might vary from project to project depending their types and nature.

### ***Governance in Project: Theoretical Framework***

Governance in project management implies adoption of governance values, principles and indicators in every stages of project cycle. As a result, project resources can be utilized more properly and desired objectives of the project can be achieved. It must enable efficient and effective project decision making. It must provide clarity of accountability and clear and correct assignment of accountability. It must ensure that those stakeholders are included within the decision-making and support the efficient and effective initiation of projects.

For promoting an effective development project, every stage of project management needs to adopt some governance values, principles, methods and strategies. While some governance values could be applicable to all stages of project management, some specific governance issues are more appropriate and suitable according to need of project's nature and activities of project management. Governance issues in the project selection stage, emphasize in the government sector that project idea to be identified based on assessing priority of needs and demands of citizens or society and project ideas have to be evaluated in terms of 'value for money' and cost-benefits analysis, not only in terms of financial analysis, but also socio-economic analysis. Conventional project

identification method based on top-down approach would be replaced by bottom-up participatory approach involving all level of stakeholders to be benefited by the intended project, so that a sense of project ownership grows among all stakeholders. Participatory approach in project selection promotes ownership of projects among stakeholders and makes a clear understanding of goals and objectives. Participatory tools and techniques, such as open community meeting, consultation need to be applied, so that voices and views of locality or beneficiaries or are reflected in project selection or design.

A strong system or mechanism of accountability has to be established in the process of project implementation. Accountability mechanism in governance theory focuses not only hierarchical accountability, but also provides more attention to social or public or beneficiaries-focused accountability. A number of good practices regarding social or beneficiaries-focused accountability have been evolved across the world. For example, in Uganda, project management committee elected from benefiting communities which oversees project implementation and independent expenditure tracking system has been adopted to identify whether project resources have reached their intended destination. Who will be responsible for failure with regard to achieving desired outcome or results of the project need to be spelt out clearly. In addition, proper dissemination of project related information such as cost of project, duration of project, project activities is also essential for effective project implementation.

Timely completion of project activities with quality is an important indicator of effective project governance, which requires efficient mobilization of resources and procurement system. Governance theory emphasizes decisions relating to procurement

process should be open and transparent. Timely release of fund accelerates smooth implementation of the project. Project director should have adequate skills in preparing procurement documents and methods of procurement.

A strong accountable relationship between different actors is essentially important in the process project implementation. Effective project governance may be constrained, if there exists a conflicting relationship among different actors in the process of project implementation. Project steering committee, project director and project manager will maintain a very close relation and cooperation. Project management team would employ its efforts to develop a strong working relationship with, and between various stakeholders.

Monitoring is a continuous process from the inception and ending of the project in order to ensure effective project management. Evaluation means assessing whether desired results or outcome of the project have been achieved or not achieved. Project performance and activities can be reviewed monthly, quarterly and annually as periodical ways of review. Audit, post project evaluation and benefit realization review are some of evaluation tools adopted generally at the end of the project cycle.<sup>240</sup> In addition, community-based participatory monitoring and evaluation techniques are being applied in many donor-funded projects.

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<sup>240</sup> Graham Oakes, *Project Reviews*, pp. 29-46.



### **8.3 Upazila Annual Development Project and Its Legal Institutional Framework: Examining Governance Issues**

Article 9 and 59 of the Constitution of Bangladesh ensure that a democratically elected local government system will take responsibility to manage local affairs as an integral part of national governance structure. They will look after administration and works of public officers, maintenance of public order and preparation and implementation of plans for public services and economic development. In addition, Article 9 states, “The State shall encourage local Government institutions composed of representatives of the areas concerned and in such institutions special representation shall be given, as far as possible, to peasants, workers and women”.

In Bangladesh, central government makes Acts, rules and regulations with respect to composition, powers and functions as well as working process of local government. In this regard, the chapter 4 has highlighted legal aspects of Upazila Parishad and examined existing legal and institutional aspects with regard to development projects of Upazila Parishad under the ADP allocation from governance perspective. An in-depth analysis on the Act, rules and regulations the research has pointed out some strengths and weaknesses in the governance perspective especially project governance.

Legal provisions assert that decision-making process in the UZP is based on some sort of openness, transparency and participation and encourages a deliberative process. In addition, the Act allows the UZP to set up a number of standing committees which may

likely to promote scope of more community participation in the decision-making process and might help the UZP to perform its functions in a more efficient way.

Analysis shows that legal framework do not allow the UZP to work through a participatory and transparent way. Rules and regulations were made on an approach of 'one size fits to all' that is limiting scope of governance principles in many ways. Means of engaging community people in the management of local government as found in the developed countries are less reflected in the existing legal framework. In fact, making a more inclusive public policy through providing citizens to express collective preference has not been adequately incorporated. In addition, a number of conditionalities imposed by the central government in selecting development projects likely limit autonomy of Upazila, scope of community participation as well as accountability to community.

Existing legal framework suggests that wider people's participation meaning active engagement of common people is less focussed in the planning process of project. As a result, real demands or aspirations of community people tend to depend upon much on the wishes of the local representatives. Standing committee on project related activities is not available in the legal framework. In fact, Standing Committees prescribed in the Upazila Parishad Act are actually legally weak because huge number of departmental committees which are mostly headed by the UNO, chief bureaucrat at the Upazila level involved significantly in the process of decision making.

In addition, some rules and regulations of the existing legal framework seem to be limiting or thwarting factors in the way of participative and transparent decision-making

process due to some reasons. First, any decision taken by the UZP has to be consulted with the concerned local MP which is mandatory for the UZP. Second, every aspects of UZP is guided or regulated by a strong government control. As a result, it is difficult for a UZP to take decision independently. Even Upazila Parishad cannot take decision on matters on which government rules, circulars are not available. On the other hand, in case central government considers any decision taken by the UZP is not consistent with the existing rules and regulations, it could be challenged by the central government, even that Upazila Parishad might be dissolved. As a result, efficient decision-making based on choice of UZP as well as local community seems to be difficult in the existing legal framework, though the rationale of ADP- projects financed by the central government is to promote decentralization, to ensure peoples' participation in local development and implementing people's priority projects based on community needs and demands.

However, the existing legal-institutional framework of the Upazila Parishad provides some ways for ensuring transparency in its decision-making process. As the rules and regulations specify that every matter of Upazila Parishad has to be decided in the meeting of the Upazila Parishad which likely indicates that secrecy has not been encouraged in its decision-making process. But provision on consulting with local MP before taking any decision may be a treat to ensure transparency. In addition, the existing directives have not specified how community people are to be informed with regard to project allocation as well as project activities. As a result, it may make concerned authority to feel less encouraged or motivated to share information with community people.

Regarding accountability the existing rules provides some structures and institutions which are directly or indirectly tend to ensure some sort of accountability. For example, the directives state that the UZC and/or UNO may visit any project any time and can order corrective measures, if any lapses or irregularities are observed. In addition, Deputy Commissioner and Divisional Commissioner who are higher-level officials are responsible for inspecting projects under his district and make comments, advices and observations. Moreover, a Project Supervision Committee is assigned at each Union to monitor implementation of projects and to report to the Upazila Parishad from time to time with regard to on-going projects.


But some vagueness or limitations, such as lack of clear line of ensuring accountability, less scope of wider people's participation in the project selection and project implementation, lack of effective performance evaluation regarding project success or failure, and lack of citizen centric accountability on a constant basis can make the legal framework poor accountability process. As a whole, there are some weaknesses and limitations in the existing legal-institutional framework which may make counter-productive results and might not be conducive to effective governance of Upazila Parishad, project-management in particular.

#### **8.4 Development Projects under ADP Allocation of Two Upazilas: An Analysis**

The chapter 5 reveals that every year the two Upazila Parishads implemented a large of number of development projects under ADP-allocation. On an average, 54 to 60

projects were implemented. Similar findings were observed in a previous study<sup>241</sup> conducted in the 1990s which indicate that trend of taking projects by the Upazila Parishad was not changed remarkably over the years.

Regarding size of projects in terms of estimated project-cost, the study reveals that 62 percent projects of Adarsha Sadar and about 76 percent projects of Homna was found less than Tk. 100000. But size of projects of Homna Upazila was smaller compared to the Adarsha Sadar. However, over the years the average size of projects of both Upazilas gradually increased. Data of recent years show that average project-cost of Adarsha Sadar was higher compared to Homna Upazila (Figure 8.1).



<sup>241</sup> Report of the Task Forces on Bangladesh Development Strategies for the 1990s, Managing the Development Process, Volume Two (Dhaka: Universtiy Press Limited, 1991), p. 242.

Findings of the study show that the ADP-projects under the Adarsha Sadar were distributed among the unions unevenly while in Homna, projects were distributed almost equally. But in terms of distribution of allocation of money among the Unions, both Upazilas distributed their allocation almost equally, although average number of projects as well as average ADP-allocation between the two Upazilas varied year to year and union to union. The research agrees with findings of a previous study that local leaders, especially UP Chairman who are majority members in the Upazila Parishad prefers equal distribution of grants as a traditional practice prevailing before introduction of Upazila system as well as to avoid conflicts and confrontation in the Upazila Parishad.<sup>242</sup>

Regarding distribution of allocation in different sectors, the largest amount of allocation in both Upazilas was provided for the development of physical infrastructure which was often crossed maximum limits as prescribed in the government directives. Under the physical infrastructure sector, transport and communication sub-sector received more attention than other sub-sectors, such as development of local markets and public health.

The study reveals that both Upazilas, as per central government's directives, required allocation in different sub-sectors was not provided. For example, in 2012-13, both Upazila Parishads did not allocate any amount to projects related to fisheries and livestock development, small and cottage industries which are specified under the sector

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<sup>242</sup> Nizam Ahmed, *Bureaucracy and Local Politics in Bangladesh – A Study in Roles and Relationships* (Dhaka: A H Development Publishing House, 2009)

of agriculture and irrigation. In addition, no allocation was provide to other agriculture-development projects such as intensive crops programme, seed supply, social forestation, fruits and vegetable production, though mentioned in the guidelines. However, a remarkable difference was observed between Homna and Adarsha Sadar with regard to agriculture sector that Homna U[azila spent more than minimum share in agriculture sector which was less focused in Adarsha Sadar. Part of reason could be that Homna is more predominantly rural Upazila and highly dependent of agricultural activities while Adarsha Sadar is more urbanized. In the socio-economic sector, projects related to education development have received the largest share of allocation in both Upazilas while the health and social welfare sector has been neglected in both Upazilas.

Regarding the nature of projects, it was observed that in both Upazilas, projects taken on road-communication were almost similar nature which include making brick carpeting on earthen roads, constructing concrete roads, protecting roads from canal or river erosion. In agriculture and irrigation development, both Upazilas put much emphasis on construction of concrete drain for irrigation purpose. For development of education sector, projects commonly taken were supply of furniture to different educational institutes. In sanitation and public health, most of the projects were related to supply of low-cost latrines and installation of tubewell for community people. However, some projects undertaken by Homna were found different in nature from Adarsha Sadar Upazila, for example, tree plantation, procurement of formaline test equipments, construction shed in local market, equipments for testing arsenic in tubewell's water, distribution of blankets among poor, digitization of birth registration information, and supply furniture to Upazila health complex. In addition, Homna Upazila Parishad

implemented special types of projects, locally called as *Ghatla* (stairs on the bank of river) which were not found in Adarsha Sadar.

Above analysis reveals that ground realities do not match with the priorities reflected in the centrally formulated directions with regard to distribution of ADP allocation as per sectors and sub-sectors as well as maintaining sector and sub-sector wise minimum and maximum share. Even conditionalities given by the central government were overlooked because nature of local problems and demands were not similar. For example, *ghatla* were more necessity to local community both in rainy and dry season. But this sort of projects could be difficult to categorize in any of the sectors or sub-sectors according to central government directives.

#### 8.5 Quality of Governance in ADP Project: Analysis of Views of Respondents

Based on empirical evidences the Chapter 6 argues that local ADP-projects of the studied Upazila Parishads suffered from low quality of governance in different stages of project-cycle due to poor reflection of community priorities, poor active community participation, limited access to project information, weaknesses of central government directives, weak accountability, transparency, monitoring and supervision, high corruption, unfair political interference. As a result, performance and outputs of development projects as intended was less fulfilled. Based on findings of the survey and researcher's observations, a number of factors of poor quality of governance could be identified.



First, directives of central government which were formulated based on the approach 'one size fits to all' were not adequately conducive for reflecting community's priorities in selection of ADP-projects. These directives impose some sorts of conditionality on the Upazila Parishad with regard to utilization of ADP-fund. On the other hand, based on views expressed by most of the respondents, ADP-projects selected by the two Upazila Parishad were of less priority in terms of fulfilling community demands and aspirations because majority of projects were found mismatched with demands and aspirations expressed by the villagers.

Second, poor participation of local community in the process of project selection affects quality of governance. Field survey and researcher's observations reveal that direct community participation or engagement through consultation or by any other means in the project selection process was found limited. It was observed that local government representatives, local influentials especially politically affiliated persons including local MP were found more actively involved in project selection. Part of the reason was negative attitude among the local policy makers towards active community participation. Other constraints as found in the study include less opportunity for participation, monopoly of elites in decision-making and poor legal provisions or mechanisms that ensures participatory approach in decision-making process. In addition, local representatives perceive wider community participation in the project selection process as a problematic matter. Moreover, community people do not have much interest or do not think of participation as a serious issue.

Third, quality of governance in ADP-projects suffers from poor transparency both in project selection and implementation. Access to information by community people on project related activities was very limited due to poor scope of community participation, hiding attitude of local government leaders and weakness of government directives.

Fourth, weak accountability project implementation process weakens quality of governance. Institutional mechanisms mentioned in the directives aimed at ensure answerability or monitoring and supervision were less practiced in both Upazilas. In addition, poor accountability was caused by poor participation and transparency in the project management. The study suggests that visits of higher authorities as well as oversight function of local MP could be effective means of ensuring accountability in ADP-project implementation.

Fifth, quality of governance of ADP-projects becomes, to a large extent, affected by corrupt practices in different stages of project cycle. Major corrupt practices were identified as like as use of low quality of materials, not spending of full amount of project money, forfeiting of project money by project implementation committee, not completing project fully, paying full project money remaining some activities incomplete and hiding information of project cost. In addition, different malpractices in tendering process, such as unholy association of contractors, less competition in bidding, political influences in tendering, adoption of other's license for bidding by fake contractors weaken quality of governance in ADP-projects.

Sixth, local policy makers take less interest in project analysis based on financial and economic indicators in the project selection which weakens quality of ADP-projects. Local policy planner's especially local government representatives were more interested in realizing their vested interests through the development projects. As a result, projects seem less effective to produce desired results as expected by the community. In fact, the existing project selection process is basically based on top-down approach instead of bottom-up approach.

Seventh, some institutional weaknesses such as weak monitoring and supervision, delay in fund release generate low quality of project output. Community based monitoring and supervision system through forming Project Supervision Committee was rarely found at the ground. Sometimes the Committee was found less effective due to its formation through politicization and vested interests. As a result, project implementation process suffers from quality output.

## **8.6 Problems of Governance in Bangladesh and Suggestions to Overcome Those**

Bangladesh has been facing a serious governance crisis in political, administrative and economic spheres. Nature of governance problems is complex and multidimensional that varies sector to sector or institution to institutions or local to national level. Chapter seven has highlighted some common problems of governance of Bangladesh that are being talked in different corners. Most talked governance issues are corruption, politicization, weaknesses of bureaucracy, lack of accountability and transparency, poor people's participation, too much centralization etc. As a result, performance in the government sectors has not been encouraging as expected. Many studies and reform

commission have detected causes and factors of poor governance of Bangladesh and provided a number of recommendations and suggestions to overcome those problems. But very few measures have been implemented properly.

It is obvious that the contemporary governance condition in Bangladesh is not satisfactory due to a number of factors such as exploitation, political intrusion in management, favoritism, misapplication of authority, lack of accountability and non-transparent government and administration etc. It is evident that improving governance of Bangladesh is a challenging task. Because vested interest groups like to benefit from the status quo and they make resistance to modification.

## **8.7 Recommendations**

- The existing legal framework of ADP projects of Upazila Parishads under central government's grants needs to be overhauled in order to make it suitable for ensuring quality of governance. The conditionalities mentioned in the legal framework with regard to distribution of allocation have put much emphasis on sectoral developments, such as agriculture, transport, communication, health, education etc. For balanced area development, level of poverty and other socio-economic situation prevailing among unions of the respective could be included as criteria in the existing guidelines with regard to distribution of ADP-allocation.
- At present, ADP allocation is heavily concentrated in physical infrastructure development. No doubt, infrastructure development is essentially important, but

human resource development is also significantly important. The study has found that Adarsha Sadar has undertaken one project for providing sewing machines to rural women, though this type of project was not taken regularly in every year. The study suggests that every Upazila Parishad should undertake at least one project related to skill development on different sectors, livestock rearing, fish farming, modern agriculture technology, computer education and any other skills.

- The existing guidelines do not clearly mention about composition of members, responsibilities of the Union-based monitoring committee. In this regard, government may give directives as soon as possible to form the committee at the Union level.
- Government officials and local representatives including MP need to be oriented on guidelines properly, so that they can spend government money effectively. Short training programmes and workshops could be organized in this regard. UNO can organize workshops and training for all stakeholders related to ADP projects at the Upazila level.
- In most cases projects have been selected without preparing a five-year plan. Part of reason that clear guidelines of formulating of five years plan at the Upazila level is not available. In this regard, central government could provide a detailed guidelines regarding formulation of a five-year plan.
- Participatory project selection process is highly essential in order to select projects more need-based. In this regard, the participatory practice of LGSP could be adopted in ADP-project selection process. In addition, at the beginning of a financial year a week long project-planning workshop could be organized at the

Upazila level at the presence of local MP to assess local needs and priorities. The workshop could be attended by cross-section of participants, such as officials, local representatives, civil society members, journalists and so on. Cost of workshop could be borne from ADP-allocation. Government may include this issue in the guidelines.

- Before approval of projects, the mandatory condition of taking advice from the local MP was found problematic for proper project-management of Upazila Parishad. Government may repeal this condition by amending the law. Moreover, for proper resource utilization of government MP's role in project monitoring and evaluation has found very effective. In this regard, a good practice was found in Adarsha Sadar, which could be institutionalized by making law.
- Access to information to the community people is highly essential for ensuring good governance at the local level. In this regard, existing directives have given some clear instructions, such as display of signboard containing various information of project at the project-site, display of project list in notice boards at Upazila and Union level. But these are not properly enforced. Government may provide further letters to remind all stakeholders regarding these issues. In addition, list of approved project-list with short brief of project description could be posted in the official website of Upazila as well as in web portal of Union Information Centres and could be published in local newspaper.
- Before approval of project in the Upazila Parishad's meeting, standing committees of the Upazila Parishad could be involved to review the projects. On

the other hand, Upazila Parishad should provide much emphasis on projects proposed by different standing committees in its annual development programme.

- For effective implementation as well as to ensure quality of projects under ADP allocation, constant monitoring and supervision is highly essential. In this regard, a district level project-monitoring officer under Local Government Division could be recruited. He would not only monitor on-going projects under ADP allocation, but also facilitate proper implementation of guidelines.
- The existing practice of providing grant in four installments from the central government cause delay of planning and implementation of projects. Therefore it would be better, if it is reduced to two installments, much better to provide whole allocation at the beginning of financial year.
- Regular visits by higher authorities as well as local MP could be effective means of ensuring accountability in ADP-project implementation along with other ways such as improving access to information, providing scope of community participation directly.

## **8.8 Conclusion**

Development projects both at local and national level under the national budget involve public resources. Efficient use of public resources as well as ‘value for money’ of public expenditure has been receiving a great attention in any responsive governance system in the countries especially less developed countries like Bangladesh. Success or failure of development projects is dependent on a wide number of factors which might be different from project to project. The study argues that better performance of projects is highly related to better governance environment and poor governance environment reduces quality of project governance. In this regard, findings of the study confirm that the existing governance environment in different stages of project cycle at the Upazila level in Bangladesh is less suitable for ensuring good quality of project governance. Unless governance issues received much attention, expected outcome of the projects may not be fully realized, and development process may take slow space. The study could be useful source for the government to take some policy measures in order to improve project governance at the local level.



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## *Appendices*

### **Appendix 1.1: Interview Schedule for the Villagers**

Name of the Respondent:

Village:

Union:

Upazila:

District:

Age:

Years

Educational Qualification:

Main Profession:

Size of Agricultural Land:

Acre

1. In your opinion, how much priority is given in under taking project of Upazila Parishad under the ADP grants according to importance or demand of the people? (Please give tick)

Very much     Much     Roughly     Less     Not at all

In your opinion, mention two major problems of your Upazila. Is the importance is given in ADP projects in order to solve three problems?

Yes     No

If yes, give example of one project.

2. In your opinion, is any discussion held at the local level before taking the projects?  
Yes     No

If yes, with whom you discuss?

1.

2.

3.

If no, why it is not done?

3. In your opinion, how much priority has given on following issues?

Matters relation	Very much	Much	Average	Less	Not at all
Cost benefit analysis of Projects					
Benefits or interests the poor people as a result of project implementation					
Benefits or interests the rich people as a result of project implementation					
Benefits or interests of Upazila chairman people as a result of project implementation					
Benefits or interests of Union					

chairman people as a result of project implementation					
Employment of the Unemployed People of the locality as a result of project implementation					
Increase of agricultural production as a result of project implementation					

4. Do you think that the projects of the Upazila Parishad have been under taken on correct information?

Yes  No

If Yes, Who has given the information?

How much appropriate was the information given?

Very much  much  AVERAGE  less  Not at all

How can the relevant information given on Project. Be more improved?

5. In your Opinion, what kind of projects should be taken as important in respect of taking projects of upazila parishad under ADP Grants (mention three projects according to importance).

6. In your Opinion, are the projects taken by Upazila Parishad under ADP are informed to the public?

Yes  No

If yes, how it is informed?

Do you know about the allocation of the Projects?

Yes  No

If yes, please tell, if it is known about the total collocation the projects of your Union in changed under current ADP.

Do you know the chairman of Project Implementation Committee?

Yes  No

7. Your Opinion (Give tick) regarding standard of Implementation of on going infrastructural development projects like construction/repair of roads, bridge, culvert etc.

Matters relating	Very much	Much	Average	Less	Not at all
Full Implementation of fixed or target of the projects					
To maintain qualities standard in Implementation of the projects					
Selection of area/site of projects					
Spend the fund of the projects Properly					
Implement the Project at right time to Provide					
Benefit to the targeted People Specially to the poor people					
Others (If there is any) 1. 2.					

8. As your knowledge, how much irregularities or corruptions are implementation of ADP Projects under taken through the Upazila parishad?

Very much     much     Average     less     Not at all

How the corruption are done?

In What types kind of projects the corruptions are done more?

What actions are taken against if any irregularity is done in any Project?

How the corruptions in Projects can be Prevented?

9. In your opinion, in selection of projects Upazila how far put emphasis on following issues.

Issues	Very much	Much	Average	Less	Not at all
Raising of employment					
Raising of income of the people					
Raising of Agricultural Production					
Development of the poor					
Development of the rich					
Development of the Women					
Others : 1. 2.					

10. In your Opinion, how much participation of general people in the selection of projects designed by the Upazila Parishad?

Very much     much     Roughly     less     Not at all

How the Participation of the people can be increased in the Projects designed by the Upazila Parishad?

11. In your Opinion, how much transparency is maintained in management of the Projects by Upazila Parishad?

Very much     much     Average     less     Not at all

Give two recommendations for ensuring transparency in preparation of project.

12. In your Opinion, how much accountability is maintained in management of the projects of Upazila Parishad?

Very much     much     Average     less     Not at all

How Accountability can be improved in management of the projects?

13. Mention two major problems in selection of the projects through Upazila Parishad under Government Grant.

14. Mention two major problems in preparation of the projects through Upazila Parishad under Government Grant.

15. Mention two major problems in implementation of this Projects of Upazila Parishad taken under Government Grant.

16. Any other Opinion:

## Appendix 1.2: Sample Size of Known Population

$$n = \frac{z^2 \cdot p \cdot q \cdot N}{e^2(N-1) + z^2 \cdot p \cdot q}$$

Where,

n = Sample size

Z = The value of the standard variate at a given confidence level and to be worked out from table showing area under Normal Curve. In the present study it was considered standard normal deviate at 95% confidence level = 1.96;

p = Sample proportion, which may either be based on personal judgment, experience or may be result of a pilot study. In absence of such estimate one method may be to take the value of p=0.50 in which case 'n' will be the maximum and the sample will yield at least the desired precision. In the present study value of p was estimated as 0.50;

q = 1 – p (in the present study q = 1 – 0.50 = 0.50);

e = Acceptable margin of error (the precision), usually considered 0.50 or 0.02;

N = Size of population.

Source: C. R. Kothari (2004). Research Methodology Methods & Techniques (Second Edition), Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi.

Appendix 4.1: List of Transferred Departments to Upazila Parishad and Deputed Officials

Name of Department Transferred to Upazila Parishad	Officials of Transferred Departments
Ministry of Public Administration	Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO)
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directorate of Health</li> <li>• Directorate of Family Planning</li> </ul>	Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer Upazila Family Planning Officer
Ministry of Agriculture <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directorate of Agriculture Extension</li> </ul>	Upazila Agriculture Officer
Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock	Upazila Fisheries Officer Upazila Livestock Officer
Ministry of Food and Disaster Management	Upazila Project Implementation Officer
Ministry of Social Welfare <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directorate of Social Welfare</li> </ul>	Upazila Social Welfare Officer
Ministry of Primary and Mass Education <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directorate of Primary Education</li> </ul>	Upazila Education Officer
Ministry of Women and Children Affairs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directorate of Women</li> </ul>	Upazila Women Officer
Ministry of Youth and Sports <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directorate of Youth Development</li> </ul>	Upazila Youth Development Officer
Local Government Division <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local Government Engineering Department</li> <li>• Public Health Engineering Department</li> </ul>	Upazila Engineer Assistant Engineer
Rural Development and Cooperative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directorate of Cooperative</li> <li>• Bangladesh Rural Development Board</li> </ul>	Upazila Cooperative Officer Upazila Rural Development Officer
Ministry of Environment and Forest <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directorate of Forest</li> </ul>	Upazila Forest Officer
Ministry of Education <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directorate of Secondary Education</li> </ul>	Upazila Secondary Education Officer



#### **Appendix 4.2: Format for Project Proposal for Upazila Parishad Under ADP- Allocation**

1. Title of the Project
1. Implementing agency
2. Nature and Objective
3. Importance and Justification
4. Total expenditure and year-wise expenditure
5. Activities wise estimated expenditure
  - a) Land
  - b) Labour
  - c) Materials ( brick, cement, steel, etc.)
  - d) Transport
  - e) Land development
  - f) Others
6. Implementation Team
  - a) Date of Starting
  - b) Date of completion
7. Selected site of the project
8. Sources of project financing
  - a) Government
  - b) Local contribution
  - c) others
9. Methods of Project implementation: Tender/Project Implementation Committee
10. Nature of manpower: a) skilled b) Unskilled
11. Project benefits generated after completion of the project
12. Maintenance of arrangements
  - a) Employees required annually and their training
  - b) Annual requirements of goods and tools for maintaining
  - c) Annual recurring cost
13. Description of similar of project being implemented by national government or regional agencies at the Upazila
14. Necessity of undertaking other complementary projects by the national government and Upazila Parishad in order to derive full benefits of the proposed project.
15. Measures taken to acquire land if it is necessary for the project.
16. Expected outcome/benefits as a result of the project implementation
  - a) In terms of money
  - b) In terms of employment
  - c) In terms of socio-economic welfare
  - d) Cost benefit ratio
17. How project idea generated
18. Whether any pre feasibility survey/study conducted before taking the project

Appendix 5.1: Nature of Projects Implemented Across the Unions of Adarsha Sadar  
Upazila, 2008-09 - 2012-13

a) In 2008-09

Nature of project	Name of UP						Total
	Kalirba zar	Durga pur (North)	Durga pur (South)	Amra tholi	Panch tobi	Jagana thpur	
Construction of irrigation channel				3			3
Putting bricks on earthen road	1	1	4	1		4	11
Construction of bridge and culvert	5					3	8
Construction guide/returning wall along road		1		3	2	2	8
Construction of road side drain	1		2		1		4
Repair of upazila office						1	1
Construction of sanitary latrine and toilet	1	1	1	2	1	1	7
Supply furnitures to educational institutes			1		1		2
Supply sports materials to educational institutes					1		1
Procurement of stationeries for office						1	1
Printing birth certificate	1			1			2
Installation of RCC pipe in road		1	1	2	1		5
	9	4	9	12	7	12	53

b) In 2009-10

Nature of project	Name of UP						Total
	Kalirba zar	Durgap ur (North)	Durgapur (South)	Amrath oli	Pancht obi	Jaganat hpur	
Construction of irrigation channel	2	1		1		4	8
Putting bricks on earthen road	3	3	4	11	3	11	35
Construction of bridge and culvert	11	1		3		1	16
Construction guide/returning wall along road	3	4	1	3	6		17
Construction of road side drain		1	5	2	2		10
Construction of sanitary latrine and toilet				1		3	4
Installation of tubewell for drinking water					1		1
Supply furnitures to educational institutes				2			2
Purchase stationaries for office						1	1
Printing birth certificate	1						1
Installation of RCC pipe in road	1						1
Construction of boundary wall along graveyard	1						1
Repair of drain of side road			1	4	1		6
Total	22	10	11	27	13	20	103

c) In 2010-11

Nature of project	Name of UP							Total
	Kalirbarzar	Durgapur (North)	Durgapur (South)	Amratholi	Panchtobi	Jaganathpur	Whole upazila	
Construction of irrigation channel					1	2		3
Development of small and cottage industry							1	1
Putting bricks on earthen road	5	2	1	3	2	5	1	19
Construction of bridge and culvert	3		1	2				6
Construction guide/returning wall along road	1	1		1	2			5
Construction of road side drain			3		1	1		5
Repair of upazila office							1	1
Repair of Upazila residence							2	2
Installation of tubewells for drinking water				1				1
Supply furniture to educational institutes					1		1	2
Supply of musical instruments of education institutes							1	1
Procurement of stationeries for office							1	1
Total	9	3	5	7	7	8	8	47

d) In 2011-12

Nature of project	Name of UP							Total
	Kalirbarzar	Durgapur (North)	Durgapur (South)	Amratholi	Panchtobi	Jaganathpur	Whole upazila	
Construction of irrigation channel	2			2	1	1		6
Construction of concrete road			3		1			4
Putting bricks on earthen road	4	2		2		3		11
Construction of bridge and culvert	1			3	3			7
Construction guide/returning wall along road	1	1	1	3				6
Construction of road side drain	1	1	1	1	2	1		7
Construction of sanitary latrine and toilet		1						1
Installation of tubewells for drinking water		1						1

Supply furnitures to educational institutes				1			1	2
Supply of electric roof fans to education institutes							1	1
Supply of musical instruments to educational institutes							1	1
Supply of sports materials to education institutes							1	1
Construction a library room in school		1						1
Procurement of agricultural equipment							1	1
Purchase stationeries for office							1	1
Total	9	7	5	12	7	5	6	51

e) In 2012-13

Nature of project	Name of UP						Whole Upazila	Total
	Kalirbarzar	Durgapur (North)	Durgapur (South)	Amrathalit	Panchtubi	Jaganathpur		
Construction of irrigation channel	1			1		2		4
Construction of concrete road			2					2
Putting bricks on earthen road	5	4		2	1	1	1	14
Construction of bridge and culvert	3	1			2	1		7
Construction guide/returning wall along road	1	2		2	1			6
Construction of road side drain					1			1
Repair of Upazila residence							1	1
Construction of sanitary latrine and toilet				1	1			2
Installation of tubewells for drinking water				1		2		3
Supply furnitures to educational institutes							1	1
Supply of electric roof fans to education institutes							1	1
Supply of musical instruments to educational institutes							1	1
Supply of sports materials to education institutes							1	1
Supply of sewing machines							1	1
	10	7	2	7	6	5	7	45

Appendix 5.2: Nature of Projects Implemented Across the Unions of Honma Upazila,  
2008-09 - 2012-13

a) In 2008-09

Nature of project	Name of UP										Total
	Ma tab an ga	Ga gut ia	Dula lpur	Chan dech ar	Asad pur	Nilokh i	Vash ania	Gar mora	Joyp ur	Who le Upaz ila	
Construction of irrigation channel	1	1	1	2	1	1			1		8
Construction of bridge and culvert	1			1		1					3
Construction guide/returning wall along road		1	2				2	2			7
Construction of sanitary latrine and toilet	1		2	1	1	1	1		1		8
Installation of tube wells for drinking water		1									1
Supply of musical instruments to educational institutes										1	1
Repair of primary school					1						1
Construction room for educational institute									1		1
Test of arsenic of tube well water										1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>31</b>

b) In 2009-10

Nature of projects	Name of UPs										Total
	Ma tab an ga	Ga gut ia	Dula lpur	Chan dech ar	Asad pur	Nilokh i	Vash ania	Gar mora	Joyp ur	Who le Upa zila	
Irrigation channel	2	2		4	1	1	1	1	1		13
Concrete road construction					1						1
Repair of road			1				1				2
Bridge and culvert		1	1	3		1					6
Guide/returning wall	3	2	3					1	2		11
<b>Ghatla</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>		<b>16</b>
Construction shed in market							1				1
Construction of road side drain						1					1
Repair Upazila residence										2	2
Sanitary latrine and toilet			1			1					2
Tubewell installation	1	3		2			2	1	2		11
Supply furniture to educational institute			1			2		1		1	5
Supply musical instrument to education institute										2	2

Construction of new road		1								1	
Repair of education institute			1							1	
Furniture of Upazila health complex									1	1	
Construction room for educational institute								1		1	
	7	9	9	10	3	7	11	6	9	6	77

c) In 2010-11

Nature of project	Name of UPs									Total
	Matabanga	Gagutia	Dulalpur	Chan-dechar	Asadpur	Nilokhi	Vashania	Gar-mora	Joypur	
Construction of irrigation channel	3	1		2	2			2	2	12
Putting bricks on earthen road	2								1	3
Construction of bridge and culvert		2	3	3	1		1	1		11
Repair of bridge/culvert	1	2				2				5
Construction guide/returning wall along road	1	2	2			1	2	2		10
Construction of shed in market		1					2			3
Construction of road side drain					3					3
Construction of sanitary latrine and toilet		1	1			4	1		2	9
Installation of tube wells for drinking water									1	1
Supply furniture to educational institutes			1			2		1		4
Total	7	9	7	5	6	9	6	6	6	61

d) In 2011-12

Nature of project	Name of UP										Total
	Matabanga	Gagutia	Dulalpur	Chan-dechar	Asadpur	Nilokhi	Vashania	Gar-mora	Joypur	Whole Upazila	
Construction of irrigation channel	1	1		2	1	1	2	1	1		10
Construction of concrete road			1		1		1	1			4
Construction of bridge and culvert		2	1	1			1				5
Construction guide/returning wall along road	1	1	1		1			1			5
Construction of <i>Ghatla</i>	1	1	1			1			2		6
Construction of shed in				1		1			1		3

market												
Construction of road side drain						1						1
Construction of sanitary latrine and toilet	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			9
Installation of tube wells for drinking water									1			1
Supply furniture to educational institutes	1				1		1	1	1			5
Supply of sports materials to education institutes									1			1
Supply sewing machine								1				1
Construction of boundary wall for educational institutes				1								1
Tree plantation	2											2
Construction drain for a housing project for destitute					1							1
Repair of primary school						1						1
Others											1	1
Total	7	6	5	6	6	6	6	6	8	1		57

e) In 2012-13

Nature of project	Name of UP										Total
	Matabang a	Gaguti a	Dulalpur	Chandechar	Asadpur	Nilokhi	Vashania	Garimora	Joypur	Whole Upazila	
Construction of irrigation channel	1	1	1	1	1		1	1			7
Construction of concrete road		1						1			2
Putting bricks on earthen road					1						1
Repair of road		1					1				2
Construction of bridge and culvert									1	1	2
Construction guide/returning wall along road	1					2		1			4
Construction of <i>Ghatla</i>	1		1	1		1		1	1		6
Construction of shed in market			1	1	1						3
Repair of upzila office										1	1
Construction sanitary latrine and toilet	1	1	1	1		1				1	6
Installation of tube wells for drinking water							1				1
Procurement of instrument for										1	1

testing poison of fish											
Supply furniture to educational institutes	1		1	1				1	1	1	6
Social welfare (distribute blankets among poor)										1	1
Digitization of birth registration information										1	1
Construction of new road					1						1
Total	5	4	5	5	4	4	3	5	3	7	45



Appendix 5.3: Distribution of ADP-projects Across the Unions of Adarsha Sadar Upazila  
In Terms of Project Cost, 2008-09 - 2012-13

a) In 2008 - 09

Project Cost (Tk.)	Name of UP						Total
	Kalirbazar	Durgapur (North)	Durgapur (South)	Amratholi	Panchtobi	Jaganathpur	
9140						1	1
10000			1				1
14650	1						1
15000	1		1	2	1	1	6
15122				1			1
19500			1				1
21668				1			1
23215	1						1
23231	1						1
24596			1				1
25000			2	5			7
30000			1		1	7	9
31500			1				1
35000						1	1
36481	1						1
37000		1					1
39800				1			1
40000	2		1		1		4
43028	1						1
50000				2	1		3
70000		3			1		4
75000	1				2	1	4
396252						1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>53</b>

b) In 2009-10

Project Cost (Tk.)	Name of UP						Total
	Kalirbazar	Durgapur (North)	Durgapur (South)	Amratholi	Panchtobi	Jaganathpur	
7382				1			1
10000	1						1
12655				1			1
15000				1			1
17000				1			1
20000				9			9
20900	1						1
21000						1	1
25000	1			3			4
27618				1			1
30000	2			2	1		5
35000	5			1		4	10
36000			1				1
38632				1			1
40000	4	1	2			9	16

40583						1	1
45000	3				1		4
50000	3		2	1			6
54000					1		1
55000				4			4
60000						1	1
65000	1				1		2
70000			4		2	1	7
70583						2	2
75000	1	9	2	1	7	1	21
Total	22	10	11	27	13	20	103

c) In 2010-11

Project Cost (Tk.)	Name of UP						Whole upazila	Total
	Kalirbazar	Durgapur (North)	Durgapur (South)	Amratholi	Panchtobi	Jaganathpur		
7500					1			1
24900							1	1
37986	1							1
43427	1							1
49994			1					1
73750						1		1
73802						1		1
73833						1		1
73912							1	1
73913						1		1
74948						1		1
89915			1					1
92273				1				1
93724	1							1
95503	1							1
96495				1				1
97949				1				1
99643					1			1
100000	3	2	2	3	3	3		16
106746	1							1
115242				1				1
124494					1			1
191591	1							1
197542					1			1
221286			1					1
299440							1	1
400000		1						1
499450							1	1
500000							1	1
555376							1	1
594041							1	1
1135674							1	1
	9	3	5	7	7	8	8	47

d) In 2011-12

Project Cost (Tk.)	Name of UP						Whole upazila	Total
	Kalirbazar	Durgapur (North)	Durgapur (South)	Amratholi	Panchtobi	Jaganathpur		
31850							1	1
52645				1				1
52843	1							1
63711	1							1
66553					1			1
72412					1			1
76961	1							1
78530	1							1
92581		1						1
97857					1			1
99248					1			1
100000	3	3	2	8			1	17
104527						1		1
104750					1			1
104752					1			1
104837		1						1
104957		1						1
105000							1	1
112804	1							1
118009						1		1
124401						1		1
128563						1		1
131045						1		1
160000							1	1
168853			1					1
171794		1						1
175081	1							1
178260			1					1
180168				1				1
191427				1				1
203841			1					1
208979				1				1
209332					1			1
340000							1	1
450000							1	1
	9	7	5	12	7	5	6	51

e) In 2012-13

Project Cost (Tk.)	Name of UP						Whole Upazila	Total
	Kalirbazar	Durgapur (North)	Durgapur (South)	Amrathalit	Panchtubi	Jaganathpur		
35024	3							3
45012						1		1
50000	1							1
50014					1			1
73208	1							1
81666	1							1
90019				1				1

95000	1							1
100000	3	4		4	3	4		18
100002		3						3
120000				1				1
140020				1				1
170003							1	1
200000							1	1
200063					1			1
205004					1			1
250000						1	1	2
300000							2	2
323240			1					1
381097			1					1
500000							1	1
3000000							1	1
	10	7	2	7	6	5	7	45

Appendix 5.4: Distribution of ADP-projects Across the Unions of Homna Upazila In Terms of Project Cost, 2008-09 - 2012-13

a) In 2008-09

Project Cost (Tk.)	Name of UP										Total
	Matabang	Gagutia	Dulapur	Chandechar	Asadpur	Nilokhi	Vashania	Garmora	Joypur	Whole Upazila	
27000	1	1	1			1	1		1		6
29500					1						1
30000			1								1
32000				1							1
36000	1	1	1			1	1				5
40000					1			1			2
44688										1	1
47500			1								1
48312				1							1
50000				1					1		2
57000										1	1
61000				1							1
71000								1			1
75000	1	1	1		1	1	1		1		7
Total	3	3	5	4	3	3	3	2	3	2	31

b) In 2009-10

Project Cost (Tk.)	Name of Union in Homna										Total
	Matabanga	Gagutia	Dulapur	Chandechar	Asadpur	Nilokhi	Vashania	Garmora	Joypur	Whole Upazila	
15000		1									1
20400							1				1
24400		1									1
28000						1					1
30000				1						1	2
35000		1									1
40400			1								1
42000						1					1
45000			1								1
45400			1								1
45800										1	1
47700	1	1		2			2				6
48300		1									1
50000		1	2	1					2		6
52700	1										1

55000	1							1			2
60000							1				1
70000	2		2								4
70400		1									1
72000					1						1
73000			1								1
74000		1									1
75000	2	1	1	6	2	5	7	5	7	1	37
375000										1	1
715073										1	1
783267										1	1
	7	9	9	10	3	7	11	6	9	6	77

c) In 2010-11

Project Cost (Tk.)	Name of UP									Total
	Matabanga	Gagutia	Dulapur	Chandchar	Asadpur	Nilokhi	Vashania	Garmora	Joypur	
35000		1								1
40000		2					1			3
50000	3	1	1		2	8			2	17
60000		1					1			2
70000		1	3							4
75000	2	1						4	1	8
80000			3							3
100000	2	2		5	4	1	4	2	2	22
125000									1	1
Total	7	9	7	5	6	9	6	6	6	61

d) In 2011-12

Project Cost (Tk.)	Name of UP										Total
	Matabanga	Gagutia	Dulapur	Chandchar	Asadpur	Nilokhi	Vashania	Garmora	Joypur	Whole Upazila	
50000	1	1			1		2	1	4		10
60000						1					1
70000	1			1	1						3
80000	2	2			1	1					6
90000				2		2		1			5
100000	3	3	5	2	3	1	4	4	3		28
120000				1							1
180000						1					1

250000										1		1
1150000											1	1
Total	7	6	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	8	1	57

d) In 2012-13

Project cost	Name of UP										Total
	Matabanga	Gagutia	Dulapur	Chandchar	Asadpur	Nilokhi	Vashania	Garmora	Joypur	Whole Upazila	
50000	1	1	1	1	1			1			6
80000										1	1
100000	4	2	4	4	2	3	2	4	2		27
130000										2	2
150000					1	1				1	3
185000										1	1
200000		1									1
250000							1				1
335000										1	1
350000										1	1
800000									1		1
Total	5	4	5	5	4	4	3	5	3	7	45